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Summary
Changing consumption patterns and a growing world population have resulted in
an increased demand for vegetable oil. Due to its price advantages and suitable
chemical properties, in particular the demand for palm oil has increased making
it globally the most widely used vegetable oil in 2019. Palm oil production is
geographically highly concentrated in Indonesia and Malaysia that alone provide
over 85% of the global supply. These countries also harbor important parts of
moist tropical forests which are one of the world’s most biodiverse ecosystems and
global carbon sinks. While the area under oil palm cultivation has been growing
continuously in the last decades, the area under rainforest has declined. Part of
this decline can be directly attributed to oil palm expansion.
Oil palm induced land use changes are associated with environmental degrada-
tion. The repercussions are not restricted to the regional or local scale through
e.g. a distortion of water and microclimate regulating services, but have global
consequences such as biodiversity loss and carbon emissions. Yet, oil palm expan-
sion has contributed to poverty reduction and income growth for many smallholder
farmers. The contrast between negative environmental consequences and positive
welfare effects highlights the trade-offs associated with oil palm expansion. The
present dissertation aims at identifying policies and oil palm management practices
that could mitigate these trade-offs.
This thesis comprises three essays. The first two essays focus on policies aiming
at biodiversity restoration in oil palm dominated areas. The last essay explores
management practices to close yield gaps and to increase soil organic carbon (SOC)
in smallholdings. All essays area based on primary data collected from oil palm
smallholder farmers in Jambi Province, Indonesia. Jambi Province is one of the
hotspots of oil palm expansion and has experienced tremendous land use changes.
The planting of native trees inside or at the border of the plantation has been
suggested as one way to increase biodiversity in oil palm plantations. However,
little evidence exists on which policy instruments are effective to promote native
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tree planting in oil palm plantations. The first essay of this dissertation addresses
this research gap. The agroforestry adoption literature and focus group discussions
suggest that missing information and restricted access to seedling markets represent
constraints to tree planting. In case these constraints are binding, providing farmers
with access to seedlings and information should increase tree planting adoption. To
test this hypothesis, a randomized controlled trial was implemented in 2016 and
two interventions were designed. The first provided information on tree planting
and management through a manual and a video. The second combined information
with input provision. In addition to the video and the manual, farmers received six
native tree seedlings for free.
We estimate intention-to-treat effects on farmers’ tree planting decision in oil
palm plantations with a double-hurdle model. Both interventions significantly in-
crease the number of trees planted per hectare in oil palm plantations in comparison
to the control group. Under both interventions, a small share of farmers plant many
trees in their plantations. However, free seedling provision in addition motivates
many farmers to adopt low intensity tree planting. We also analyze tree survival
rates. We find that farm-level tree survival is significantly lower for the farmers
who received seedlings for free than for the adopting farmers in the control group
and for those only receiving information. Non-correspondence between farmers’
preferences and the seedlings received can be identified as one driver.
The effective support of ecosystem services operating at larger scales requires to
take on a landscape-level perspective. For biodiversity conservation and the support
of related ecosystem services, there is evidence that a critical size of conservation
area at the landscape level and its spatial connectivity are of importance. The second
essay of this dissertation looks into how payments for ecosystem services (PES)
schemes for tree planting need to be designed in order to meet these requirements.
PES are compensation mechanisms through which providers of ecosystem
services, e.g. farmers putting their land under conservation, are compensated for
the resulting costs by the respective beneficiaries. The experimental literature
has suggested separate design options to reach a critical size of conservation area,
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and to improve its spatial connectivity. However, evidence is missing on how to
simultaneously meet both requirements. To close this research gap, we implemented
a framed field experiment in 2018. In a hypothetical scenario, farmers needed to
decide whether to keep their land under oil palm cultivation or to switch to a mixed
system that integrates other trees. While oil palm cultivation is linked to higher
income, the mixed system increases biodiversity. To mirror the landscape-level
requirements, biodiversity is only improved if a critical number of farmers plant
the mixed system. Moreover, effects are higher if mixed systems are grown on
bordering land. To explore the effects of potential PES designs, we analyze two
incentive schemes. In the first one, the area threshold, farmers who plant the mixed
system are compensated if at least three out of six farmers in a group do so. In the
second one, an agglomeration payment, adopting farmers receive compensation if
at least three farmers in the group plant the mixed system on bordering land. Our
results show that both PES designs increase the likelihood that farmers plant the
mixed system in comparison to a baseline scenario without compensation payments.
However, once communication is allowed for, the area threshold outperforms the
agglomeration payment with regard to environmental effectiveness and overall
efficiency, while reaching similar levels of budget efficiency.
Tree planting can also support climate regulating functions by absorbing and
storing carbon dioxide. Soil organic carbon (SOC) restoration represents another
approach to improve the carbon sequestration in oil palm plantations. In addition,
it might strengthen the provision of yield supporting soil ecosystem services. In-
creasing SOC can be achieved by adding organic material, e.g. through mulching
with empty fruit bunches (EFB). EFB remain after the oil fruits have been stripped
off in the palm oil mills. EFB are rich in nutrients and can be used as organic
fertilizer. This can help to increase smallholders’ yields that mostly lie below those
of industrial plantations.
Several studies have indicated that mulching can be beneficial to soil carbon
and yields. However, evidence is mostly derived from field-trial experimental data
in industrial plantations. These trials might not reflect the real-world conditions of
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smallholder farmers. This motivates the third essay in which we look at the effects
of EFB mulching on SOC contents and yields in oil palm smallholdings. Based on
yearly data covering the years 2015 to 2017, we estimate the effect of mulching on
yields with a random effects panel data model. Since the adoption to apply mulching
might be endogenous, we employ an instrumental variable estimation. Based on
soil samples collected in 2017, we analyze the effect of mulching on SOC. Finally,
we look into the impact channels and analyze whether and to what extent the
effect of mulching on yields operates through SOC increases. Our results support a
positive effect of mulching on SOC contents and yields. However, SOC contents do
not appear to be a significant predictor for yields. The effect of mulching on yields
therefore likely operates through other channels such as direct nutrient addition.
This dissertation suggests that policies and management practices could help to
mitigate environmental-economic trade-offs involved in oil palm cultivation. In case
of soil organic carbon restoration, environmental improvements and income genera-
tion might be complements. Our results further indicate that biodiversity-friendly
farming practices can be promoted with non-monetary interventions. However,
to reach a larger share of the population, subsidized inputs or even monetary
incentives might be needed.
iv
Acknowledgement
First of all, I would like express my gratitude towards my supervisor Prof. Meike
Wollni. Thank you for all your support throughout this time! I have learned a
lot from your feedback and our personal discussions. Your openness to new ideas
and the very respectful working atmosphere have contributed to large parts that I
could not only improve my scientific skills during the PhD time, but also enjoyed
most of this time. I would also like to thank Prof. Bernhard Brümmer and Prof.
Matin Qaim for joining my thesis committee and Prof. Brümmer for the feedback
on my second paper.
I had the chance to write my PhD thesis as part of the CRC 990 EFForTS and
spent several months in Indonesia for data collection. I would like to acknowledge
the DFG for funding the field work. The data collection would have not been
feasible without the help of many persons in Indonesia. A big, big thanks goes to
Mega, Rizki, Yuking and Fahrozi! Thank you for your help with all personal and
professional problems in Jambi. My deepest thanks goes to all of the assistants
who helped me during the data collection. I am grateful to you, Winda, Dattita,
Shara, Yanti, Tuti, Rizki, Tina, Yohana, Anto, Ardo, Wila, Juwita, Khoti, Ayu,
Andita, Zaki, Tito, April, Dena, Monica, Lia, and Christian. I am aware that
working conditions in the field were not always easy. I really acknowledge what you
have achieved and I wish you all the best for your future and hope that you can
realize your dreams and wishes. I would also like to express my gratitude to all the
farmers who participated in the surveys and the experiments. Thank you for your
patience and for taking the time to respond (several times) to all of our questions!
My gratitude goes to the villagers and the village administrative staff of the villages
Ramin, Seponjen, Mekar Sari, Markanding, Sumber Mulya, Mentawak Baru,
Mentawak Ulu, Bukit Suban, Pintas Tua, Sungai Jernih, Bangun Seranten, Lubuk
Mandarsah, Punti Kalo, Tuo Sumay, Bukit Harapan, Kehidupan Baru, Karya
Mukti, Belanti Jaya, Tapah Sari, Tri Mulia Jaya, Lembah Kuamang, Mingkung
Jaya, Bukit Kemuning, Tirta Mulya, Pulau Betung, Sungai Puar, Talang Datar,
v
Suka Maju and Matra Manunggal in Jambi! Your hospitality really impressed me!
Toni, thanks for joining me during the second field trip! It was a great relief,
both personally and professionally, to have somebody with me whom I can trust
and who took over part of the responsibility.
From the CRC, I would in particular like to acknowledge the C07 and the C02
team for their readiness to help and to share data and experiences! Thank you,
Nina, for coming up with the idea of an interdisciplinary project and for introducing
me to the world of soil science. A big thanks to you, Peter, for answering all my
statistical questions.
Finishing this PhD would have not been feasible with all the amazing colleagues
and friends from the chair and the department (and the substantial overlap between
both) here in Göttingen. First, I would like to thank the "Laufen, Yes we can"
group, Andrea, Denise, Hanna, Kathrin and Lisa. Even though most of you were
only physically present in the beginning, you really shaped this PhD time! You,
Denise, are the only one who accompanied this PhD from the beginning till the
very end. I am really grateful for experiencing all the ups and downs of these
four years together with you and for all your personal and professional help, in
particular in the last six months! My dear Miri, thank you so much for all your
care during our shared time in Jambi and in the office! I really admire your energy!
A big thanks to Marcello, Karina and Jessie for proofreading parts of this thesis
and to Jessie for always having an open ear for my English related and all other
problems.
To my friends outside of Göttingen and in particular to Charli, Laura, Anne
and Sara(h): thanks for all the support throughout this time! Knowing that I can
always count on you means a lot to me.
Final möchte ich meiner Familie danken, meinen Eltern, meinem Bruder und
Sarah. Vielen Dank für Eure ganze Unterstützung in dieser Zeit! Mama, Papa,
ich bin zutiefst dankbar für Euer Vertrauen und dafür, dass Ihr mich meinen Weg
ohne großes Hinterfragen habt gehen lassen. Die Gewissheit, zuhause einen Ort zu







1.1 Oil palm expansion and its consequences in Indonesia . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Policies and management practices to improve the sustainability of
oil palm cultivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Research objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Study area and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5 Outline of dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Effects of information and seedling provision on tree planting
and survival in smallholder oil palm plantations 15
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Study design, data and estimation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.1 Study area and sampling strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.2 Randomization approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.3 Description and implementation of treatments . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.4 Econometric specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.1 Adoption decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.2 Subgroup-specific treatment effects by seed access constraint 34
vii
Contents
2.3.3 Does free seedling delivery discourage tree planting beyond
what is given for free? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.4 Cost effectiveness considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.5 Tree survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Achieving a suitable landscape pattern for biodiversity conser-
vation through payments for ecosystem services - Evidence from
Indonesia 61
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Oil palm expansion in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3 The conservation game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3.1 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3.2 Theoretical predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.3 Case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.4 Experimental setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.4.1 Socio-economic characteristics of the sample . . . . . . . . . 76
3.4.2 Group-level results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4.3 Individual contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4 The effect of soil conservation practices on yields and soil carbon
in smallholder oil palm plantations 114
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.2 Characteristics of empty fruit bunch mulching . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3 Study region, sampling procedure and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.3.1 Study region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.3.2 Plot selection and soil sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
viii
Contents
4.3.3 Socio-economic data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.4 Conceptual model and estimation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.4.1 Reduced form estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.4.2 Pathway analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.5.1 Descriptives and constraints to adoption . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.5.2 Reduced form effects of mulching on yields . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.5.3 Pathway analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5 Conclusion 157
5.1 Main findings and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.2 Limitations and scope for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.3 Sustainability and policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
References 166
A General Appendix 186
A.1 Appendix Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187




2.1 Baseline descriptives and mean comparison tests . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Descriptives of outcome variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Intention-to-treat estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Intention-to-treat estimates with distribution winsorized at 99
percentile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Heterogeneous Treatment effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6 Intention-to-treat estimates for planting of self-procured tree seedlings
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 Total costs and outcomes of interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.8 Cost effectiveness measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.9 Descriptives of farm-level survival rates (adopters only) . . . . . . 39
2.10 Difference in tree survival rates between different treatment groups 40
2.11 Potential determinants of tree survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.12 Mean comparison test of significant predictors for tree survival . . 42
A2.1 Intention-to-treat estimates for adoption decision . . . . . . . . . . 48
A2.2 Intention-to-treat estimates for intensity decision . . . . . . . . . . 49
A2.3 Intention-to-treat effects on the unconditional predicted number
of trees planted per hectare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A2.4 Bootstrap-t confidence intervals for treatment groups . . . . . . . 51
A2.5 Heckman selection model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A2.6 Weighted Intention-to-treat estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A2.7 Determinants of selection in follow-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A2.8 Bounds estimation for Intention-to-treat estimates . . . . . . . . . 55
A2.9 Fractional probit estimation for tree survival . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
x
List of Tables
A2.10 Descriptives of other explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A2.11 Definition of explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.1 Experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3 Group-level descriptives for environmental effectiveness and its
drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.4 Efficiency, income and cost measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5 Effects of two PES designs on farmers’ conservation decision . . . 88
3.6 Effects of three payment levels on farmers’ conservation decision . 90
3.7 Subgroup-specific effects of the two PES designs on farmers’ con-
servation decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A3.1 Number of groups assigned to different PES designs and payment
levels (rounds 6-20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A3.2 Explanation of specific explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A3.3 Mean comparison tests between PES designs . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A3.4 Mean comparison tests between payment levels . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A3.5 P-values of comparison tests for environmental effectiveness outcomes103
A3.6 P-values of comparison tests for efficiency outcomes . . . . . . . . 104
A3.7 Group-level descriptives for environmental effectiveness and its
drivers (combined PES-schemes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A3.8 Effects of two PES designs on farmers’ conservation decision (full
tables) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A3.9 Effects of three payment levels on farmers’ conservation decision
(full tables) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
A3.10 Effects of six PES-schemes on farmer’s conservation probability . . 111
4.1 Socio-econonomic and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.2 Descriptives of EFB mulching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.3 Instrumental variable estimation of the effect of mulching on yields 133
4.4 Random effects panel data results of mulching on yields . . . . . . 135
xi
List of Tables
4.5 Pathway analysis of the effect of mulching on yields . . . . . . . . 136
4.6 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
A4.1 Effect of mulching on yields (2015-16 data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
A4.2 Robustness checks for reduced form results of mulching on yields . 146
A4.3 Explanation of selected variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
A4.4 First stage results (instrument strategy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
A4.5 Effect of mulching on yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
A4.6 Pathway analysis of the effect of mulching on yields . . . . . . . . 152
A4.7 First stage regression results (pathway analysis) . . . . . . . . . . 154
A4.8 OLS estimation of the direct mulching effect . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
A4.9 Mean difference tests between EFB farmers and external control




1.1 Location of Jambi in Indonesia (left) and location of villages in
Jambi (right) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 Location of treatment and control villages in Jambi . . . . . . . . 21
A2.1 Distribution of strictly positive tree planting quantities . . . . . . 47
3.1 Spatial arrangement of six participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2 Location of villages for framed field experiment in Jambi . . . . . 74
3.3 Average environmental effects generated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4 Average share of farmers who conserve (participation) . . . . . . . 79
3.5 Average environmental effects generated per conserving farmer
(coordination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
A3.1 Example of poster used for explanation of experiment . . . . . . . 99
A3.2 Average budget efficiency (all groups) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.1 Location of villages with soil samples in Jambi . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.2 Soil sampling strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121






1.1 Oil palm expansion and its consequences in
Indonesia
Global demand for vegetable oil has been constantly rising in the last decades
(OECD & FAO, 2019). Population growth, changing consumption patterns and
increases in biofuel consumption can be identified as main drivers (OECD & FAO,
2019). Palm oil is the most widely consumed vegetable oil accounting for around
35% of the global demand (OECD & FAO, 2019; Teoh, 2010). Reasons for its strong
marketability are inter alia its suitable chemical properties, its long shelf-life as well
as cost advantages in comparison to competitor oil crops due to low post-planting
requirements for land, labor and other production inputs (Sheil, 2009; The World
Bank & IFC, 2011). As a consequence, palm oil is used as ingredient in a multitude
of different products, covering food, cosmetic, and pharmaceutical goods among
others (Vijay, Pimm, Jenkins, & Smith, 2016).
Between 1980 and 2018, global palm oil production has increased by an estimated
1,300% (FAO, 2019). Due to the climatic requirements of the African oil palm
(Elaeis guineensis Jacq), the production area is located in the tropics (Corley &
Tinker, 2016). While oil palm is cultivated in 43 countries (Vijay et al., 2016), its
production is highly concentrated in two countries: Indonesia, the biggest producing
country since 2008, and Malaysia, which alone produce 87% of the global supply
(Austin et al., 2017; Rist, Feintrenie, & Levang, 2010). However, in the last decade,
production has also increased in South America, West Africa and other countries
in South-East Asia (Foster et al., 2011; Vijay et al., 2016) suggesting a further
global expansion.
The increase in palm oil production has led to important land use changes in
the producing countries. In Indonesia, the area under oil palm cultivation has
increased by 50% over the last 10 years (Bou Dib, Krishna, Alamsyah, & Qaim,
2018) reaching 6,777,498 ha in 2018 (FAO, 2019). At the same time, primary
forest cover has declined, in particular in Sumatra and Kalimantan, which are
the main oil palm producing areas in Indonesia (Carlson et al., 2013; Margono,
Potapov, Turubanova, Stolle, & Hansen, 2014; Margono et al., 2012). While not all
oil palm expansion happened on forest area, it represents one of the main drivers
of deforestation in Indonesia. Estimates suggest that between 31% and 54% of the
established plantations replaced primary or secondary forest in the 1990s and 2000s
(Austin et al., 2017; Vijay et al., 2016). Oil palm-induced deforestation has slowed
down in Kalimantan and Sumatra since 2005 (Austin et al., 2017). Notwithstanding,
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increasing deforestation rates have been reported for newly emerging production
areas such as Papua, threatening the regionally still existing primary rainforest
(Austin et al., 2017).
Moist tropical forests that can be found in palm oil production areas are among
the most biodiverse ecosystems on Earth (Fitzherbert et al., 2008). In particular, the
islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan are considered a biodiversity hotspot. Notably,
5% of all global endemic plants and 2.6% of all global vertebrates identified can be
found in the region (Myers, Mittermeier, Mittermeier, da Fonseca, & Kent, 2000).
Many of these species are specialists and (partially) depending on forest cover for
survival (Fitzherbert et al., 2008). Oil palm plantations are characterized by a
reduced plant diversity and architectural complexity, and a changed microclimate
in comparison to forests (Foster et al., 2011). Consequently, the conversion of forest
area into oil palm plantations is associated with reduced species diversity for a wide
range of taxa, including butterflies (Koh & Wilcove, 2008), plants (Drescher et al.,
2016), birds and insects (Clough et al., 2016). Estimates suggest that on average
across all taxa, only around 15% of all species found in forests are also present in
oil palm plantations and in particular species with high conservation concerns are
absent (Fitzherbert et al., 2008). In combination with the high endemism in the
region, this highlights the consequences of oil palm expansion for global biodiversity
loss.
Besides biodiversity loss, carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions induced
by oil palm expansion represent global environmental threats due to their potential
effect on global warming. Most carbon is released as a consequence of forest
clearing due to fires (Carlson et al., 2013; Fargione, Hill, Tilman, Polasky, &
Hawthorne, 2008), the draining of peat land (Koh, Miettinen, Liew, & Ghazoul,
2011; Murdiyarso, Hergoualc’h, & Verchot, 2010) as well as the general removal of
(the carbon stored in) above ground biomass (Guillaume et al., 2018). However, the
loss of below ground biomass (Kotowska, Leuschner, Triadiati, Meriem, & Hertel,
2015), as well as a reduction in soil carbon due to e.g. erosion (Guillaume, Damris,
& Kuzyakov, 2015; van Straaten et al., 2015) also contribute to these emissions.
While both biodiversity loss and carbon emissions represent global environmental
problems, some environmental consequences are mostly felt locally through e.g. soil
degradation and reduced water and microclimate regulation services (Dislich et al.,
2017; Merten et al., 2016).
In contrast to its negative effects on the local and global environment, oil palm
expansion has broadly contributed to income growth and improved welfare for
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the local population (Euler, Krishna, Schwarze, Siregar, & Qaim, 2017; Feintrenie,
Chong, & Levang, 2010; Kubitza, Krishna, Alamsyah, & Qaim, 2018; Rist et al.,
2010). In 2018, the sector contributed to around 3.3% of Indonesian GDP (Badan
Pusat Statistik, 2019) and offered direct and indirect employment opportunities
for estimated 4.3 million and 12 million individuals, respectively (Jelsma, Woittiez,
Ollivier, & Dharmawan, 2019). Positive welfare effects are in particular due to
the strong involvement of smallholder farmers who produced around 40% of the
national crude palm oil in 2018 (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2019).
However, welfare gains are not evenly distributed in the population. Con-
tractual arrangements with companies and formal land titles could be, among
others, identified as welfare determinants (Euler, Hoffmann, Fathoni, & Schwarze,
2016; Gatto, Wollni, Asnawi, & Qaim, 2017). As a consequence, in the early oil
palm producing areas in Indonesia where oil palm cultivation was promoted by
government supported migration schemes, in particular migrant farmers from Java
have benefited (McCarthy, 2010). Better access to extension services and land
titles explain their often privileged position in comparison to local farmers (Gatto
et al., 2017; McCarthy, 2010). Local farmers in contrast are often excluded from
oil palm adoption due to knowledge barriers and restricted access to credit mar-
kets (Obidzinski, Andriani, Komarudin, & Andrianto, 2012) resulting in increased
inequality between adopting and non-adopting farmers (Bou Dib, Alamsyah, &
Qaim, 2018; McCarthy, 2010). Besides potential conflicts between different types
of smallholder farmers, the involvement of large industrial plantations has received
considerable criticism in the literature because of land conflicts with the local
population and precarious working conditions for laborers (Feintrenie, Chong, &
Levang, 2010; Obidzinski et al., 2012; Rist et al., 2010).
These examples indicate that oil palm expansion has had major environmental,
economic and social consequences in Indonesia and thus affected all three dimensions
of sustainability (United Nations, 2012). Mostly relevant for this dissertation are
the economic and environmental dimensions. For the economic dimension, positive
effects can be identified for large shares of oil palm farmers as oil palm expansion has
contributed to income growth and poverty reduction. In contrast, the environmental
dimension has been negatively affected because of species loss, soil degradation and
carbon emissions. The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the identification
of policy and management options that could reduce these economic-ecological
trade-offs. Besides being relevant for the oil palm specific context, the results of this
thesis potentially can help to inform policies to mitigate environmental problems
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associated with the expansion of other cash crops.
1.2 Policies and management practices to improve
the sustainability of oil palm cultivation
In order to reduce oil palm related environmental problems, two approaches can
be adopted. The first focuses on policies to reduce land expansion and stop
deforestation (Phalan, Fitzherbert, Rafflegeau, Struebig, & Verwilghen, 2009). The
second tries to improve the environmental performance of oil palm plantations
(Foster et al., 2011; Koh, Levang, & Ghazoul, 2009). While both approaches should
be jointly considered, the second might be particularly promising in high production
areas, where land use change is already advanced and little forest area remains.
This is the case for many early oil palm production areas in Indonesia (Austin et
al., 2017).
To inform policies in high production areas, the present dissertation explores oil
palm management practices that can mitigate environmental-economic trade-offs.
In addition, it tries to identify policies to promote their adoption and to enhance the
environmental and/or economic outcomes. From an environmental perspective, the
focus is on policies and management practices aiming at biodiversity and soil carbon
restoration. These could mitigate global environmental problems associated with
oil palm cultivation, but also improve the farming conditions of the local population
through increased pest control or improved yield supporting soil ecosystem services.
The following section will introduce two management practices that could reduce
related trade-offs.
Planting native trees inside or along the border of oil palm plantations has
been proposed as one way to increase biodiversity in oil palm plantations (Koh &
Wilcove, 2007; Miccolis, Robiglio, Cornelius, Blare, & Castellani, 2019; Teuscher et
al., 2016). Mixed oil palm systems harbor a greater species richness and abundance
than monoculture systems (Ashraf et al., 2018; Syafiq et al., 2016; Teuscher et
al., 2015; Yahya et al., 2017). Although the risk of negative effects on oil palm
yields exists, already low planting intensities - with potentially little competition
between palms and trees for nutrients, water and light - potentially can increase
bird abundance and diversity (Teuscher et al., 2015). Moreover, fruits and timber
derived from trees can generate economic returns, add to a healthy nutrition
and diversify income sources (Gérard et al., 2017; Lin, 2011; Tscharntke et al.,
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2012). This suggests that tree planting might be one option to reduce trade-offs
between economic development opportunities for smallholder farmers and negative
biodiversity effects.
Besides supporting biodiversity, trees can absorb and store carbon from the
atmosphere (Goldman, Thompson, & Daily, 2007). Soil organic carbon restoration
represents another way to increase carbon sequestration in oil palm plantations
(Minasny et al., 2017). Since soil organic carbon (SOC) is also linked to many soil
ecosystem services that support crop growth, supporting soil carbon sequestration
might also positively affect yields. This can help to close the yield gaps reported for
smallholder oil palm plantations (Euler et al., 2016; Soliman, Lim, Lee, & Carrasco,
2016; Woittiez, van Wijk, Slingerland, van Noordwijk, & Giller, 2017) with likely
positive effects on smallholders’ income.
The second management practice explored in this dissertation is the mulching
with empty fruit bunches (EFB) (Abu Bakar, Darus, Kulaseharan, & Jamaluddin,
2011; Comte, Colin, Whalen, Grünberger, & Caliman, 2012; Moradi, Teh Boon
Sung, Goh, Husni Mohd Hanif, & Fauziah Ishak, 2015; Tao et al., 2017). EFB
are the bunches which remain after the oil fruits have been stripped off during
processing at the palm oil mills. They are rich in carbon and hence could increase
SOC contents. Moreover, EFB contain several nutrients and can be used as organic
fertilizer. Therefore, EFB mulching represents a management practice likely to
increase smallholders’ yields.
1.3 Research objectives
This dissertation comprises three essays which address two broad research objectives.
First, it investigates whether, and if so which policies can promote the uptake
of tree planting in oil palm plantations as a means for biodiversity restoration.
This research objective is addressed in the first and the second essay that provide
experimental evidence on real (first essay) and hypothetical (second essay) tree
planting adoption. Second, this thesis tries to quantify the ecological and economic
effects of management practices and policies expected to reduce economic-ecological
trade-offs. To this end, the second essay analyzes hypothetical farmers’ income and
landscape-level biodiversity effects generated from tree planting under different
policies. The third essay explores the effects of EFB mulching on yields and SOC
contents in oil palm smallholdings. The following section will present the addressed
research gaps and the essay-specific research objectives.
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The first essay addresses the question of how the adoption of native tree planting
can be promoted among smallholder farmers in Jambi Province, Sumatra. Focus
group discussions and the agroforestry adoption literature (Meijer, Catacutan,
Ajayi, Sileshi, & Nieuwenhuis, 2015; van Noordwijk et al., 2008) indicate that
knowledge and seed access barriers prevent tree planting. Consequently, providing
information and seedlings likely could spur adoption.
Information provision through extension approaches can support the adoption
of technologies aiming at agricultural income improvements (Benyishay & Mobarak,
2018; Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson, 2008; Kondylis, Mueller, & Zhu, 2017; van
Campenhout, Walukano, Nattembo, Nazziwa-Nviiri, & Blom, 2017). Free or
subsidized input provision can spur the uptake of technologies which are easy to
use and do not generate negative side effects (Carter, Laajaj, & Yang, 2013; Dupas,
2014). However, tree planting in oil palm plantations represents a very particular
technology in that it aims at income diversification and especially biodiversity
conservation, a global public good that might be linked to small direct monetary
benefits to the farmers. The public benefits generated can explain the focus of the
literature on monetary incentives as tree planting promoting policies (Jack, 2013;
Jack, Oliva, Severen, Walker, & Bell, 2015; Pagiola et al., 2007). This is despite
potential advantages of non-monetary interventions and in particular extension
approaches in comparison to compensation payments where negative side effects
such as increased inequality and problems of unsecured financing have been reported
(Muradian et al., 2013).
Neither the effects of information dissemination, nor the effects of free input
provision on the adoption of a primarily environmentally motivated agricultural
technology have received a lot of attention in the literature. The few exceptions are
mostly based on cross-sectional data and often lack a clear identification strategy
(e.g. Matata, Ajayi, and Oduol 2010, Meijer et al. 2015 for a review, Ruseva, Evans,
and Fischer 2015, Gregorio, Herbohn, Harrison, and Smith 2015). To the best of
my knowledge, there exists only one experimental paper that looks at information
and subsidized seedling provision on tree planting on private land (Jack et al.,
2015). Yet, the design does not allow to estimate the effects of the interventions
on the number of trees planted. The latter is, however, important to derive more
informed policy conclusions since a positive relationship between the number of
trees in oil palm plantations and biodiversity effects is likely (Teuscher et al., 2015).
Despite its relevance for global biodiversity loss, the specific oil palm context has
so far been neglected in the literature.
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To provide evidence on the effects of information and free seedling provision on
the number of trees planted per hectare in oil palm plots, a randomized controlled
trial (RCT) was implemented. Two interventions were designed: The first provided
only information about tree planting in oil palm plantations, while the second
combined information with free seedling provision. The first essay presents intention-
to-treat effects of the interventions on the number of trees planted per hectare
in oil palm plantations. In addition, it analyzes whether free seedling provision
discourages tree planting beyond what is provided for free by looking at the number
of self-procured trees planted. Finally, heterogeneous treatment effects depending
on the constraints farmers face, cost-effectiveness measures, as well as tree survival
and its potential drivers are explored.
Tree planting might generate positive biodiversity effects at the local plantation
level. For an efficient up-scaling from the local to the regional level, it is important
to take into consideration landscape-level requirements for biodiversity conservation.
These comprise both the composition of the landscape, i.e. the proportion of different
habitat types, and its configuration, i.e. the spatial arrangement of the different
land-uses (Goldman et al., 2007; Liere, Jha, & Philpott, 2017).
The effects of landscape composition, as measured by the area size under
natural or semi-natural habitat, on species diversity are likely characterized by
non-linearities and threshold (Kupsch et al., 2019; Martensen, Ribeiro, Banks-Leite,
Prado, & Metzger, 2012; Ochoa-Quintero, Gardner, Rosa, Ferraz, & Sutherland,
2015; Tscharntke, Batáry, & Dormann, 2011). If the area falls below these thresholds,
species diversity might decline abruptly and the risk of species extinction might arise
(Fahrig, 2003; Pardini, Bueno, Gardner, Prado, & Metzger, 2010). The configuration
of a landscape measures inter alia how well natural or restored patches are connected.
Connectivity between habitat is important for species exchange between different
patches (Holzschuh, Steffan-Dewenter, & Tscharntke, 2010). Moreover, conserved
or restored areas might serve as corridors which could link remaining forest patches
and facilitate movements of forest dependent species (Gilbert-Norton, Wilson,
Stevens, & Beard, 2010; Höbinger, Schindler, Seaman, Wrbka, & Weissenhofer,
2012; Koh et al., 2009). A suitable landscape for conservation of a broad range of
species is thus likely characterized by a critical size of conservation area that is
further spatially connected. The question of how policies need to be designed to
create such landscape patterns is the topic of the second essay.
The second essay looks at financial compensation mechanisms to promote tree
planting adoption. Tree planting in this essay entails larger scale conversion of
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plantations into mixed oil palm-tree systems and the cutting of parts of the planta-
tions. This likely leads to considerable income reductions for farmers motivating
the analysis of financial compensation mechanisms such as payments for ecosystem
services (PES) schemes. PES are voluntary, often financial, transactions between
beneficiaries and providers of ecosystem services that are conditional on agreed
rules of natural resource management and aim at providing environmental benefits
(Wunder, 2015). To increase their environmental effectiveness, PES schemes should
be designed to meet the landscape level requirements for biodiversity conservation.
In order to generate an environmentally relevant conservation area size, some
authors have suggested to make compensation mechanisms subject to reaching the
required area at a predefined scale (Cadsby & Maynes, 1999; Le Coent, Preget, &
Thoyer, 2014; Midler, Pascual, Drucker, Narloch, & Soto, 2015; Narloch, Pascual,
& Drucker, 2012). Others have analyzed options to increase the spatial connectivity
between conserved plots, either by offering bonus payments if bordering land is put
under conservation (Banerjee, 2018; Parkhurst & Shogren, 2007; Parkhurst et al.,
2002) or by making the spatial connectivity of the conserved areas a prerequisite for
compensation (Wätzold & Drechsler, 2014). However, both aspects have only been
analyzed separately yet. Most studies analyzing PES design options are based on
laboratory or framed field experiments, whose results are highly dependent on the
scenario created within the experiment. Therefore, an extrapolation of which design
options are most suited to reach both critical area thresholds and an increased
connectivity between conserved plots is difficult. Moreover, experimental evidence
on the effectiveness of bonus payments is almost entirely based on laboratory
experiments conducted with students (e.g. Banerjee 2018; Banerjee, Cason, de
Vries, and Hanley 2017). Evidence is therefore needed on whether these policy
instruments are also promising when real decision makers make (hypothetical) land
use decisions outside the fully controlled laboratory environment.
To close this research gap, I implemented a framed field experiment with oil palm
smallholders. In the experiment, farmers needed to decide whether to maintain
their oil palm plantation or whether to switch to a mixed system in which around
40% of the oil palms have been cut and replaced with native trees. Because of
the positive effects of trees on bird and other pollinator diversity (see above), the
planting of native trees generates biodiversity effects. These effects are represented
as donations to an environmental NGO (e.g. Ibanez, Moureau, and Roussel 2017;
Kuhfuss, Hanley, Preget, Thoyer, and de Vries 2017). Drawing on evidence from
forest, other semi-natural or restored areas (Gilbert-Norton et al., 2010; Hass et
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al., 2018; Ochoa-Quintero et al., 2015; Tscharntke et al., 2011) and on evidence of
positive effects of rainforest proximity on bird diversity in oil palm plots (Azhar
et al., 2011), biodiversity effects are only generated if a critical mass of farmers
conserve, and effects are greater if bordering land is put under conservation.
The second essay compares two PES designs that differ in the requirements
for receiving compensation payments. In the first, farmers who conserve receive
compensation if at least three farmers in a group of six do so. In the second,
conserving farmers are compensated if three farmers with bordering land conserve
in the group. In addition, the essay analyzes the effects of different payment levels
and of communication on farmers’ decision to plant the mixed system in their
plantations. At the group level, it explores the magnitude of the hypothetical
biodiversity outcomes generated under the two PES designs. Finally, budget
efficiency and overall welfare effects will be discussed.
The third essay analyses whether EFB mulching increases yields and SOC in
smallholder oil palm plantations. Several papers have indicated that EFB mulching
can increase yields and SOC contents (Abu Bakar et al., 2011; Moradi et al., 2015;
Tao et al., 2017; Teh Boon Sung, Joo, Chien, & Seng, 2011), but that effects
are context specific (Comte et al., 2013). Most evidence on the effects of EFB
mulching is derived from experimental studies in industrial plantations. Despite
their growing importance in the palm oil sector (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2019), to
the best of my knowledge, the effects of EFB mulching in smallholdings have not
been analyzed yet. However, smallholder farmers manage their plantations under
conditions which can be substantially different to those in experimental studies
(Duflo et al., 2008). An extrapolation of the results from experimental studies to
smallholder plantations is consequently difficult.
The third essay combines panel data on yields and management practices with
cross-sectional data derived from soil samples taken in smallholder plantations
to assess the effects of EFB mulching on yields and SOC contents. Given the
potential endogeneity of EFB mulching, identification of these effects is based on
instrumental variable estimation. Furthermore, the essay analyzes whether the
effects of EFB mulching on yields operates through improvements in SOC contents.
This adds to the scarce evidence on whether SOC is important to support yields of
perennial crops such as oil palm (e.g. Gérard et al. (2017); Tao et al. (2017)).
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Lines in right picture indicate regency delimiters and shaded area indicates the location of Jambi
city. Dots refer to the villages in which the RCT was implemented. Black dots indicate the
subsample of the villages with additional soil samples. Green triangles indicate the villages in
which the framed field experiment was implemented.
1.4 Study area and data
As part of the collaborative research center 990 Ecological and Socioeconomic Func-
tions of Tropical Lowland Rainforest Transformation Systems (Sumatra, Indonesia)
(EFForTS), the research presented in this thesis was conducted in Jambi Province,
in Sumatra, Indonesia (Figure 1.1). Oil palm was introduced in Jambi in the
1980s through the government-led transmigration program. Within its framework,
poor farmers were relocated from the overpopulated islands of Java and Bali to
less populated ones, mostly to Sumatra. These new settlers received two to three
hectares of land for oil palm cultivation as well as access to inputs and extension.
Since the 1980s, the province has turned into one of the hotspots of oil palm
cultivation in Indonesia and has been affected by tremendous land use changes.
Between 1990 and 2016, the area under oil palm cultivation has increased fourfold
and bypassed rubber as the main crop in the region in 2012 (Bou Dib, Alamsyah,
& Qaim, 2018). While oil palm is not the sole driver of deforestation, unprotected
forest cover decreased by more than 75% in a similar time span (1990-2011) (Clough
et al., 2016). In 2018, Jambi Province ranked seventh with regard to the area
under oil palm cultivation among all 34 provinces (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2019).
While the national average of smallholder engagement is around 46% as measured
in terms of production area, it amounts to 75% in Jambi and is thus substantially
higher (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2019).
11
Chapter 1. Introduction
This dissertation builds on various primary data collected in Jambi between 2015
and 2018. Chapter 2 uses data from a representative household survey that covers
the lowland area of Jambi. The lowland area has been most heavily affected by the
discussed transformation of rainforest into oil palm and rubber plantations (Gatto,
Wollni, & Qaim, 2015). It comprises five regencies, Muaro Jambi, Batanghari,
Sarolangun, Tebo, and Bungo (Figure 1.1). In 2015, 36 oil palm growing villages
were selected. To capture the heterogeneity of oil palm cultivation in Jambi, 27 of
these villages are transmigrant while nine are local villages. Transmigrant villages
refer to those villages that were founded under the transmigration program and that
are mostly inhabited by migrants from Java. In contrast, most individuals living
in local villages have Melayu background (Krishna, Euler, Siregar, & Qaim, 2017).
The transmigrant villages were randomly selected out of a list of all transmigrant
villages where at least 70% of the households were engaged in oil palm cultivation.
Since many local farmers are growing rubber, this threshold was lowered to 30%
for local villages. Per village, 22 to 24 households that grow oil palm without
contractual arrangements (independent farmers) were randomly selected leading to
a total sample size of 817 farmers. Data collection took place in 2015 and 2016 and
information on oil palm management, native tree planting and socio-economics was
assessed. The attrition rate between both years is 10%. In the beginning of 2016,
a RCT was implemented. The randomization strategy is discussed in chapter 2.
For the analysis of the RCT, chapter 2 mostly uses 2015 baseline socio-economics,
and information on tree planting and survival collected in 2016.
Chapter 4 builds on a subsample of the former data set. Out of the 36 villages,
18 villages were randomly selected. Due to high non-response rates, eventually a
19th village was included in the sample. These villages cover all five districts of the
lowland area. To construct the sample, farmers interviewed in 2016 were stratified
according to whether they applied EFB mulching on at least one plot or not. 32
farmers applying EFB mulching and 97 control farmers are part of the final sample.
For these farmers, additional information on soil conservation practices and oil
palm management was collected in 2017. Per farmer, one plot was selected for soil
sampling to assess SOC contents. The identification of the effect of EFB mulching
on yields is based on panel data covering the years 2015-2017. The instrumentation
strategy uses the GPS location of the villages, as well as the GPS location of the
palm oil mills found in Jambi. Information on the latter was retrieved from the
Universal Mill List (World Resources Institute et al., 2019). The analyses of the
effect of mulching on SOC contents, and of the pathways through which mulching
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affects yields use the 2017 data. To conduct robustness checks for the effects of
mulching on SOC contents, the data is combined with soil and socio-economic data
collected in 37 oil palm plantations by another research team of the CRC (Euler et
al., 2017; Guillaume, Holtkamp, Damris, Brümmer, & Kuzyakov, 2016).
Chapter 3 uses data from the framed field experiment implemented in 2018. The
study area is restricted to the three regencies in the lowland area with the highest
share of oil palm cultivation area in 2016, which are Muaro Jambi, Batanghari and
Bungo (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jambi, 2019). 11 villages were selected.
Since transmigrant villages account for the largest share of oil palm in Jambi (Gatto
et al., 2015), eight transmigrant and three local villages were included. Village
selection was not done randomly and hence the sample is not representative for
the three regencies. The criterion for the inclusion into the sample was that at
least 25% of the farmers in the village grew oil palm. Moreover, I tried to include
villages where little CRC research was conducted before. This was meant to reduce
the potential influence of stimuli farmers might have received by former interviews,
and the time load put on the farmers and the village employees. In particular,
I took care to avoid the villages in which the RCT presented in chapter 2 was
conducted since the informational campaign might have affected the results of the
framed field experiment. In each village, 36 households were randomly selected.
Only households owning and managing oil palm plantations are part of the sample.
In each household, the person in charge of managing the oil palm plantation was
interviewed. Due to logistical problems in one village, only 12 farmers could finally
be selected to be part of the survey. Therefore, 12 additional farmers were selected
in two other villages leading to 48 farmers in these villages. In total, the sample
comprises 396 farmers.
1.5 Outline of dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 analyzes the effects of infor-
mation and seedling provision on the number of trees planted per hectare in oil
palm plantations and on tree survival. Chapter 3 explores whether PES schemes
can promote tree planting and how different PES designs affect individual tree
planting probabilities and group-level environmental outcomes. The effects of EFB
mulching on yields and SOC are presented in chapter 4. Chapter 5 summarizes
the main findings and presents limitations as well as sustainability and policy
implications. The relevant sections of the questionnaire for chapters 2 and 4 as
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well as the experimental protocol and the ethical approval for chapter 3 can be
found in the General Appendix.
14
Chapter 2
Effects of information and
seedling provision on tree
planting and survival in
smallholder oil palm plantations
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15
Chapter 2. Tree planting and survival in oil palm
2.1 Introduction
Agricultural expansion is a major driver of biodiversity loss, which is currently at
unprecedentedly high levels, as emphasized in the recent report of the Intergov-
ernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Diaz,
Settele, & Brondizio, 2019). In South-East Asia, agricultural expansion during
the last three decades has been mainly driven by oil palm production (Gibbs et
al., 2010). Responding to high demand in international markets, the production
area has increased six fold between 1990 and 2017 (FAO, 2019). The region is
now the main producer of palm oil in the world, accounting for over 85% of global
palm oil production (FAO, 2019). Approximately 31% to 50% of the oil palm
plantations are established on land that was formerly forest area (Austin et al.,
2017; Meijaard et al., 2018; Vijay et al., 2016). Since tropical rainforests globally
show the highest level of biodiversity (Diaz et al., 2019) and since only around
15% of the recorded species living in primary forests can be found in oil palm
plantations (Fitzherbert et al., 2008), this expansion has led to a drastic decrease
in local and global biodiversity.
The limited range of taxa found in oil palm plantations is in particular due
to the reduced vegetation complexity within the plantations (Koh et al., 2009).
One approach to increase the structural complexity is the planting of native trees
inside oil palm plantations (Zemp, Ehbrecht, et al., 2019). Positive biodiversity
effects of polycultural plantations, where trees and other crops are grown within
oil palm plantations, in comparison to pure monocultural plantations have been
shown for bird, arthropod and bat communities (Ashraf et al., 2018; Ghazali et
al., 2016; Syafiq et al., 2016; Teuscher et al., 2016; Yahya et al., 2017). Most of
these studies do not consider different planting intensities of trees or other crops,
and therefore cannot derive empirical evidence on the relationship between the
number of trees planted and biodiversity effects. One exception is Teuscher et al.
(2016) analyzing biodiversity effects of native tree islands in oil palm plantations,
who systematically vary tree island size1, but do not find a statistically significant
correlation with biodiversity effects after one year of tree planting. However, in a
study with smallholder oil palm farmers, Teuscher et al. (2015) show that already
small increases in the number of trees planted per hectare can positively affect bird
abundance and species richness in oil palm plantations.
1Tree islands refer to native trees planted in clusters within oil palm plantations. Teuscher et
al. (2016) study tree islands with 6, 25, 100 and 400 trees.
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The present study addresses the question of how native tree planting can be
promoted in oil palm plantations of small-scale farmers in Sumatra, Indonesia.
Small-scale farmers are increasingly engaged in oil palm cultivation, accounting for
approximately 50% of the total oil palm area in Sumatra (Badan Pusat Statistik,
2019), and thus represent key addressees of policies promoting sustainable plantation
management. Various studies have documented that smallholder farmers and
their families have benefited significantly from oil palm cultivation in terms of
income gains (Euler et al., 2017; Feintrenie, Schwarze, & Levang, 2010; Kubitza,
Krishna, Alamsyah, & Qaim, 2018). Smallholder oil palm plantations in our study
area typically resemble large-scale plantations in terms of being homogeneous
monocultural stands, and only few farmers maintain individual trees – usually
remnants – in their plantations (Teuscher et al., 2015).2 From a farmer’s perspective,
planting native trees in their oil palm plantations bears the risk of affecting oil
palm yields negatively. Lower oil palm yields may result from competition for light,
water and nutrients between trees and oil palms (Teuscher et al., 2015) although
some studies have also reported insignificant or tentative evidence of positive yield
effects (Corley & Tinker, 2016; Miccolis et al., 2019). Moreover, farmers may also
derive benefits from native trees, such as fruits and timber and increased resilience
through the diversification of income sources.
Relatively little is known about what instruments are suitable to induce
biodiversity-friendly land uses such as native tree planting. Most studies focusing on
agroforestry-like practices or tree planting analyze the effects of existing payments
for ecosystem services (PES) contracts that compensate adopters financially for
their planting efforts (Pagiola et al., 2007; Wunder & Albán, 2008). Relatively few
studies compare different policy designs with regard to their effectiveness to induce
tree planting. Exceptions are Jack (2013) who compares a lottery and an auction
PES contract design for tree planting, and Jack et al. (2015) who analyze the
effect of varying levels of seedling subsidies and reward payments on tree planting
and survival. The focus on financial rewards can be motivated by limited private
benefits and by the positive externalities generated through tree planting (Jack et
al., 2015). Nonetheless, in particular in developing countries, market inefficiencies
that hinder technology adoption can stem from several sources and individuals
might face constraints simultaneously in several dimensions (Foster & Rosenzweig,
2010; Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007). Among others, a lack of information and missing
access to input markets have been identified to impede the uptake of tree planting
2In our study area, around 28% of the farmers have trees in their plantations.
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(Romero, Wollni, Rudolf, Asnawi, & Irawan, 2019) and agroforestry (Meijer et al.,
2015; van Noordwijk et al., 2008). Despite their importance, these potential barriers
have so far received little attention in the literature analyzing policy incentives for
tree planting.
More generally for the case of agricultural technologies, previous studies have
shown that information provision can effectively spur adoption among small-scale
farmers in developing countries (Aker, 2011). Most of these studies, however,
focus on productivity-enhancing technologies such as soil fertility management
(Benyishay & Mobarak, 2018; Kondylis et al., 2017), fertilizer application (Duflo et
al., 2008) or generally improved management practices (Cole & Fernando, 2016;
van Campenhout, van Asten, Rashed, Vandevelde, & Walukano, 2017). However,
farmers might be reluctant to adopt an agricultural technology that is not primarily
intended to increase income or productivity, but rather to diversify income and
production patterns, and in particular to improve regional and global environmental
conditions. While there is evidence that farmers’ land use choices are also affected
by environmental and social motives (Greiner & Gregg, 2011), rigorous evaluations
of the effect of information provision on land management decisions with primarily
environmental motives are scarce.
In the presence of positive environmental externalities, additional incentives
in the form of free or subsidized input provision may be justified and necessary
to significantly increase technology uptake. Free or subsidized input provision
can potentially relieve constraints, such as missing access to input markets or
high transaction costs (Bensch & Peters, 2020; Omotilewa, Ricker-Gilbert, &
Ainembabazi, 2019), frequently hindering technology adoption among small-scale
farmers in developing countries. However, some scholars have questioned the
suitability of free or heavily subsidized input provision based on two main arguments:
First, free provision might reduce product use or the maintenance given to the
goods in comparison to when a positive price is charged. Possible explanations are
linked to the inability of the providers to differentiate between individuals deriving
low and high utility from the respective technology use, so called screening effects,
or to the lower sunk costs of losing the good (Ashraf, Berry, & Shapiro, 2010;
Thaler, 1980). In particular for long-lived goods such as trees, lack of maintenance
after adoption might lead to low survival rates of the seedlings planted. Second,
the one-time free or subsidized provision might negatively affect future or further
acquisition of the good by setting a price benchmark too low for free market
transactions (Bensch & Peters, 2020; Dupas, 2014; Omotilewa et al., 2019).
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Recent empirical evidence shows that the subsidized provision of goods which
are easy to use and do not generate negative side effects does not reduce product
use (Carter et al., 2013; Dupas, 2014), or the willingness to pay for the good in
markets (Omotilewa et al., 2019). The picture is less clear for goods that require
continued care such as improved stoves, for which both positive effects of free
provision on stove maintenance (Bensch & Peters, 2020) and high abandonment
rates have been reported (Hanna, Duflo, & Greenstone, 2016). In particular, there
is scarce evidence on how free input provision affects use and care for goods with
limited private, but substantial public environmental benefits. In contrast to goods
aiming at improved private health outcomes or increased agricultural income, the
decision to adopt a technology with positive environmental externalities, such
as tree planting, might also be motivated by altruistic or environmental motives.
These intrinsic motivations can potentially interact with the external interventions
that subsidize the respective action. As a result, tree planting activities that
go beyond the subsidized material might be discouraged or farmers might stop
tree planting and maintenance activities when subsidies cease (Gneezy, Meier, &
Rey-Biel, 2011).
Previous research on the effect of free or subsidized seedling provision on tree
planting in general supports a positive correlation (Ruseva et al., 2015). Yet,
some authors have raised concern over potential negative effects on the local
seedling supply system, which could imply negative effects on further acquisitions
(Gregorio et al., 2015; Harrison, Gregorio, & Herbohn, 2008). There is hardly any
experimental literature quantifying the effect of subsidized seedlings provision on
tree planting and maintenance, with the exceptions of Romero et al. (2019), who
find that the free provision of seedlings increases the probability of tree planting,
and Jack et al. (2015), who observe a positive relationship between the size of the
take-up subsidy and tree planting, but no significant effect on tree survival. None
of these studies analyze planting intensity – the number of trees planted – and can
therefore draw insights on whether the provision of free or subsidized seedlings
discourages further planting efforts.
In this study, we use a randomized controlled trial to test the effects of two
distinct policy interventions on tree planting and survival. The first intervention
provides information on native tree planting in oil palm plantations. The second
intervention combines the provision of information with the provision of free
seedlings. The combined intervention allows us to identify whether providing
farmers with free seedlings in addition to information dissemination significantly
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increases farmers’ tree planting activities in oil palm plantations, compared to
the pure information intervention. In a double-hurdle framework, the probability
of farmers to plant seedlings in oil palm plantations and their planting intensity,
measured as the number of trees planted per hectare, are analyzed. We also assess
whether the provision of free seedlings discourages tree planting beyond what is
provided for free. To derive more explicit policy implications, we compare the cost
effectiveness of the two interventions with respect to the total number of trees
planted and survived. Finally, since the ecological effectiveness of the interventions
is subject to tree survival, we analyze the drivers of farmers’ performance in terms
of their tree survival rates. Next, section 2.2 describes the experimental design,
the interventions, the data collection process, as well as the estimation strategy.
Results on tree planting and survival as well as cost effectiveness considerations
are presented in section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Study design, data and estimation strategy
2.2.1 Study area and sampling strategy
Our study took place in Jambi Province, one of the hotspots of oil palm cultivation
in Indonesia (Krishna et al., 2017). Oil palm was introduced in Jambi in the 1980s
through a government program which supported the expansion of oil palm. Within
this so-called transmigration program, poor farming households were relocated
from the overpopulated islands of Java and Bali to less populated ones, mostly to
Sumatra (Euler et al., 2016). These new settlers received two to three hectares of
land for oil palm cultivation as well as extension services and inputs for oil palm
cultivation.
We focus on five regencies in Jambi – Muaro Jambi, Batanghari, Sarolangun,
Tebo, and Bungo – that represent the lowland area of Jambi, which has been mainly
affected by rainforest transformation into oil palm and rubber plantations (Gatto et
al., 2015) (Figure 2.1). In total, 36 oil palm growing villages were selected, 75% of
which are transmigrant villages and 25% local villages.3 To construct the sampling
frame, we listed all transmigrant villages in the study area that have a main focus
3By transmigrant (local) villages, we understand villages in which mostly transmigrant (local)
farmers live. Local farmers belong to the Melayu ethnic group while transmigrant farmers are
mostly Javanese. Since especially local Melayu farmers, who are more and more switching from
rubber to oil palm cultivation, will drive the further expansion of oil palm, we opted to include
both village types in the sample.
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Figure 2.1: Location of treatment and control villages in Jambi
The lines indicate the regency delimiters and the shaded area the location of Jambi city. Control
villages are indicated by dots. Blue triangles indicate T1 villages. Green rhombi indicate T2
villages.
on oil palm production.4 Out of a total of 90 transmigrant villages, we randomly
selected 27 villages to be included in our sample. In addition, we identified nine
local villages with a main focus on oil palm production in the study area and
included them in our sample.5 We obtained village level data from the Village
Potential Statistics (PODES) census dataset collected in 2008 by the Indonesian
Central Bureau of Statistics. To complement the data, we implemented a small
village survey in September 2015, which elicited information on seedling market
access, extension services and other village-specific information. Lists with all oil
palm growing households were provided by the village staff.
Contract-farming arrangements between oil palm smallholders and companies
are common in the study region and were in particular promoted at the beginning
of oil palm expansion (Gatto et al., 2015). As farmers who are under contract with
companies do not have full autonomy over management decisions, which could
impact the results of our interventions, we restrict our sample to independent
smallholders who grow oil palms without contractual arrangements. Within each of
the villages, we randomly selected 22 to 24 households. In total, 817 farmers were
part of the sample. We conducted a baseline survey in the villages from October
until December 2015 to collect information on the number, the species and the
location of trees planted in the last 12 months, as well as household descriptives.
4The criterion for inclusion was that at least 70% of the dwellers report oil palm production
to be their main occupation.
5For local villages we had to adjust the criterion to at least 30% of the dwellers reporting oil
palm production to be their main occupation, because local villages are mainly engaged in rubber
production and oil palm expansion is more recent (Euler et al., 2016).
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The interviews were carried out by twelve local assistants who were students from
the Indonesian universities of Jambi and Bogor Agricultural University. After
pre-testing the questionnaire in four villages, the assistants were trained intensively
in the classroom and in the field. Follow-up data was collected from October till
December 2016. 90% of all farmers could be interviewed again resulting in a sample
of 737 farmers in the follow-up.
2.2.2 Randomization approach
In order to reduce the risk of spill-over effects, random assignment was done at
village level. Villages were allocated to two treatment arms, Treatment 1 (T1) and
Treatment 2 (T2), and one control arm with help of a stratified randomization
technique. As stratification variables, we used the migration status of the village
(transmigrant or local), whether or not a village had access to seedling markets
(Yes/No) and the share of oil palm growing households in the village (above or below
73.5%). Within each of the generated six strata, an equal number of villages were
assigned to the three experimental arms with help of a random number generator.
In the end, each arm contained twelve villages.
Table 2.1 presents baseline descriptives of the sample. In order to test whether
randomization was successful in creating balance between groups, we conduct 60
mean difference tests. The number of farmers who cut trees in their plantation
in 2015 and the household size are statistically different between the treatment
groups at the 1% level. Additionally, we find that the share of farmers who refer to
problems of getting seedlings is statistically different between T1 and the control
group at the 1% level. With regard to the possession of home gardens, farmers in
T2 possess slightly more often a home garden than farmers in the control group,
but the difference is only marginally significant (p-value: 0.094). Given that some
imbalance can occur by chance (Morgan & Rubin, 2012), the randomization can
be considered successful.
2.2.3 Description and implementation of treatments
To test the effect of two policy options on tree planting in oil palm plantations, two
interventions were designed: one provides only information (T1), while the other
one combines information with free provision of six seedlings (T2). Information was
delivered through a video that we composed and filmed in collaboration with a local
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Table 2.1: Baseline descriptives and mean comparison tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Control T1 T2 C=T1 C=T2 T1=T2
Mean estimates, standard deviation below P-values
Household head characteristics
Age of HH head 49.52 49.14 49.62 49.79 0.686 0.645 0.902
(in years) (10.42) (10.19) (10.97) (10.11)
Years of education 7.53 7.67 7.42 7.49 0.480 0.598 0.835
HH Head (3.61) (3.65) (3.62) (3.58)
Access to env. extension 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.339 0.349 0.870
(1=Yes/0=No)
Gender of HH head 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.108 0.184 0.738
(1=female / 0=male)
Household characteristics
Household size 3.96 3.93 3.83 4.13 0.474 0.110 0.009***
(No. of persons) (1.50) (1.57) (1.38) (1.53)
Value of assets 49745.24 32778.05 84134.21 32011.06 0.262 0.949 0.253
(in 1,000 IDR) (492402) (56654.4) (846562.7) (55756.89)
Other crops cultivated 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.655 0.994 0.715
(1=Yes/0=No)
Total land owned 5.69 5.68 5.81 5.58 0.845 0.830 0.720
(in ha) (6.85) (5.2) (9.38) (5.07)
Home garden 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.96 0.273 0.094* 0.216
(1=Yes/0=No)
Farm characteristics
Total ha oil palm 4.45 4.42 4.63 4.29 0.752 0.701 0.603
managed (6.16) (4.15) (8.95) (4.06)
Share of plots with 0.68 0.7 0.66 0.7 0.452 0.942 0.586
systematic land titles (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.42)
Share of plots flooded 0.13 0.1 0.16 0.15 0.186 0.293 0.759
in last 12 months (0.32) (0.28) (0.35) (0.33)
Plot age (in years) 14.83 15.52 14.4 14.59 0.222 0.503 0.842
(6.57) (6.13) (6.26) (7.25)
Mean number of trees 3.43 5.07 2.62 2.63 0.336 0.340 0.948
per ha in OP (26.76) (43.24) (12.28) (11.96)
Farmer planted trees on 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.428 0.829 0.626
his/her own (1=Yes/0=No)
Number of trees planted 1.84 2.46 1.43 1.64 0.584 0.670 0.793
in OP in the past per ha (18.56) (30.53) (6.88) (7.99)
Trees cut in OP in last 12 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.122 0.004***
months (1=Yes/0=No)
Mean price for oil fruit bunch received 1.02 1.03 0.99 1.05 0.414 0.593 0.232
per kg (‘000 IDR) (0.17) (0.17) (0.02) (0.19)
Seed access constraints 0.57 0.63 0.51 0.58 0.002*** 0.259 0.106
(1=Yes/0=No)
Information constraints 0.63 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.337 0.259 0.920
(1=Yes/0=No)
Observations 817 270 274 273
Columns (1) to (4) show mean estimates and corresponding standard deviations for continuous variables in parentheses.
Columns (5) to (7) report p-values of mean difference tests conducted with linear regressions. In all model specifications,
stratification variables are included. Stars refer to * 0.10, ** 0.05, and *** 0.01 significance level. All standard errors are
clustered at village level.
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film-maker, and through an illustrative manual.6 In the short movie, a lecturer
from the University of Jambi introduced the concept of tree planting in oil palm
plantations. He explained that planting native trees can increase local biodiversity
with positive effects on pest control, and improve soil fertility, in particular in
the case of nitrogen-fixing legume trees. He raised the possibility of negative oil
palm yield effects resulting from competition for nutrients and sunlight between
trees and oil palms, but also pointed out that fruit and timber trees can generate
additional income. The six species distributed in the experiment were mentioned as
examples of native species that could be planted with oil palms and that generate
economic returns. The planting process and the maintenance activities necessary to
support tree survival were presented in detail. Farmers were instructed that native
trees could be planted in between existing oil palms or around the border of the
plantation. Rather than cutting productive oil palms, we suggested to remove old
and dead oil palms and plant native trees in the resulting gaps. The movie did not
provide a recommendation on the precise number of trees to be planted. In order to
stimulate cognitive and emotional activity of the audience (Bernard, Dercon, Orkin,
& Seyoum Taffesse, 2015), a role model approach was implemented by inviting
three farmers from Jambi to participate in the video. The role model farmers
described their experience with tree planting and also mentioned the species that
they chose to plant in their oil palm plantations. The movie was complemented
by an illustrative manual designed by a local artist. The manual provided the
same information on potential environmental and economic outcomes of native
tree planting as well as instructions on how to plant and maintain trees. It was
distributed to the farmers during the movie screenings to be taken home as a later
reference.
Since focus group discussions that we conducted in our research area prior to
data collection identified missing markets as one obstacle to tree planting, seedlings
of six multipurpose trees native to Jambi were distributed for free to each farmer
in T2. The selected species included three fruit trees (Archidendron pauciflorum
‘Jengkol’; Durio zibethinus ‘Durian’; Parkia speciosa ‘Petai’), one natural latex
(Dyera costulata ‘Jelutung’), and two timber trees (Peronema canescens ‘Sungkai’;
Shorea leprosula ‘Meranti’).7 Tree choice was made because these trees are native
6The video and the manual can be found at https://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/604624.html
and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W0GwYuwt0D4feature=youtu.be.
7Scientific name in italics and local name in quotation marks. Two of the three fruit trees are
leguminous plants such that they fix nitrogen in the soil, which provides additional nutrients to
the oil palms.
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to Jambi, known to farmers and provide economic benefits (Gérard et al., 2017).
Each farmer in T2 received one of each species leading to a total of six seedlings
per person handed out after the end of the video screening. Measured in local
prices in Jambi city, the six seedlings are worth approx. 37,500 Indonesian Rupiah
(IDR).8 In total, 1,458 seedlings were distributed.
The interventions were carried out in February 2016 such that the farmers could
plant the trees before the start of the dry period. Five local assistants helped with
the implementation. The video screenings took place in the village offices. Farmers
were invited to the video session by the village staff via an official letter three
days prior to screening. A reminder text message was sent one day before. The
attendance of the assigned farmers was controlled with help of an attendance sheet.
In total, 71.1% of all farmers assigned to the two treatment arms attended the
video screening. For the informational intervention (T1) this share was 67.9%, for
the combined (information plus seedlings) intervention (T2) it was 74.4%. The
difference between both groups is not statistically significant (p-value: 0.164).9
Farmers who did not attend the video screening were visited at their houses at a
later time to complete a short mid-term survey. At this occasion, the farmers were
also provided with the manual and, if assigned to T2, with the seedlings. The survey
was also conducted in the control group. 26.3% of farmers in T1 received only the
manual. Seedlings and the manual alone were given to 22.0% in T2. Accordingly,
5.8% in T1 and 4.0% in T2 did not receive any of the interventions. Additional
non-compliance can occur if other external institutions are present in the study
region and provide information and seedlings to the control group. Our results
show that around 5% of all farmers in the sample received tree related extension
approaches from other sources, while approx. 9% of the farmers got seedlings for
free from other sources. Since both the number of farmers who got either other
extension approaches or seedlings, and the number of trees provided for free are
balanced between treatment and control groups, this is unlikely to threaten the
internal validity of the results.10
In order to reduce possible experimental effects such as the Hawthorne effect
8This amounts to 2.8 USD using the average exchange rate between IDR and USD at the time
of the interventions. Because of transportation costs it is likely that the prices in the villages are
higher.
9Test for significance was done in a linear regression framework with the sample of treatment
villages only and village-level clustered standard errors. Attendance to movie was regressed on a
dummy for T2.
10Mostly farmers get seedlings for free from their neighbors. Controlling for the external
interventions does not change the results presented in section 2.3.
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that could undermine the internal and external validity of the results (Simons,
Beltramo, Blalock, & Levine, 2017), farmers were not told that they participated
in an experiment. However, we cannot rule out that due to the frequent visiting of
the farmers, questions related to tree planting in oil palm plantations might have
become more salient to the interviewees (Zwane et al., 2011). Since both treatment
and control groups were visited with the same frequency, the effect should be
similar across groups, and therefore should not bias the estimates. Additionally, we
kept track of information exchange between farmers in the control and treatment
villages in order to be able to control for possible spill-over effects. We do not find
evidence that information exchange between treatment and control villages about
tree planting has happened at a broad scale.11
2.2.4 Econometric specification
Our main interest lies in the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect of the interventions
on the expected number of trees planted per hectare.12 We estimate the following
model:
Yij = β0 + β1T1j + β2T2j + β3Sj + β4Xij + β5Y P REij + eij (2.1)
where Yij is the outcome variable of interest, i.e., the per hectare number of
trees planted in oil palm plantations by farmer i in village j. T1j takes the value 1
if village j was assigned to T1, T2j equals 1 if the village was assigned to T2. Sj is
a vector of stratification variables and the vector Xij contains farmers’ baseline
characteristics. Following McKenzie (2012) we employ an ANCOVA estimator
by including the baseline dependent variable Y P REij to reduce the variance of the
treatment estimator. ANCOVA is preferred over difference-in-difference estimation
in case of low autocorrelation between the pre-treatment and current outcome
variable (McKenzie, 2012), as is the case in our data.13 eij is an individual-specific
error term that is clustered at the village level. Two model specifications are tested.
The first one in addition to the treatment dummies controls for the stratification
11In our sample, we can detect twelve cases of information exchange between farmers in
treatment and control villages. Out of the twelve, only six state that the topic of tree planting
was discussed. It is therefore unlikely that spill-over effects threaten the internal validity of our
results.
12By trees we understand tall wood trees that have a clearly developed stem and do not have
branches at the basis (Roloff and Bärtels 2014). Therefore, other palm species, banana plants
and shrubs were not considered in the analysis.
13The autocorrelation coefficient is 0.09 in our case.
26
Chapter 2. Tree planting and survival in oil palm
variables and the baseline dependent variable. In the second specification, we
additionally include the baseline characteristics that are imbalanced between groups
and the control variables in Table 2.1 to increase the precision of our estimates.14
We analyze the planting decision of the farmers using a double-hurdle (DH)
model (Cragg, 1971), where adoption is modelled as a two stage process. In a first
step, farmers decide about whether to plant trees in their oil palm plantation or
not. In the second step, the intensity of adoption, which is the number of trees
planted per hectare, is determined. The original model by Cragg (1971) assumes
independence between both decisions. This assumption finds statistical support in
our data.15
The DH-model represents a general version of the Tobit model. In contrast to
the latter, it does not assume that both the adoption and the intensity decision are
generated by the same stochastic process (Salmon & Tanguy, 2016). Therefore, the
treatment and other control variables can affect the adoption decision differently
than the intensity decision (Cragg, 1971). The DH-model is especially appealing
in cases where imperfect markets hinder adoption, e.g. due to restricted access to
information or seed markets (Shiferaw, Kebede, Kassie, & Fisher, 2015). As shown
in the focus group discussions, these aspects appear to be relevant in our context.
To further support the use of the DH-model, a Vuong test is conducted (Shiferaw
et al., 2015). The test results suggest that the DH-model is closer to the true data
generating process than the Tobit model (p-value 0.000).
In case of normally distributed residuals, but if negative predicted outcome
variables should be prevented, the intensity decision can be estimated with help of
a truncated normal distribution (Cragg, 1971; Salmon & Tanguy, 2016). Due to the
highly right-skewed distribution of the strictly positive per hectare number of trees
planted (Figure A2.1 in the Appendix) we use a more flexible Generalized Linear
Model (GLM) approach with log-link to estimate the effects of the treatments on
the conditional intensity decision (Manning & Mullahy, 2001). The use of the link
function is tested with help of a Pregibon test (Belotti, Deb, Manning, & Norton.
Edward C, 2015). The log-link cannot be rejected (p-value: 0.331).16 In order to
14Strong collinear variables were not included in the model. This choice is supported by the
joint insignificance of the variables in the unconditional predictive margins estimation of the
double hurdle model (p-value of 0.373).
15Test for independence done with help of a Heckman selection model. Test results and more
information are provided in Table A2.5 in the Appendix.
16We additionally run a Pregibon-test for the identity link function. The Pregibon-test suggests
a model misspecification (p-value of squared prediction: 0.011). Also the AIC and the BIC are
lower when the log-link instead of the identity-link is used.
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test for the correct family of distribution for the GLM error term, we use a modified
Park test (Manning & Mullahy, 2001; Salmon & Tanguy, 2016). We cannot reject
the use of the gamma-distribution for the error term (p-value: 0.801).
The GLM-approach is superior to applying a logarithmic transformation to
the skewed outcome variable in case of heteroscedasticity in the residuals at
the logarithmic scale (Manning & Mullahy, 2001). We use a modified White
test (Wooldridge, 2010) to test for heteroscedasticity in the regression of the
logarithmized per hectare number of trees planted on the explanatory variables.
The Chi-square test statistic suggests that heteroscedasticity is present in the
data (p-value of 0.04). This supports the use of the GLM approach. Manning
and Mullahy (2001) highlight substantial increases in standard errors of GLM in
comparison to OLS if the log-scaled residuals are heavily tailed. However, the
kurtosis of the estimated log-residuals from our preferred GLM is 2.93 and hence
below that of a normal distribution. Therefore, precision losses are likely to be
small.
We assume a representative household that is maximizing its expected utility
from tree planting taking into account the perceived benefits and costs of tree
planting. In a first step, the farmer decides whether to plant or not. The decision
to adopt depends on the expected utility of adoption. In case the expected utility
is positive, we will observe adoption in a perfect market environment. However, in
reality, farmers often face constraints which need to be overcome before adoption
can occur. In particular, we assume that farmers need to have reached a specific
level of knowledge about tree planting before they will adopt the technology. In
addition, farmers need to have access to seedlings in order to observe a positive
adoption decision. Therefore, we will observe adoption if three conditions are
simultaneously fulfilled: A farmer has reached a sufficient level of knowledge,
transaction costs of accessing seedling markets are not too high, and a farmer
desires a positive quantity of trees in his or her oil palm plantation. Conditional on
a positive decision to plant, the farmer will then decide in a next step about the
utility maximizing number of trees. Following Belotti et al. (2015), the adoption
decision can be described as:
Pr(y > 0|x) = F (xδ) (2.2)
where y is our outcome variable of interest, x is a set of explanatory variables,
δ the coefficient of our explanatory variables in the adoption decision and F a
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cumulative distributional function of the error term.
The conditional intensity decision is expressed as:
E(y|y > 0, x) = g−1(xβ) (2.3)
where g is the respective link function of the GLM approach, x the covariates
for the intensity decision and β the estimated coefficients. For the log-link case, (2)
can be written as:
ln(E(y|y > 0, x)) = xβ ⇒ E(y|y > 0, x) = exp(xβ) (2.4)
Inferences about the unconditional expected value, which is the overall mean,
can be made by combining the probability of adoption and the intensity decision:
E(y|x) = Pr(y > 0|x) ∗ E(y|y > 0, x) (2.5)
2.3 Results
During the one-year period between baseline and follow-up survey, 145 farmers
(19.7%) planted a total number of 2,909 trees in oil palm plantations.17 Descriptives
of our outcome variables are reported in Table 2.2.
2.3.1 Adoption decision
The intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates are reported in Table 2.3. Given the discrete
character of the treatment dummies, we report average marginal effects (AME) of
the interventions on the unconditional expected number of trees planted per hectare
(eqn. (2.5)), which are shown in the first two columns. Columns (3) and (4) show
AME of the interventions on farmers’ decision to plant trees (eqn. (2.2)). Columns
(5) and (6) report conditional AME on the intensity decision for the subsample
of the tree-planting individuals only (eqn. (2.3)). Besides standard p-values, we
also report significance levels based on pairs cluster bootstrap-t procedure. This
approach provides asymptotic refinements and has been shown to reduce problems
of over-rejection in case of a limited number of clusters (Cameron, Gelbach, &
17In addition, trees were planted in home gardens (36.2% of all farmers), in other plots or on
fallow land (3.7% of all farmers). 40.4% of all farmers did not plant trees at all.
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Table 2.2: Descriptives of outcome variables
Total Control T1 T2
Share of farmers who 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.43
planted in oil palm plots T1=C* T2=C***
T1=T2***
N 737 239 2451 253
Number of trees planted 1.07 0.13 1.13 1.90
per hectare (5.561) (0.826) (6.581) (6.801)
T1=C** T2=C***
N 736 239 2441 253
Number of trees planted 5.47 2.90 11.48 4.40
per hectare by adopters (11.608) (2.718) (18.268) (9.839)
T1=C*
N 144 11 24 109
Standard deviation reported in parentheses for continuous variables. Test for mean difference
conducted with a linear regression of the outcome variables on the treatment dummies with
clustered standard errors and stratification variables included. In vertical order, p-values for T1
= Control are 0.082, 0.049 and 0.060 for the three outcome variables respectively. For T2 =
Control, p-values are 0.000, 0.013 and 0.351, for T1= T2 0.000, 0.358 and 0.128.
1 Different sample size due to the fact that one farmer could not remember how many trees he
planted in his oil palm plantation.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Miller, 2008).18 Full model results, i.e., the coefficients and AME of all covariates
for the adoption decision, the conditional and unconditional expected number of
trees, are reported in Tables A2.1-A2.3 in the Appendix.19
Both treatments significantly increase the unconditional expected number of
trees planted per hectare (columns (1) and (2)). On the average, farmers in T1
plant 1.0 tree per hectare more than farmers in the control group. Assignment to
T2 increases the number of trees planted per hectare on average by 1.7 trees in
comparison to the control group. Although the effect size of T2 is slightly larger than
that of T1, the difference between both treatments is not statistically significant.20
This suggests that both interventions are similarly effective in increasing the
18Bootstrap-t confidence intervals are provided in the Appendix in Table A2.4
19With regard to the covariates that are significantly different between treatment arms (balance
checks in Table 2.1), we only find that the possession of a home garden, which is however only
marginally significantly different between T2 and the control group, significantly influences the
adoption decisions. Imbalances between groups therefore do not appear to threaten the internal
validity of the results.
20The results for the unconditional expected number of trees planted per hectare are supported
by an OLS regression of the number of trees planted per hectare on the treatment dummies alone,
or on the treatment dummies in combination with the stratification variables.
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Table 2.3: Intention-to-treat estimation
Uncond. expected val-
ues
Adoption decision Cond. expected values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




T1 0.995**/a 0.984**/a 0.057*/c 0.061**/b 8.127***/a 7.938**/b
(0.422) (0.452) (0.033) (0.029) (2.673) (3.578)
T2 1.583***/a 1.721***/a 0.381***/a 0.398***/a 0.762 1.026
(0.347) (0.412) (0.028) (0.028) (1.012) (1.683)
N 736 736 737 737 144 144
Control 0.172** 0.150* 0.047*** 0.042*** 3.578*** 3.582***
group1 (0.078) (0.089) (0.018) (0.015) (0.778) (1.125)
P-values
of t-test
for T1=T2 0.296 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.047
Controls2 No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses and estimated with Delta method. Columns
(1) and (2) show unconditional AME. Columns (3) and (4) report AME for the adoption decision.
AME for the intensity equation are reported in columns (5) and (6). A GLM with log-link and
gamma distribution was used for estimation. Stratification variables and the pre-treatment
(baseline) dependent variable are included in all model specifications.
1 Predicted mean for control group displayed. Significance level reported for test E(Y) = 0.
2 Baseline controls include number of household members, whether a farmer cut trees in OP in
2015, education, whether he or she had a home garden, total area of oil palm managed, the
mean price for oil bunches received, whether he or she received environmental extension, the
share of plots that were flooded and whether farmers experienced information and/or seed
access constraints.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a/b/c refer to significance level 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c)
based on bootstrap-t procedure. 1000 replications used for estimating confidence intervals.
expected number of trees per hectare. Yet, the unconditional planting intensity
potentially masks underlying decision patterns that may differ under the two policy
interventions. Results of the double-hurdle model allow us to distinguish between
extensive and intensive margins.
At the extensive margin, columns (3) and (4) show that both treatments
have a positive and significant effect on farmers’ decision to plant trees in oil palm
plantations, although to varying degrees. Assignment to T1 on average increases the
probability that smallholders adopt by approx. 6 percentage points in comparison
to the control group. The effect of T2 is significantly larger than that of T1; the
provision of seedlings and information increases the probability of planting by
approx. 39 percentage points on average. We cannot separate the individual effects
of information and input provision in T2, because of the possibility of interactions
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between both (Ashraf, Jack, & Kamenica, 2013). However, if we assume that
negative interaction effects between information and tree seedling provisions are
unlikely, the 33 percentage point difference in effect size between T1 and T2 could
be interpreted as an upper bound for the effect size of pure seedling provision.
These results suggest that input provision is important to motivate tree planting
in oil palm plantations for a large share of the farmers.
At the intensive margin, columns (5) and (6) show that the average expected
number of planted trees conditional on adoption is not significantly higher in T2
compared to the control group. In contrast, T1 has a significantly positive effect on
the conditional number of trees planted per hectare compared to both T2 and the
control group. Accordingly, in T2 we observe large numbers of farmers planting on
average only few trees each, whereas in T1 few farmers adopt, but each of them
plants a relatively large number of trees. The treatment effects on the unconditional
expected number of trees are therefore driven by different underlying mechanisms:
T2 particularly increases the planting probability of farmers, whereas the effect of
T1 is driven by a few high-intensity adopters.
Attrition
From the original 817 farmers interviewed in 2015, 737 could be re-interviewed
in the follow-up implying an attrition rate of 10%. To test whether attrition is
random, we compare attrition rates between treatment and control groups. This
shows that assignment to T2 reduces the probability of attrition by four percentage
points at the 5% significance level (p-value: 0.03). To further test for differential
attrition, we run mean comparison tests for attritors’ characteristics in the different
treatment groups (Duflo, Glennerster, & Kremer, 2006).21 The results show that
attritors do not differ systematically between groups except that farmers dropping
out in T2 are statistically more often women (p-value: 0.080) and older than the
farmers remaining in the sample (p-value: 0.026). Robustness checks for our results
are conducted based on inverse probability weights and bounds and confirm that
our results are not sensitive to attrition (Tables A2.6-A2.8 in the Appendix).
21Mean comparison tests (here and in subsequent analyses) are based on linear regression
models with village-level clustered standard errors.
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Outlier analysis
Several cross-checks for the number of trees planted were implemented in the
questionnaire to ensure the validity of the reported quantities of trees planted.
Notwithstanding, as a further robustness check, we analyze the extent to which
our results are driven by outliers. To this end, the distribution of the strictly
positive number of trees planted per hectare is winsorized at the 99 percentile.
Seven observations are replaced, four of which are farmers assigned to T1 and three
assigned to T2.
Table 2.4: Intention-to-treat estimates with distribution winsorized at 99 percentile
Uncond. expected val-
ues
Adoption decision Cond. expected values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




T1 0.716** 0.723** 0.057* 0.061** 5.442*** 5.226**
(0.299) (0.333) (0.033) (0.029) (1.708) (2.582)
T2 1.366*** 1.467*** 0.381*** 0.398*** 0.400 0.376
(0.262) (0.318) (0.028) (0.028) (0.816) (1.564)
N 736 736 737 737 144 144
P-values
of t-test
for T1=T2 0.111 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.053
Controls 1 No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses and estimated with Delta method. Columns
(1) and (2) show unconditional AME. Columns (3) and (4) report AME from a logit regression.
Columns (5) and (6) report AME from a GLM with log-link and gamma distribution of the
error terms. Stratification variables and pre-treatment (baseline) dependent variable included
in all model specifications. Before estimation, distribution was winsorized at the 99 percentile.
1 Baseline controls include number of household members, whether a farmer cut trees in OP in
2015, education, whether he or she had a home garden, total area of oil palm managed, the
mean price for oil bunches received, whether he or she received environmental extension, the
share of plots that were flooded and whether farmers experienced information and/or seed
access constraints.
2 For completeness, also the results of the participation decision are shown even though they
are not affected by winsorizing the distribution.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results (Table 2.4) indicate that overall the significance levels of the
estimated AME are not affected by outliers. Although the sizes of the estimated
coefficients decrease, both treatments still have significantly positive effects on the
unconditional number of trees, and T1 has a significantly positive effect on the
conditional number of trees planted per hectare. However, for the unconditional
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expected values, the difference in effect size between T1 and T2 is now statistically
significant – at least when including baseline controls. Hence, our finding that both
interventions are similarly effective in terms of increasing the unconditional number
of trees planted per hectare is dependent on the 1% of farmers who plant the most.
2.3.2 Subgroup-specific treatment effects by seed access
constraint
In the previous section, we find that the combined intervention (T2) significantly
increases the likelihood of adoption compared to the pure information intervention
(T1). Our conceptual model suggests that adoption of tree planting will only occur
if individuals, besides having a positive intention to plant trees, are also able to
overcome potential knowledge and seedling access barriers (section 2.2.4). This
would imply that information provision alone (T1) can only have a positive effect
on the tree planting decision of farmers who are not seed access constrained. In
contrast, seedling in combination with information provision (T2) can potentially
induce adoption even under seed access constraints. In order to test whether T1
and T2 have differential effects on adoption under seed access, farmers are divided
into two subgroups: The first comprising farmers who stated in the baseline that
access to seeds was limited in their village, and the second consisting of farmers who
indicated that seed material was easily available in the village.22 To test whether
the treatments have a significant effect on the adoption decision in the respective
subgroup, we create dummies for the combinations of treatment status (T1 and T2,
respectively) and the two subgroups defined above (Glennerster & Takavarasha,
2013). Results of a linear probability model are presented in Table 2.5.23
The results show that the effect of T1 on adoption is only significant in the
absence of seed access constraints, as expected. In contrast, the combined inter-
vention (T2) significantly increases adoption rates in both subgroups. Accordingly,
our results support the need of a comprehensive approach, like the combined
intervention in T2, to induce adoption in the presence of multiple constraints.
22Farmers were asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale whether they agree that native tree
seedlings are easily available in the village, where (strongly) disagree indicates a perceived
constraint. Accordingly, farmers were asked to assess the general situation in their village, and not
whether they personally had tried to access seedlings. Descriptive statistics for the two categories
are reported in Table 2.1.
23We use a linear probability model because we are interested in probabilities. The sign of the
interactions might differ when logarithmized odds ratios, as used in the logistic regression, instead
of probabilities are compared between different groups (Ganzach, Saporta, & Weber, 2000).
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneous Treatment effects
(1) (2)























Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients from a linear probability
model reported. Stratification variables and lagged outcome variable included in both model
specifications.
1 Baseline controls include number of household members, whether a farmer cut trees in OP in
2015, education, whether he or she had a home garden, total area of oil palm managed, the
mean price for oil bunches received, whether he or she received environmental extension and
the share of plots that were flooded
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2.3.3 Does free seedling delivery discourage tree planting
beyond what is given for free?
Section 2.3.1 shows that the effect of T2 on the conditional expected number of trees
planted per hectare is significantly smaller than that of T1 (Table 2.3). We consider
two potential interpretations for the lower average conditional planting intensity in
T2. First, we observe that a large share of adopters in T2 (77%) plant only six
or less trees. It is possible that the free provision of seedlings motivates adoption
among farmers who derive relatively low utility from tree planting. For these
farmers, free input provision might act as a subsidy, such that adoption only occurs
if inputs are provided for free. This interpretation is in line with findings from the
experimental literature on sorting effects (Lazear, Malmendier, & Weber, 2012).
Second, a common concern regarding the provision of free inputs is that it might
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undermine further acquisitions of the good (Omotilewa et al., 2019). Accordingly,
the provision of free seedlings in T2 may discourage additional planting efforts
beyond what is given for free. This could be due to motivational crowding (Gneezy
et al., 2011) or due to an anchoring effect. The latter could either be a price
anchoring that sets the benchmark price for trees at zero, or a quantity anchoring
if farmers in T2 interpreted the number of seedlings provided as being optimal. To
assess whether the lower conditional planting intensity of adopters in T2 reflects a
lower willingness of these farmers to procure additional seedlings, we re-estimate
our models considering only the number of self-procured seedlings planted in oil
palm plots (i.e., not provided for free through our intervention) (Table 2.6).
Table 2.6: Intention-to-treat estimates for planting of self-procured tree seedlings
Uncond. expected val-
ues
Adoption decision Cond. expected values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




T1 1.072** 1.267** 0.056* 0.061** 8.837*** 10.479***
(0.433) (0.536) (0.033) (0.028) (2.532) (3.661)
T2 1.001** 1.615** 0.063** 0.070*** 6.924** 11.678**
(0.407) (0.779) (0.027) (0.023) (3.107) (5.737)
N 736 736 737 737 63 63
P-values
of t-test
for T1=T2 0.902 0.679 0.850 0.752 0.624 0.853
Controls1 No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses and estimated with Delta method. Columns
(1) and (2) show unconditional AME. Columns (3) and (4) report AME for the adoption decision.
AME for the intensity equation are reported in columns (5) and (6). A GLM with log-link and
gamma distribution was used for estimation. Stratification variables and the pre-treatment
(baseline) dependent variable are included in all model specifications.
1 Baseline controls include number of household members, whether a farmer cut trees in OP in
2015, education, whether he or she had a home garden, total area of oil palm managed, the
mean price for oil bunches received, whether he or she received environmental extension, the
share of plots that were flooded and whether farmers experienced information and/or seed
access constraints.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Results show that both interventions have very similar effects on the number of
self-procured seedlings. Effect sizes of T1 and T2 on the adoption decision, the
unconditional, and conditional number of trees planted do not significantly differ
from each other. Thus, in both groups we observe similar (albeit small) shares of
farmers motivated to incur additional planting efforts beyond what is provided for
36
Chapter 2. Tree planting and survival in oil palm
Table 2.7: Total costs and outcomes of interventions









T1 1140 666 4591 3001
T2 1606 1226 7025 5435
C 163 135 0 0
Sunk costs include the salaries for the local movie-maker and the artist who designed the manual.
Running costs include assistants’ salary and per diem, car rental, printing of the manual and
costs for the tree seedlings. Costs due to video or manual design were equally accounted for in
T1 and T2. For conversion of local currency in USD, official 2016 exchange rate was used.
free by the intervention and displaying similarly high levels of conditional planting
intensity on the average. Thus, there is no indication that the free provision of
seedlings in T2 crowds out own tree planting efforts; it rather seems to encourage
tree planting also among farmers deriving lower utility from tree planting.
2.3.4 Cost effectiveness considerations
To be able to draw more informed policy recommendations, tree-planting outcomes
induced by the two interventions should be assessed in relation to the costs incurred.
So far we have considered the number of trees planted per hectare as relevant
outcome indicator to assess the effectiveness of the interventions. Tree planting
is certainly a necessary first step towards more biodiversity-friendly plantation
management, however, ultimately environmental effects are only generated if trees
survive. When assessing cost-effectiveness, we therefore consider not only the total
number of trees planted due to the intervention, but also the total number of trees
that survived after one year. The first year is a crucial time period for tree survival,
as trees are especially vulnerable during this early stage and require more care
(Jack et al., 2015). The numbers reported in Table 2.7 indicate that in total T2 has
resulted in around 41% more trees planted and 84% more trees survived compared
to T1. Yet, total costs incurred by T2 are also higher: when considering the sunk
costs of designing the information campaign (video and manual), total costs are
around 53% higher, without sunk costs they are around 81% higher in T2 compared
to T1.
Based on these numbers, we calculate cost effectiveness measures for the two
policy interventions (Table 2.8). Since we are interested in the incremental effect of
the interventions (compared to no intervention), we subtract the number of trees
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Table 2.8: Cost effectiveness measures


















T1 0.22 0.11 0.33 0.18 245
(1.55) (1.07) (2.37) (1.63)
T2 0.21 0.15 0.27 0.19 253
(0.90) (0.77) (1.16) (1.00)
P-values 0.881 0.718 0.688 0.897
of T1=T2
Cost effectiveness measures present the number of planted or survived trees per farmer divided
by the per capita costs of the interventions. We subtract the average number of trees planted
per household in the control group from the number of trees planted per household in the
treatment groups to express the incremental effect of our interventions. Test for difference in
cost effectiveness between T1 and T2 done in a linear regression with village-level clustered
standard errors and stratification variables.
planted/survived in the control group. Cost effectiveness measures are reported with
and without the sunk costs of designing the information material. A comparison
of the measures reported in Table 2.8 reveals that the two interventions perform
very similarly in terms of aggregate cost effectiveness – none of the measures differ
significantly between the two interventions. Accordingly, while costs of T2 are
substantially higher than those of T1, the better aggregate tree outcomes generated
by T2 compensate for the higher program costs.
2.3.5 Tree survival
An important leverage point for improving the cost-effectiveness of the interventions
is raising the tree survival rate. At the aggregate level, only around 58% and 76%
of the planted trees in T1 and T2, respectively, survived (Table 2.7). Since tree
planting and maintenance activities are implemented at the farm level, any measures
to enhance tree survival would best be targeted at farmers. Table 2.9 presents
average tree survival rates at farm level by treatment group. Since tree planting
is a pre-condition for tree survival, only adopters are considered in the analyses
in this subsection. The average survival rates reported in Table 2.9 differ from
the aggregate measures reported in the previous subsection, since many farmers
in T2 plant only small numbers of trees in comparison to farmers in T1 and the
control group – therefore in the latter groups it is more likely that even a small
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reduction in the survival rate can imply a large loss in the number of trees.24 The
descriptive comparison reveals that adopters in T2 perform significantly lower with
respect to tree survival rates than adopters in T1 and the control group (Table 2.9).
There is no significant difference in survival rates achieved by farmers in T1 and
the control group. These results are supported by estimates from a fractional
probit regression regressing farm-level tree survival rates on treatment assignment
(Table 2.10, column (1)).25
Table 2.9: Descriptives of farm-level survival rates (adopters only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Overall Control T1 T2 T1=C T2=C T1=T2
0.660 0.923 0.854 0.590 0.462 0.000*** 0.022**
(0.399) (0.140) (0.320) (0.408)
N 144 11 24 109
In columns (1) to (4), standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Columns (5) to (7) show
p-values of mean difference test with clustered standard errors.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We identify four different categories of factors that are likely to be associated
with farmers’ performance regarding tree survival in our context. If these factors are
unbalanced between treatment groups, they can help explain the differential survival
rates between treatment groups. First, the planting pattern might determine tree
survival. Many trees planted together in clusters are more resilient and hence likely
to show higher survival rates (Goldman et al., 2007). We control for both the
number of trees planted by the farmer and the share planted in clusters. Second,
farmers’ characteristics such as experience and skills and the related maintenance
given to trees might positively influence tree survival.26 Also, farmers who received
seedlings for free may invest less effort in maintenance, due to either a lower intrinsic
interest in trees or due to lower sunk costs of seedling loss (Ashraf et al., 2010;
Thaler, 1980). Third, we expect that the plot conditions, including exposure to
flooding and drought, oil palm plantation age, the number of oil palms planted
per hectare and whether a river borders the plot, affect tree survival. Fourth, the
species choice might be a significant predictor for tree survival. Even though the
24The lower aggregate number of surviving trees in T1 is driven by two farmers. These farmers
planted together 300 trees, but none of the planted trees survived.
25Since both zero and one appear with a positive frequency in our data set, we rely on a
fractional probit estimation instead of a beta regression to explain survival rates. Fractional
probit estimation is preferred over OLS due to the bounded nature of the dependent variable.
26We proxy skills with education and wealth. Variable choice is discussed in Table A2.11 in the
Appendix.
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Table 2.10: Difference in tree survival rates between different treatment groups
(1) (2)





T2 – no planting beyond -1.022***
intention (0.354)





Coefficients from a fractional probit estimation are reported. Village-level clustered standard
errors in parentheses. In column (2), farmers in T2 who did not plant the distributed tree
species were excluded from the analysis. P-values of test for T1=T2 in column (1): 0.014, for
test T1=T2-no planting beyond intention: 0.143, for test T1=T2-planting in excess of intention:
0.009; for test T2-no planting beyond intention=T2-planting in excess of intention: 0.099 in
column (2).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
species distributed in the experiment were chosen because they are native to Jambi
and known by the farmers, they might not have been optimal species to plant with
oil palms. In addition, it could be that exogenously distributed seedlings do not
correspond to smallholders’ preferences.
We test for these potential correlations conditional on tree planting adoption,
and thus are leaving the randomized framework of our experiment. We regress tree
survival rates on a range of farm and household factors belonging to the different
categories using a fractional probit model. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.11
report those variables that turn out to be significant predictors of tree survival
rates (full model results are reported in Table A2.9 in the Appendix).
We find ample support for the relevance of the second category of factors
identified above. Prior experience with tree planting in oil palm plantations and
maintenance given to the trees27 are significantly and positively associated with
27We acknowledge that reverse causality between survival rate and maintenance might be
present in case seedlings die early, such that maintenance is no longer given. Yet, our informational
session indicated that maintenance should be given directly after planting the trees. This reduces
the risk of reverse causality in the treatment groups. In addition, it is unlikely that reverse
causality is systematically linked to T2, since both treatment groups received the same set of
information.
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Share of provided species in -0.275*** -0.199**
total trees planted (0.081) (0.093)
Share of plots with a river 0.144*** 0.171*** 0.096
bordering (0.055) (0.057) (0.059)
Experience with tree planting in 0.206*** 0.233*** 0.234***
OP (1=Yes) (0.059) (0.056) (0.049)
Maintenance done to trees 0.181*** 0.200*** 0.209***
(1=Yes) (0.055) (0.051) (0.053)
Distance from Jambi to village -0.002*
(in km) (0.001)
Number of free seedlings -0.029***
planted in excess of intention (0.010)
N 141 141 101
AME from fractional probit estimations shown. Village-level clustered standard errors estimated
with help of Delta method and displayed in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) include the whole
sample of adopters and all species planted. In column (3), the analysis is restricted to the
species distributed in T2, and accordingly only includes the adopting farmers in T2 who plant
the provided tree species in their oil palm plantations.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
the probability of tree survival at the farm level. Regarding the third category of
factors, only the share of plots that border a river is positively and significantly
correlated with the tree survival rate in both model specifications. Trees are often
planted along the river side, where light and water availability are higher. Finally,
regarding the fourth category, we find that the share of the species distributed in the
experiment in overall species planted is significantly and negatively correlated with
the tree survival rate. To further explore the relevance of the significant predictors
in explaining the lower tree survival rates exhibited by farmers in T2 compared to
T1 and the control group, we report mean difference tests in Table 2.12.28
From the variables that exhibit a significant correlation with the tree survival
rate, only the share of the distributed tree species in total trees planted is signifi-
28Adopters in T1 and in the control group are merged into one comparison group, given that
their survival rates are not statistically different. The combined survival rate for adopters in the
control group and T1 is 0.876. This is statistically different from the survival rate in T2, which
is 0.590 (p-value: 0.004). Descriptives of the other variables are shown in Table A2.10 in the
Appendix, for which we do not find any systematical differences between treatment groups either.
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Table 2.12: Mean comparison test of significant predictors for tree survival
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Maintenance1 (1=Yes) 0.333 0.314 0.339 0.810
Experience with tree planting
(1=Yes)
0.230 0.286 0.211 0.539
Share of plots which border a
river2
0.204 0.118 0.231 0.156
(0.400) (0.327) (0.418)
Share of tree species provided in
total
0.700 0.278 0.832 0.000***
trees planted (0.439) (0.441) (0.346)
N 144 35 109
In columns (1) to (3), standard deviation reported in parentheses for continuous variables.
Column (4) shows p-values of mean difference tests with clustered standard errors.
1 Maintenance includes fertilizer and/or manure application and/or weeding.
2 Characteristics of plots in which farmers planted trees.
cantly different between treatment groups (Table 2.12). Thus, our species choice
might be one relevant reason why we observe a lower tree survival rate among
farmers in T2. In fact, a rather low survival rate of three of the species, Meranti,
Durian and Jelutung, is also found in an ecological experiment in the study area
(Zemp, Gérard, et al., 2019). While native to Jambi, these tree species may not
perform well when planted in immediate proximity to oil palms.
In addition, it could be that the tree species distributed in the experiment do
not correspond to farmers’ preferences, or that farmers’ in T2 were given more
seedlings of selected species for free than they actually intended to plant. To explore
this further, we calculate the number of “preferred” seedlings received by farmers
in T2 – this is the number of seedlings out of the six tree species distributed for
free, for which the farmer had previously indicated a positive planting intention.29
The number of “preferred” seedlings was then subtracted from the number of
the freely distributed seedlings that were actually planted in order to obtain the
number of free seedlings that were planted in excess of the farmer’s originally stated
intention. In Table 2.11 column (3) we restrict our analysis to adopters in T2 in
order to explore whether the number of free seedlings planted in excess of intention
29Farmers in T2 were asked after the information campaign but before the seedlings were
handed out how many trees of each of the six species they would plant in their oil palm plantation
if provided for free.
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explains survival rates of the distributed species. Indeed, we find a significantly
negative effect indicating that farmers who planted more than they intended -
possibly because they received the seedlings for free- exhibit lower tree survival
rates among the distributed species. This may at least to some extent explain
the lower overall tree survival rates observed among farmers in T2 (Table 2.10).
In Table 2.10 column (2) we split T2 farmers into two subgroups – those who
planted free seedlings in excess of intentions and those who did not – and compare
average tree survival rates between these two subgroups, T1, and the control group.
The results show that survival rates in the subgroup of T2 farmers planting in
excess of intentions are significantly lower compared to all other groups (p-values
reported below Table 2.10). Thus, non-correspondence between our species choice
and farmers’ preferences seems to represent an important factor influencing the
effectiveness of interventions – even if it does not fully explain lower survival rates
in T2 since the survival rate achieved by T2 farmers not planting beyond their
intentions is still significantly lower than that of the control group.
Finally, we cannot rule out that other factors, which are confounded with
the share of our tree species in total tree species planted and which we cannot
control for are the underlying reasons for the low survival rate of the distributed
species and hence for the lower tree survival rate observed among farmers in T2.
In particular, it could be the case that the age of the seedlings was not ideal for
immediate planting. Moreover, since the seedlings were brought from Jambi to the
respective villages, it could be that the delivered seedlings did not arrive in a good
state at the farmers’ houses due to poor quality roads in part of the study region.
Some evidence for the latter is provided by the significant and negative correlation
between the distance from Jambi to the respective village and the tree survival
rate that is however small in size (column (2) in Table 2.11).
2.4 Conclusion
Results from a randomized controlled trial implemented in Jambi Province, Indone-
sia, suggest that information (T1) and information in combination with seedling
provision (T2) are effective in stimulating tree planting in smallholder oil palm
plantations. Both treatments lead on average to a higher predicted number of trees
planted per hectare in comparison to the control group. The combined intervention
(T2) leads to a higher planting probability but lower conditional planting intensity
than sole information provision (T1). Our results suggest that the lower average
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conditional number of trees planted per hectare in T2 is driven by a large share of
farmers planting only the seedlings provided for free. Nonetheless, the free provision
of seedlings in T2 does not seem to discourage additional planting efforts – which
are carried out by similar shares of farmers with similar planting intensities in both
treatment groups. From a policy perspective, comparing the cost-effectiveness of
the two interventions is critical. Although the combined intervention incurs higher
program costs due to seedling purchase and delivery, it is also more effective in
terms of the total number of trees planted and survived. As a result, we find no
significant difference in cost-effectiveness between the two interventions.
In order to generate broader biodiversity effects and allow for ecological scaling
effects from the local to the regional level, diversified plantations will need to be
spread over a large area. This could enable species movements between diversified
plantations and could act as corridors to link remaining forest patches (Koh et
al., 2009). While both interventions in our experiment motivated a small share
of farmers to make substantial planting efforts, the combined intervention (T2)
additionally induced low-intensity planting (up to six trees per hectare) among
a large share of farmers. This more likely generates a landscape design where
diversified plantations are spread over a large area. Here, a potential advantage
of the combined intervention is that it also motivates adoption of tree planting
among farmers who had initially stated that seedlings were not easily available in
their village. Thus, in particular in remote areas of developing countries, where
seed markets may be missing or characterized by high transaction costs, combining
information with seedling provision may be the more viable approach to achieving
considerable uptake of tree planting.
An important leverage point to increasing cost-effectiveness of the interventions
is increasing tree survival rates, in particular in the context of free seedling provision,
where we found farm-level survival rates to be significantly lower. Our results
suggest that here species choice is critical and should be based on recent evidence
from ecological experiments (Zemp, Gérard, et al., 2019) and in particular reflect
farmers’ preferences. Also, seedling quality and logistics of seed delivery are
important challenges that need to be addressed, as they can otherwise jeopardize
the success of the intervention. Involving local nurseries, thereby reducing transport
distances, can be promising, also in terms of local value creation and strengthening
capacities along the value chain. Furthermore, tree mortality is generally lower
for farmers with more experience in tree planting. The integration of practical
training elements into the extension approach might thus be a way to increase
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tree survival. Finally, further research could also experiment with the number of
seedlings provided to farmers to assess how it influences their planting decision and
the number of trees planted. This will generate important insights regarding the
feasibility of up-scaling tree planting intensities among larger numbers of farmers,
which will be important for the generation of broader biodiversity effects.
A limitation of our study is that we did not measure biodiversity outcomes,
e.g. in terms of arthropod or bird diversity, and therefore cannot establish the
relationship between the number of native trees planted or survived and actual bio-
diversity outcomes. Several recent studies comparing monoculture and polyculture
practices in oil palm smallholdings have found significant positive effects of the
latter on arthropod, bird and bat communities (Ashraf et al., 2018; Ghazali et al.,
2016; Syafiq et al., 2016; Yahya et al., 2017). However, polycultural farming here
refers to complex agricultural systems combining oil palms with other crops such
as banana, coconut, tapioca, corn, and sugar cane, as well as fruit trees such as
jackfruit, mango and cacao. Accordingly, the studies have not been designed to
derive the relationship between (native) tree planting intensity and biodiversity
outcomes. Only Teuscher et al. (2015) explicitly analyze the effects of the number
of trees in oil palm on bird abundance and species diversity. In their sample of 120
smallholder oil palm farmers, predicted bird diversity conditional on the number
of trees ranges from 2.58 species (when there are zero trees) to 5.15 species (in
case of 125 trees). Over the same range of trees, bird abundance ranges from
3.66 individuals to 8.05 individuals. The response of tree diversity and abundance
to tree planting is non-linear, indicating a strong decrease in the marginal effect
of additional trees on bird diversity and abundance with increasing number of
trees. The results presented by Teuscher et al. (2015) suggest that if six trees are
planted in a one-hectare monoculture oil palm plantation (with no native trees
to start with), as done by a large share of the farmers receiving free seedlings
in our study, the predicted increase in bird diversity ranges around 0.6 species
and in bird abundance around one individual. However, it needs to be taken into
account that ecological effects measured at the plot level depend also on other
factors such a ground vegetation cover and chemical inputs (Azhar, Lindenmayer,
Wood, Fischer, & Zakaria, 2014; Yahya et al., 2017). Further, feedback effects
between landscape and plot-level characteristics exist such that plot-level effects
cannot be easily extrapolated to the landscape level (Tscharntke et al., 2012).
The expansion of oil palm plantations in South East Asia is a key driver of
global biodiversity loss (Diaz et al., 2019). Ecological research has suggested that
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the introduction of more structural complexity, e.g. in form of diversified oil palm
systems, can sustain increased biodiversity outcomes compared to monoculture
landscapes (Koh et al., 2009; Syafiq et al., 2016; Yahya et al., 2017). Our research
suggests that in particular the combination of information with free seedlings
robustly motivates smallholder farmers to increase the number of trees planted
in their oil palm plantations, thereby promoting the uptake of more diversified
plantations. With regard to the external validity of our results, two aspects
deserve mentioning. Many smallholders in Jambi, Indonesia, were previously
part of an outgrower scheme or have received extension services from large-scale
plantations, propagating homogeneous plantation structures. This has resulted in
some skepticism among smallholder farmers about planting trees together with oil
palms as shown in focus group discussions held prior to data collection. Hence, if
in other contexts prior concerns are less pronounced, farmers may be more inclined
to experiment with tree planting in oil palm plots (Slingerland, Khasanah, van
Noordwijk, Susanti, & Meilantina, 2019). Second, the baseline survey took place
while our study region was experiencing forest fires and haze (Field et al., 2016).
This might have made environmental problems more salient to the local population
and thus increased their interest in tree planting. Therefore, similar studies in
other oil palm producing areas would be useful to explore the extent to which our
results can be generalized to other contexts.
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Table A2.1: Intention-to-treat estimates for adoption decision
Estimated Coefficients Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Planting in OP Planting in OP Planting in OP Planting in OP
T1 0.872*/c 0.994**/b 0.057**/c 0.061**/b
(0.510) (0.472) (0.033) (0.029)
T2 2.772***/a 3.051***/a 0.381***/a 0.398***/a
(0.419) (0.392) (0.028) (0.028)
Access to seeds -0.199 -0.231 -0.025 -0.028
(0.221) (0.231) (0.027) (0.028)
Local village -0.279 -0.431 -0.035 -0.052
(0.285) (0.338) (0.035) (0.040)
Oil palm share >73.5% -0.277 -0.316* -0.035 -0.039*
(0.195) (0.178) (0.024) (0.021)
Total number of trees 0.030** 0.032** 0.004** 0.004**
planted per ha in OP (0.012) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002)
Number HH members 0.032 0.004
(0.062) (0.007)
Trees cut in OP -0.205 -0.025
(0.831) (0.101)
Years of education 0.071** 0.009**
(0.030) (0.004)
Home garden -1.275*** -0.155***
(0.384) (0.048)
Total hectare -0.018 -0.002
OP managed (0.022) (0.003)
FFB price per kg -0.224 -0.027
(0.705) (0.085)
Environmental extension 0.925** 0.113***
received (0.367) (0.043)
Share of plots flooded 0.178 0.022
(0.303) (0.037)
Information constraints 0.336 0.041
(0.226) (0.028)




Observations 737 737 737 737
McFadden pseudo R2 0.195 0.226
Logit estimation used. Columns (1) and (2) report estimated coefficients. Columns (3) and (4) derived
AME. Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Delta method used to estimate standard
errors for AME.
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
a/b/c refer to significance level 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) based on bootstrap-t procedure. 1000
replications used for estimating confidence intervals. Due to computational complexity, bootstrapped
confidence intervals were only computed for the treatment variables.
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Table A2.2: Intention-to-treat estimates for intensity decision
Estimated Coefficients Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trees planted Trees planted Trees planted Trees planted
per ha per ha per ha per ha
T1 1.185***/a 1.168***/a 8.127***/a 7.938**/b
(0.267) (0.415) (2.673) (3.578)
T2 0.193 0.252 0.762 1.026
(0.262) (0.432) (1.012) (1.683)
Access to seeds -0.327 0.006 -1.753 0.036
(0.320) (0.306) (1.759) (1.711)
Local village 0.418 0.552 2.241 3.088
(0.389) (0.511) (2.183) (3.214)
Oil palm share >73.5% -0.888*** -0.882*** -4.762*** -4.932***
(0.312) (0.301) (1.798) (1.754)
Total number of trees 0.012 0.016 0.062 0.089
planted per ha in OP (0.015) (0.020) (0.079) (0.123)
Number HH members -0.032 -0.179
(0.095) (0.529)
Trees cut in OP -0.029 -0.162
(0.668) (3.728)
Years of education 0.013 0.071
(0.024) (0.137)
Home garden -0.420 -2.349
(0.431) (2.475)
Total hectare OP managed -0.159*** -0.892***
(0.018) (0.212)
FFB price per kg 0.030 0.167
(0.962) (5.394)
Environmental extension 0.418 2.336
received (0.322) (1.934)
Share of plots flooded 0.400 2.238
(0.338) (1.722)
Information constraints -0.004 -0.023
(0.261) (1.459)




Observations 144 144 144 144
BIC 725.6 737.5
Results presented from a GLM model with log-link and gamma distribution of error terms for the subsample of
adopters only. Columns (1) and (2) present estimated coefficients. Columns (3) and (4) report derived AME.
Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Delta method used to estimate standard errors.
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
a/b/c refer to significance level 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) based on bootstrap-t procedure. 1000 replications
used for estimating confidence intervals. For the bootstrapped model, the dummy for cutting trees in oil palm
plantations in the last 12 months was not included. This is because the dummy did not vary between some
clusters prohibiting the estimation of the parameters in several pseudo samples. Due to computational complexity,
bootstrapped confidence intervals were only computed for the treatment variables.
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Table A2.3: Intention-to-treat effects on the unconditional predicted number of
trees planted per hectare
(1) (2)
Trees planted Trees planted





Access to seeds -0.459 -0.115
(0.387) (0.363)
Local village 0.217 0.278
(0.477) (0.657)
Oil palm share >73.5% -1.131*** -1.173***
(0.405) (0.406)
Total number of trees 0.033* 0.039
planted per ha in OP (0.018) (0.026)
Number HH members -0.013
(0.112)
Trees cut in OP -0.158
(0.921)














Seed access constraints -0.042
(0.323)
Observations 736 736
Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Delta method used to estimate standard
errors. AME for the unconditional expected number of trees per hectare.
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
a/b/c refer to significance level 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) based on bootstrap-t procedure.
1000 replications used for estimating confidence intervals. Due to computational complexity,
bootstrapped confidence intervals were only computed for the treatment variables.
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Table A2.4: Bootstrap-t confidence intervals for treatment groups
(1) (2)
T1 T2 T1 T2
Coefficients adoption 90%-CI 99%-CI 95%-CI 99%-CI
decision [0.104; 1.568] [1.824;4.086] [0.165; 1.692] [2.147; 3.950]
AME adoption 90%-CI 99%-CI 95%-CI 99%-CI
decision [0.008; 0.102] [0.297; 0.465] [0.004; 0.113] [0.291; 0.448]
Coefficients intensity 95%-CI 90%-CI 95%-CI 90%-CI
decision [0.664; 1.778] [-0.151; 0.884] [0.082; 2.123] [-0.683; 1.243]
AME intensity 99%-CI 90%-CI 95%-CI 90%-CI
decision [1.147; 29.485] [-0.710; 3.029] [3.106; 17.365] [-2.051; 3.695]
AME unconditional 99%-CI 99%-CI 99%-CI 99%-CI
expected value [0.273; 3.303] [0.384; 3.709] [0.195; 3.594] [0.725; 3.830]
1000 replications are used for bootstrapping. The table shows the confidence level for the highest significance
level. In case coefficients or AME is not significant at 10% level, 90% confidence intervals are displayed.
Columns (1) are estimated based on the model without covariates. Columns (2) include the same covariates
as used in Tables A2.1 to A2.3.
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Table A2.5: Heckman selection model
(1) (2)







Access to seeds -0.501** -0.0658
(0.228) (0.132)
Local village 0.194 -0.159
(0.261) (0.182)







Estimated coefficients from a Heckman selection model. Standard errors clustered at village level
and reported in parentheses.
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.83 Prob > chi2 = 0.3637.
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Further explanation of test for independence: To ensure that only positive values are predicted
by the quantity equation, we follow Wooldridge (2010) and apply a logarithmic transformation to
the number of trees planted per hectare. We assume that the possession of a home garden affects
the planting decision; as farmers with a home garden will often choose to plant trees there rather
than in their oil palm plantation. At the same time, we assume that home garden is not a relevant
predictor for the number of trees planted, which is supported by the insignificance of the coefficient
of home garden in the conditional expected value estimation in Table A2.2. Consequently, the
possession of a home garden represents a valid exclusion restriction and overcomes collinearity
problems often encountered when conducting a Wald test of independence (Dow & Norton, 2003).
The test suggests that we cannot reject the independence assumption (p-value: 0.364). The
validity of the test based on the significance of the inverse mills ratio (IMR) is further supported
by the Variance inflation factor (VIF) of the regression of the IMR on the remaining parameters
in the model. The resulting sizes of the VIF of 14.10 and 14.30 for the two model specifications
tested are well below 30 which is considered the critical level for conducting this test (Madden,
2008). This supports the use of the DH-model.
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Table A2.6: Weighted Intention-to-treat estimation
Unconditional expected
values
Adoption decision Conditional expected
values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




T1 0.982** 0.964** 0.055* 0.059** 8.173*** 7.908**
(0.414) (0.438) (0.033) (0.029) (2.617) (3.559)
T2 1.583*** 1.715*** 0.381*** 0.398*** 0.721 0.953
(0.348) (0.414) (0.028) (0.028) (1.005) (1.712)
N 736 736 736 736 144 144
P-values of
t-test
0.281 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.044
for T1=T2
Controls1 No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses and estimated with Delta method.
Columns (1) and (2) show unconditional AME. Columns (3) and (4) report AME from a logit
regression. Columns (5) and (6) report AME from a GLM with log-link and gamma distribution
of the error terms. Stratification variables and past number of trees planted per hectare in oil
palm plantations included in all model specification. Inverse probability weights applied.
1 Baseline controls include number of household members, whether a farmer cut trees in OP
in 2015, education, whether he or she had a home garden, total area of oil palm managed, the
mean price for oil palm bunches received, whether he or she received environmental extension,
the share of plots that were flooded and whether farmers experienced information and/or seed
access constraints.
Drawing on Fitzgerald et al. (1998) weights are constructed with help of auxiliary variables that
determine selection in the follow-up sample while being of minor importance for the outcome
analysis. Results of the Selection Equation are presented in Table A2.7. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ***
p <0.01
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Years of education 0.023* 0.006
(0.014) (0.016)
Trees planted in OP -0.265 -0.497
(0.614) (0.595)
Total hectare oil palm -0.011 -0.011
managed (0.008) (0.008)
Environmental 0.040 -0.032
extension received (0.266) (0.276)
Home garden 0.228* 0.323**
(0.131) (0.146)
Local village 0.159 0.198
(0.157) (0.169)
Oil palm share >73.5% 0.006 -0.038
(0.121) (0.146)
Access to seeds 0.091 0.085
(0.126) (0.126)






Trees cut in OP 0.133
(0.207)









McFadden pseudo R2 0.017 0.057
1 Out of eleven dummy variables for the assistants collecting the baseline data, only two are
statistically significant at the 10% level.
Probit model employed. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at village level. Model
2 includes additional auxiliary covariates. In order to get unbiased estimates for the outcome
variable of interest, weights are constructed by dividing (1) and (2). Estimates are used to
construct Inverse Probability weights.
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Lee bounds Manski-Horowitz bounds Lee bounds
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper


























Bounds presented for ITT regression without covariates. Confidence intervals in parentheses.
Manski- Horowitz bounds (MH-bounds) assume worse and best case scenarios for the attritors,
i.e. farmers dropping out of the control group adopt and those dropping out of the treatment
group do not (and vice versa). Since MH bounds are uninformative if applied to non-bounded
outcome variables (Lee, 2009) they are only presented for the adoption decision.
Besides random assignment of the treatments, the Lee bounds assume that treatment status
can affect selection only in one direction. Since attrition is highest in the control group, this
monotonicity assumption is likely to be fulfilled. Since Lee bounds are often smaller, they are
more informative. This is also why we interpret the results from the bounds as support for our
previous results, despite the non-significance of T1 for the adoption decision when MH-bounds are
used. However, the MH-Bounds provide a helpful indication whether the monotonicity assumption
imposed by the method proposed by Lee (2009) is realistic. Lee-Bounds need to lie within the
wider MH-bounds.
Since we cannot disentangle sample selection because of attrition and because of adoption for the
intensity decision, we do not present bounds for the conditional expected number of trees per
hectare
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Table A2.9: Fractional probit estimation for tree survival
























Share of trees 0.071 -0.027 -0.119 0.022 -0.008 -0.039
planted in island (0.405) (0.418) (0.430) (0.124) (0.124) (0.141)
Share of provided -0.898*** -0.670** -0.275*** -0.199**
species in total
trees planted
(0.267) (0.306) (0.081) (0.093)
Total number of 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000
trees planted (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean plot age 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Mean number of -0.002 -0.005 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
oil palms (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Share of plots with 0.470** 0.574*** 0.293 0.144*** 0.171*** 0.096
a river bordering (0.184) (0.200) (0.181) (0.055) (0.057) (0.059)
Share of flood -0.135 -0.353 -0.533 -0.041 -0.105 -0.175
prone plots (0.536) (0.507) (0.581) (0.164) (0.150) (0.187)
Share of drought -0.275 -0.226 -0.405 -0.084 -0.067 -0.133
prone plots (0.232) (0.240) (0.307) (0.071) (0.070) (0.098)
Years of education 0.029 0.023 0.034 0.009 0.007 0.011
(0.028) (0.026) (0.030) (0,009) (0.008) (0.010)
Experience with 0.674*** 0.784*** 0.713*** 0.206*** 0.233*** 0.234***
tree planting in OP (0.193) (0.192) (0.149) (0.059) (0.056) (0.049)
values of assets in 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
1,000 IDR (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
maintenance done 0.591*** 0.671*** 0.637*** 0.181*** 0.200*** 0.209***
to trees (1=Yes) (0.193) (0.187) (0.174) (0.055) (0.051) (0.053)
Distance to asphalt 0.014 0.004
road (in km) (0.017) (0.005)
Distance to Jambi -0.006* -0.002*
city (in km) (0.003) (0.001)
Species planted in -0.087** -0.029***
excess of intent (0.034) (0.010)
Constant 0.634 1.393 -0.208
(0.969) (0.956) (1.050)
Observations 141 141 101 141 141 101
Standard errors clustered at village level reported in parentheses. Columns (1) to (3) report
coefficients from a fractional probit estimation. Columns (4) to (6) report derived AME. To
control for the ease of transport of the seedlings, we also include the distance between the villages
and Jambi city and the distance to the next paved road in column (2). A precise description
of the variables can be found in Table A2.11. In columns (3) and (6) only farmers in T2 who
planted the distributed species are included.
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A2.10: Descriptives of other explanatory variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Overall Control + T1 T2 Control + T1
= T2
Share of trees planted in islands 0.066 0.086 0.060 0.622
(0.247) (0.284) (0.234)
Total number of trees planted 24.944 37.229 21 0.358
(91.812) (71.062) (97.502)
Mean plantation age 13.552 13.043 13.716 0.763
(7.606) (7.413) (7.693)
Mean number of oil palms per ha 141.091 139.749 141.509 0.621
(15.936) (17.072) (15.624)
Share of plots which are flood prone 0.105 0.147 0.092 0.584
(0.307) (0.359) (0.290)
Share of plots which are drought prone 0.608 0.451 0.657 0.056*
(0.485) (0.498) (0.472)
Education 8.188 8.600 8.055 0.457
(3.861) (4.146) (3.776)
Asset index (in 1,000 IDR) 33.835 44.157 30.521 0.310
(58.814) (55.326) (59.757)
N 144 35 109
In columns (1) to (3), standard deviation reported in parentheses. Column (4) shows p-values of test for mean
difference with clustered standard errors. Test for equality between the combined group of control and T1, and T2
done with help of a linear regression with village-level clustered standard errors.
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A2.11: Definition of explanatory variables
Intention-to-Treat Estimation
Variable Name Explanation
Trees planted per hectare
(outcome variable)
We can detect one important outlier in our outcome variable
who planted 167 trees per hectare for an intercropping
system.
This is over nine times the standard deviation away from the
mean of the farmers who planted in oil palm plots. The
number of trees per hectare of this farmer is replaced with
the observation of the farmer who planted the second highest
number of trees per hectare.
T1 =1 if the village was assigned to treatment one, the
informational intervention
= 0 otherwise
T2 = 1 if the village was assigned to Treatment two, the
structural intervention
= 0 otherwise
Access to seeds* = 1 if the farmers in the village have access to tree seedlings
= 0 otherwise
Local village* = 1 if mostly local Melayu farmers live in the village
= 0 mostly transmigrant farmers live in the village
Oil palm share >73.5%* = 1 if more than 73.5% of the farmers in one village are
engaged in oil palm cultivation
= 0 otherwise
Number HH members* Number of persons in a household
Trees cut in OP* = 1 if a farmer cut trees in his or her oil palm plantation in
the last 12 months
Years of education* Years of education of household head
Home garden* = 1 if a farmer has a home garden
= 0 otherwise
Total number of trees planted
per ha in OP *
Number of trees per hectare a farmer has planted in oil palm
plantations, per household. Since the distribution of tree
density is highly right skewed, the variable is winsorized.
The top 1% of the
distribution is replaced with the 99 percentile.
FFB price per kg* For prices, we use the mean prices for Fresh Fruit Bunches
farmers
got in 2015 for the rainy and dry season. For farmers who
have not
harvested their plots yet, the mean village value is used.
Environmental extension
received*
= 1 if the farmer received any environmental extension in
the last 12 months
= 0 otherwise
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Share of plots flooded* Number of plots flooded in 2015 divided by total number of
plots
Seed access constraint* Farmers were asked on a five point Likert scale ranging from
strongly disagree (=1) to strongly agree (=5) whether
seedlings are easily available in the village. Farmers who
(strongly) disagree with this statement were classified as
seedling constrained=1.
Seedling constraint = 0 otherwise
Information constraint* Farmers were asked on a five point Likert scale ranging from
strongly disagree (=1) to strongly agree (=5) whether there
is enough information about tree planting available in the
village. Farmers who (strongly) disagree with the first were
classified as information constrained = 1, = 0 otherwise.
Tree survival equation
Variable Name Explanation
Distance to Jambi city* Distance from village office to Jambi city based on GPS
coordinates (in km)
Distance to asphalt road* Distance from village to next asphalt road (in km)
Maintenance done to trees = 1 if a farmer applies fertilizer and/or manure application
and/or weeding.
= 0 otherwise
Values of assets* Asset index in 1,000 IDR. Assets considered for the
compilation are television, motorbike, car, fridge, washing
machine and cell-phone.
Experience with tree planting
in OP*
= 1 if a farmer has trees in his or her oil palm plantation
which he or she planted on his or her own. = 0 otherwise
Share of plots with river
bordering
Share of plots a farmer planted trees on which have a river
bordering
Share of plots which are flood
prone
Share of plots a farmer planted trees on which have been
flooded both in 2015 and in 2016.
Mean steepness of plots Mean steepness of plots a farmer planted trees on Variable
ranges from 1 to 6. A one unit increase represents an
increase in slope of 10 degrees.
Mean age of plot Mean age of the plantation where the farmers planted trees
on
Total number of trees planted Total number of trees a farmer planted
Share of provided species in
total trees planted
Number of the six species, which were chosen to be
distributed in T2, divided by the total number of trees
planted.
Share of trees planted in
islands
Number of trees which are planted in a clustered way
divided by the total number of trees planted.
Education* Years of education of household head
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Species planted in excess of
intent
Farmers were asked after the intervention how many of the
six species distributed they would like to plant per ha if
provided for free. Based on this, we estimated the number of
species a farmer would like to plant. This number was
subtracted from the number of species a farmer actually
planted to derive the number of species a farmer planted
beyond his or her intent.
Variables indicated with a * refer to baseline levels.
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3.1 Introduction
Biodiversity loss represents one of the most urgent ecological problems nowadays.
This is highlighted by the 2019 Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services report which refers to an accelerating species
extinction rate that is at its highest level ever seen (Diaz et al., 2019). In order
to protect biodiversity, agricultural land, which makes up around 37% of all land
area (The World Bank, 2016), represents a key element. Intensified agriculture has
contributed to biodiversity loss via a simplification in vegetation and landscape
structure. However, agriculture can also increase biodiversity if land is managed in
an environmentally friendly way (Tscharntke, Klein, Kruess, Steffan-Dewenter, &
Thies, 2005). This requires the involvement of private land owners. Yet, private
incentives for land owners to manage their land in a biodiversity-friendly way
are often small, because biodiversity represents a public good whose protection is
mostly linked to costs (Goldman et al., 2007).
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) can be considered a promising policy
tool in order to increase private incentives for biodiversity conservation. PES can be
defined as voluntary transactions between beneficiaries and providers of ecosystem
services that are conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management and
aim at providing environmental benefits (Wunder, 2015). While PES have become a
widely implemented policy instrument in both developed and developing countries,
their ecological effectiveness appears to be mixed (Börner et al., 2017; Pattanayak,
Wunder, & Ferraro, 2010). One of the reasons put forward for this is that often
the land use targeted under a PES-scheme does not effectively translate into an
improvement of the targeted ecosystem service (Wunder, Engel, & Pagiola, 2008).
To increase the effectiveness of PES-schemes it can be important to take into
consideration landscape-level requirements for the ecosystem service targeted. Both
the composition of the landscape, i.e. the proportion of different habitat types,
and its configuration, i.e. the spatial arrangement of the habitat types, can be of
importance (Goldman et al., 2007; Liere et al., 2017). In order to increase ecosystem
services linked to pollinator diversity such as bird diversity, a minimum size of
conservation area needs to be present for species that are (partially) dependent on
forest cover. If the conservation area falls below this minimum, species richness
and/or abundance might decline abruptly and the risk of species extinction exists
(Betts, Forbes, & Diamond, 2007; Fahrig, 2003). A second aspect, which has
been shown to affect the abundance and diversity of several species, is habitat
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fragmentation (Goldman et al., 2007). Increasing distances between, and isolation
of forest patches negatively correlate with the existence of several species, because
of e.g. limited possibilities for populations to exchange with populations living in
other patches (Martensen et al., 2012; Pardini et al., 2010). Besides evidence from
forest areas, the relevance of connectivity and the existence of threshold effects have
also been supported for semi-natural, conserved or restored areas in agricultural
landscapes (Azhar et al., 2011; Hass et al., 2018; Tscharntke et al., 2011; With,
Pavuk, Worchuck, Oates, & Fisher, 2002).
In order to ensure that a sufficient size of conservation area is created, some
authors suggest to compensate providers of ecosystem services only, if the required
size of conservation area is generated at a predefined scale (Cadsby & Maynes, 1999;
Le Coent et al., 2014; Midler et al., 2015; Narloch et al., 2012). To increase the
spatial connectivity between conserved areas, scholars have proposed an agglomera-
tion bonus in addition to a uniform payment per e.g. hectare conserved, if farmers
put bordering land under conservation (Parkhurst & Shogren, 2007; Parkhurst et
al., 2002). Another instrument suggested to improve the spatial connectivity are
agglomeration payments, where payments are only made if farmers put bordering
plots under conservation. Uniform base payments are thus not offered under such
schemes (Drechsler, Wätzold, Johst, & Shogren, 2010; Lewis, Plantinga, Nelson, &
Polasky, 2011; Wätzold & Drechsler, 2014). Positive evidence on the effectiveness
of the first two approaches is mostly provided by experimental studies (Banerjee,
2018; Banerjee, de Vries, Hanley, & van Soest, 2014; Midler et al., 2015; Narloch et
al., 2012). In contrast, evidence on the agglomeration payment is almost entirely
derived from simulation studies, with the study by Ferré, Engel, and Gsottbauer
(2018) that is however based on very small groups of two individuals as an exception.
However, none of these approaches analyze a scenario in which the generation of
environmental effects depends both on reaching a critical size of conservation area
and its connectivity. Consequently, these studies cannot derive conclusions on
which approaches are best suited for biodiversity conservation.
In order to test which policies could be suitable for biodiversity conservation,
we implemented a framed field experiment with Indonesian oil palm farmers. In
the experiment, farmers needed to decide whether to keep their land under a
monoculture oil palm plantation, or whether to switch to conservation, i.e. a
biodiversity-friendly mixed system that integrates trees besides oil palms. Two
different PES designs are analyzed: The first one is a conditional payment where
farmers are compensated for conservation if at least three farmers in a group of six
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conserve. This policy scheme especially aims at reaching critical area thresholds and
is similar to the PES design analyzed in e.g. Midler et al. (2015). The second one
is an agglomeration payment and compensates conserving farmers if at least three
farmers with bordering land conserve in the group. Besides reaching a relevant
area threshold, it sets additional incentives for improving the connectivity between
conserved plots.1 This could increase both the environmental effectiveness and the
budget efficiency of the PES scheme in comparison to designs without an explicit
spatial target (Wätzold & Drechsler, 2014). Given the general current challenge of
(sustaining) financing of compensation schemes for landscape restoration (FAO &
Global Mechanism of the UNCCD, 2015), the latter is important for policy makers.
To additionally explore the relevance of compensation sizes for conservation, these
two PES designs are combined with three different payment levels.
We look at the effects of the two PES designs and the three payment levels on
the individual conservation decision and on the environmental effects generated.
To assess the underlying drivers of the latter, we further analyze the effects on the
share of conserving farmers and on coordination, measured as the environmental
effects generated per conserving farmer. These two indicators are closely linked to
the provision of an environmentally relevant area size and its connectivity. Besides
environmental effectiveness, we look at the environmental effects generated per
unit of budget spent and the level of overall welfare generated as two efficiency
indicators PES-schemes are commonly judged upon.
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we combine two
strands of literature which have either looked at how PES-schemes need to be
designed to meet important ecological thresholds, or at how the spatial connectivity
between conserved plots can be improved by analyzing the provision of a threshold
environmental good that is positively affected by increased connectivity between
the conserved plots.2 Second, we provide experimental evidence on agglomeration
payments. While simulation studies have highlighted positive advantages of ag-
glomeration payments such as high budget efficiency, these studies assume that
land owners will put their land under conservation if expected revenues are positive
1Simulation studies have adopted a broader definition of connectivity. Conserved plots do not
need to be directly bordering. Instead, they often define a conservation density which measures
the share of conserved area in total area of the landscape targeted (e.g. Wätzold and Drechsler
2014). Under this broader definition of connectivity, the two thresholds analyzed could also be
understood as two agglomeration payments. In contrast to these simulation studies, the provision
of environmental goods is subject to reaching the critical size of area in this study.
2With threshold good, we refer to cases where more than two individuals need to conserve to
generate the public good.
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(Drechsler et al., 2010; Lewis et al., 2011; Wätzold & Drechsler, 2014). Coordination
failure which has often been observed in laboratory experiments (e.g. Banerjee et al.
2014) is therefore ignored. Consequently, evidence on whether individuals manage
to coordinate under such schemes is missing. Third, we explore the behavior of
farmers and thus real-world decision makers in a developing country context. Al-
though the question of how to improve the spatial connectivity of conservation areas
has received considerable attention in the experimental literature, most studies
work with general students as a subject pool. The study by Ferré et al. (2018) that
works with agricultural students is the exception. To our knowledge, there exist
only two studies that implement spatial aspects in a framed field experiment (Liu et
al., 2019; Rommel & Anggraini, 2018), but only the former analyses compensation
schemes. Since real decision makers may behave differently than university students
(Levitt & List, 2007) and since policy makers may find results generated from
student samples unconvincing (Liu et al., 2019), it is important to complement
existing knowledge by results from framed experiments with farmers. Indonesia
is a particularly important case since the country represents one of the global
biodiversity hotspots with many endemic species. However, the local biodiversity
is getting under increasing pressure by the still ongoing oil palm expansion (Koh
& Wilcove, 2008). Therefore, the country is key when trying to tackle global
biodiversity loss.
Our study is structured as follows. First, we give some background information
about oil palm expansion in Indonesia and the related effects on biodiversity, and
introduce the concept of tree planting in oil palm plantations. In the next section,
the framed field experiment and the study region are presented. Moreover, we
derive theoretical hypotheses for farmers’ behavior in the experiment. Section 3.4
presents results and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Oil palm expansion in Indonesia
Over 85% of the global palm oil supply is produced in South-East Asia with
Indonesia being the biggest producing country. Due to high global demand, the
area under oil palm production in the country has expanded markedly in the
last decades, reaching 6,777,498 ha of area harvested in 2018 (FAO, 2019). In
comparison to 1980, this corresponds to an increase by a factor of 33.
Smallholder farmers account for around 40% of the Indonesian palm oil pro-
duction (Gatto et al., 2015). Most of them have profited from oil palm expansion
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in terms of income growth (Euler et al., 2017). However, at the same time, oil
palm expansion has also spurred deforestation (Fitzherbert et al., 2008). Besides
concerns over climate impacts (Dislich et al., 2017), environmentalists especially
highlight the resulting threats for biodiversity (Koh & Wilcove, 2008; Vijay et al.,
2016). One of the reasons for this is that Indonesia represents one of the global
biodiversity hotspots with many endemic species, many of which are dependent
on forest area. Due to their reduced vegetation complexity, oil palm plantations
however only harbor a very limited range of taxa and many invasive species are
present (Dislich et al., 2017).
In order to increase biodiversity, some authors have suggested the planting of
mixed systems, which besides oil palms include other crops and trees (Bhagwat &
Willis, 2008). If established in a spatially coordinated way, these mixed systems
can serve as corridors and might link remnant forest patches in high production
areas (Koh et al., 2009). Mixed oil palm systems have been shown to support
more biodiversity than monoculture systems (Ashraf et al., 2018; Yahya et al.,
2017). However, the relationship between species diversity and forest cover at the
landscape level (Betts et al., 2007; Martensen et al., 2012), and species diversity
and the number of native trees in oil palm plantations at the plot level (Teuscher
et al., 2015) suggest that a minimum critical area size is likely needed to prevent
an abrupt decline in species abundance and/or diversity.
Due to competition for nutrients and light, intercropping oil palms with trees
potentially generates costs for farmers (Teuscher et al., 2015). The existence and
size of these costs likely depend on the species chosen for intercropping (Corley
& Tinker, 2016; Miccolis et al., 2019). While some smallholders prefer mixed oil
palm systems because of diversification preferences (Slingerland et al., 2019), the
costs that smallholders potentially incur when switching to a more diverse system
can explain why only few mixed systems exist in oil palm dominated areas such as
Jambi Province in Sumatra (Teuscher et al., 2015). To increase the share of mixed
systems to environmentally relevant shares at the landscape level, compensation
payments might thus be needed. This motivates the analysis of PES as a potential
policy instrument.
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3.3 The conservation game
3.3.1 Experimental design
In order to analyze farmers’ willingness to plant trees in oil palm plantations, we
use a coordination game. To increase the external validity of the results, the game
was framed around the decision to maintain a pure oil palm plantation, or to
switch to a mixed system with both oil palms and trees growing together. Our
experiment comprises three stages. First, all farmers play a baseline scenario without
compensation payments for five rounds. Afterwards, the treatments are introduced
which consist of a pure compensation stage (10 rounds) and a communication stage
(5 rounds). The precise set-up of the experiment, which follows a between-within
design, is shown in Table 3.1. The within design, in particular the change from the
baseline to the compensation stage, was chosen in order to increase the external
validity of the experimental effects of a PES introduction. Several studies have
shown that the introduction of monetary rewards for pro-environmental behavior
might interact with non-monetary motivations which could affect the conservation
outcome (Rode, Gómez-Baggethun, & Krause, 2014). This interaction might not
be adequately captured by a between design. In the following, we first describe the
baseline scenario and then present the treatments.
Table 3.1: Experimental setup
Stage Baseline Compensation Communication











PES design + sec-
ond payment level +
communication
Note: PES design can be either AT or AP. Payment levels include high,
medium or low payments.
The baseline scenario
In the experiment, farmers own one hectare of an established oil palm plantation.
This status-quo choice is motivated by our interest in exploring policy options to
support diversification in high production areas, i.e. where most farmers already have
oil palm. Farmers play in groups of six. In order to model a spatial arrangement,
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we make use of the circular network developed by Banerjee, Kwasnica, and Shortle
(2012). Farmers’ plantations are arranged on a circle with each plantation sharing a
border with two other plantations, one to the right and one to the left (Figure 3.1).
Due to the symmetric structure of the network, each farmer’s plantation has the
same number of bordering plantations such that farmers face the same degree of
strategic uncertainty. Farmers’ plot locations are determined randomly before the
start of the experiment.
In each round, farmers need to decide whether to keep the one hectare of oil
palm established or whether to switch to the mixed system. Revenues from one
hectare of oil palm are 100 experimental points, while revenues from one hectare
of the mixed system are 50 points.3 In the following, we will refer to the decision
of planting the mixed system as the decision to conserve. Conservation generates
environmental benefits in form of a global public good. These environmental benefits
are framed as improvements in bird and other pollinator diversity. In order to
activate environmental and social motives and to mimic pro-environmental behavior
(Ibanez et al., 2017), the environmental benefits are modeled as donations to an
environmental NGO. Modeling environmental benefits as donations further reflects
3Euler et al. (2016) find mean revenues for oil palm of approximately 10,000,000 IDR ($71) per
year and hectare. To ease the reading of the numbers, we divide revenues by 100,000 and represent
them as points. The ratio of revenues from oil palm and the mixed system is based on data in
the study region on returns to land for oil palm and jungle rubber, a rubber agroforestry system.
Feintrenie, Schwarze, and Levang (2010) report a ratio of per hectare returns slightly below 2. In
our calculation, we additionally include costs of converting the oil palm plantation into a mixed
system motivating the revenue ratio of 2. Due to the non-availability of revenue information of
oil palm-tree systems in the study region, we use rubber agroforestry as the benchmark for the
mixed system. Rubber and oil palm returns have been shown to be similar (Krishna et al., 2017).
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that biodiversity improvements might be linked to little direct monetary effects for
farmers. Burung Indonesia, which is the local branch of Birdlive international and
working on reforestation in the study region, was chosen as the receiving party.4
Since birds need a minimum number of trees to survive (Radford, Bennett, &
Cheers, 2005), the environmental benefits are modeled as a threshold good which is
generated if at least three hectares in a group are dedicated to conservation. Once
this threshold is reached, each conserved hectare generates environmental benefits
of 60 experimental points. Drawing on evidence from restored or enriched areas
(Gilbert-Norton et al., 2010; Hass et al., 2018) as well as because of the supported
positive effects of rainforest proximity on bird diversity in oil palm plantations
(Azhar et al., 2011), proximity of the conserved plots increases the environmental
benefits (Goldman et al., 2007). Therefore, upon reaching the threshold of three
plots under conservation, each bordering conserved plot additionally increases
environmental benefits by 10 points.5
The treatments
After five baseline rounds, a PES-scheme is implemented and compensation pay-
ments are made to farmers who conserve. Two PES designs are tested. In the first
one, compensations are made if at least three farmers in the group conserve. In
the second one, we additionally aim at increasing the spatial connectivity of the
conserved plots. Payments are therefore made if at least three farmers with bor-
dering plantations conserve. In contrast to experimental studies on agglomeration
boni (e.g. Banerjee et al. (2014)), coordination is thus not only relevant among
farmers with direct bordering plantations, but also the action of indirect neighbors,
i.e. farmers whose land shares a border with the neighbor of a respective farmer,
can directly influence the monetary payoffs of the respective farmer. We will refer
to the first payment threshold as the area threshold (AT) and the second one as
the agglomeration payment (AP).
To analyze the effects of different payment sizes on farmers’ conservation
decisions, three payment levels are implemented and combined with the two PES
designs. The first one offers a compensation of 30 points for farmers who conserve.
Therefore, 60% of the costs are refunded. In the second one, costs are fully covered.
4For more information on the NGO, please refer to
https://www.birdlife.org/asia/partners/indonesia-burung-indonesia.
5Our payoff structure implies that the area size is of higher importance than its spatial
configuration, which is supported by several studies (Martensen et al., 2012; Radford et al., 2005).
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Farmers who conserve thus receive 50 points in addition to the income generated by
conservation, if the requirements of the respective PES design are met. Finally, the
third one sets additional monetary incentives for conservation and overcompensates
farmers who conserve. Therefore, 140% of the costs are covered resulting in a
compensation payment of 70 points. Farmer i’s payoff for land use (LU) oil palm
(OP ) or conservation (C) can be described as
µi = 100 if LUi = OP (3.1)
µi = 50 if
6∑
i=1
(bordering)Ci < 3 and LUi = C (3.2)
µi = 50 + αP ES if
6∑
i=1
(bordering)Ci ≥ 3 and LUi = C (3.3)
where αP ES ∈ [30; 50; 70]. Each farmer is observed under two of these payment
levels. Five rounds after implementation of the first payment, the second payment
is implemented for another five rounds. All three payment levels are combined
with the same frequency with the AT and the AP during the compensation stage.
To prevent order effects, the order of the payments is changed randomly. The
distribution of payments over PES designs is shown in Table A3.1 in the Appendix.
Several studies have highlighted the role of communication for easing cooper-
ation (Banerjee et al., 2017; Midler et al., 2015). Communication might help to
support a cooperative norm, help individuals to gain more information about the
other individuals they interact with, and also might help with the clarification
of experiment-related questions that arose in the course of it (Cardenas, Ahn, &
Ostrom, 2004). We test whether the introduction of cheap talk increases conserva-
tion levels after individuals already have gained experience with the PES-scheme.
Moreover, we analyze whether the effect of communication differs between the
two PES designs, between the three payment levels and with respect to previous
coordination experience. While farmers are not allowed to communicate during
the first 15 rounds, communication is allowed in rounds 16 to 20.
3.3.2 Theoretical predictions
In the following, we will derive theoretical predictions for farmers’ behavior in the
experiment. Our discussion starts with the assumption that individual i derives
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only utility from the monetary payoffs he or she receives in period t, µit.6 First,
the expected effects of the two PES designs will be discussed.
Since the introduction of monetary compensations increases the profitability of
conservation, it is expected that both PES designs increase the share of farmers who
conserve. However, effects might differ between the AT and the AP. Rational indi-
viduals that aim at maximizing their own payoffs will conserve only if they assume
that the threshold for receiving compensation payments will be met. In comparison
to the AT, the AP reduces the set of possible constellations of conserving farmers
that generate compensation payments. The probability of receiving compensation
payments is consequently reduced. If we assume risk-averse or risk-neutral agents,
this generates our first hypothesis:
H1.: Participation, measured as the share of conserving farmers, is higher
under the AT than under the AP.
However, public good experiments on different payment thresholds with varying
risk levels involved often find different results. There is evidence that increasing
the required contribution size, or the required number of contributors for receiving
monetary rewards can increase contributions (Isaac, Schmidtz, & Walker, 1989;
Spiller & Bolle, 2017; Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992). Possible reasons are inter alias
that the threshold might serve as a focal point that guides individual behavior
(Isaac et al., 1989). Therefore, the opposite might also be true and the AP might
increase farmers’ conservation probability.
The AP however pushes farmers to coordinate among farmers with bordering
plantations. Since environmental effects are dependent on the spatial arrangement of
the conserved areas, we therefore expect higher environmental effects per conserving
farmer if coordination is successful.7
H2.: Coordination, measured as the environmental effects generated per con-
serving farmer, is higher under the AP than under the AT.
Overall environmental effects are the product of the share of farmers who
conserve (participation) and the average environmental effects per conserving
farmer (coordination). The effects of the two PES designs on overall environmental
benefits generated will depend on the relative size of both.8
6Only very strong non-monetary preferences change the derived predictions. For example, if
individuals derive large utility from behaving in an environmentally friendly way (warm glow),
even if environmental effects are not generated, their behavior might not depend on the probability
of receiving compensation payments.
7This difference will be driven by groups where only three farmers conserve as higher shares
of farmers automatically result in better connectivity between conserved plots.
8The effects on overall environmental effects generated are highly depending on the param-
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For the three payment levels, different Nash equilibria (NE) can be derived
assuming pure self-interested payoff maximizers. The NE when low payments
are offered is always to keep the land under oil palm production. When medium
payments are offered, there exist several NE: one in which all farmers choose oil
palm, and four others in which three, four, five or six (bordering) farmers conserve.
The NE in which some farmers conserve bears the risk that the other conserving
farmers deviate from the NE. This would result in income losses. As the income
from choosing oil palm does not depend on the action of other farmers, the NE
in which all farmers choose oil palm represents the risk-dominant NE (Banerjee,
2018; Straub, 1995). Risk-averse individuals, who likely represent the largest share
of the farmers given the developing country context (Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009),
will choose the risk-dominant NE. If high payments are offered, two NE exist: one
in which all farmers conserve and one in which all farmers choose oil palm. Since
overall monetary payoffs are higher when all farmers conserve, the latter represents
the pareto-dominant equilibrium as it maximizes overall utility. In contrast, the
NE in which all farmers choose oil palm represents the risk-dominant equilibrium.
If we include the environmental benefits generated and attach an equal weight to
individuals’ payoffs and the environmental benefits, the social optimum is always
reached when all farmers conserve.
However, we assume that individual utility is not only determined by the
monetary payoffs received, but that individuals also have non-monetary preferences.
This has been supported by several studies (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001;
Levitt & List, 2007). Non-monetary preferences may include warm glow effects
and environmental and social preferences. Given the existence of non-monetary
preferences, NE may also exist in which farmers conserve even though it is linked to
economic costs. Assuming that only farmers with high non-monetary preferences
conserve if conservation is linked to costs, we derive our third hypothesis:
H3.: The higher the monetary compensation, the more likely it is that farmers
will conserve.
Since communication has often been shown to ease coordination on the pareto-
dominant NE among individuals (Banerjee et al., 2017; Cardenas et al., 2004),
we hypothesize that communication increases farmers’ conservation probability
when high payments are offered. Moreover, we assume that most individuals
eterization of the experiment and the relative sizes of the extra effects generated by either an
improved spatial structure or by more conserving farmers. In our case, the extra environmental
benefits generated by increased connectivity are relatively small.
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have some degree of non-monetary preferences in favor of conservation, such that
communication should also increase conservation levels when medium payments
are offered. Since rational individuals would not conserve when low payments are
offered, it is unclear whether communication also increases conservation under low
compensation payments.
H4.: Communication increases conservation when high or medium payments
are offered.
3.3.3 Case study
Our study takes place in Jambi Province, in Sumatra, Indonesia. Oil palm was
introduced in Jambi in the 1980s through the governmental transmigration program.
Within this program, poor farmers from the densely populated island of Java were
resettled to less populated islands such as Sumatra and Kalimantan. The new
arriving farmers were given two to three hectares of land for oil palm cultivation
and contractual arrangements with government-supported palm oil mills were
established (Gatto et al., 2015).
Since the beginning of the oil palm expansion in Jambi, the area under oil palm
production has steadily increased becoming the dominant agricultural land use in
the region in 2012 (Bou Dib, Krishna, et al., 2018). Most of its expansion happened
on former forest or bush land, or on other extensive or intensive agricultural land
use systems such as jungle rubber and rubber, with negative effects on ecosystem
services and biodiversity (Clough et al., 2016; Gatto et al., 2015). Among all 34
provinces in Indonesia, Jambi ranks seventh with regard to the area under oil palm
production (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2019).
We cover the lowland region of Jambi Province which has been most affected by
rainforest transformation (Drescher et al., 2016). We selected the three regencies
with the highest share of oil palm in the lowland area in 2016, which are Muaro
Jambi, Batanghari and Bungo (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jambi, 2019).
In total, 11 villages are part of the sample (Figure 3.2). In order to cover the
heterogeneity in oil palm production, both local villages, in which mostly local
Melayu farmers live, and transmigrant villages, which were founded under the
transmigration program, were part of the sample. Since transmigrant villages
account for the biggest share of oil palm in Jambi (Gatto et al., 2015), eight
transmigrant and three local villages were included. In each village, we randomly
selected 36 households. Only households owning and managing oil palm plantations
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Figure 3.2: Location of villages for framed field experiment in Jambi
The lines indicate the regency delimiters and the shaded area the location of Jambi city.
are part of our sample. In each household, the person in charge of managing the
oil palm plantation was invited to participate in the experiment. Due to logistical
problems in one village, only 12 farmers could finally be selected to be part of the
study. Therefore, 12 additional farmers were selected in two other villages leading
to 48 farmers in these villages. In total, our sample comprises 396 farmers.
3.3.4 Experimental setting
66 experimental sessions were carried out between November and December 2018.
Experimental sessions were organized both in the afternoon and in the evening.
To maximize participation, the preferred time slot of the farmers was assessed
before. Based on time preferences, group composition was randomly determined.
While farmers preferring the afternoon sessions are on average older, groups taking
part in afternoon or evening sessions are otherwise similar in socio-economic
characteristics.9 Groups were randomly allocated to the two thresholds and the
three payment sizes. To avoid correlation between village effects and treatments,
each treatment was implemented with the same frequency in each village with the
exception of the three villages where the number of participants does not equal 36.
The day before the experiment, farmers completed a short pre-experimental
survey in which information about socio-economics, values, trust, time and risk
9Test for mean difference was done in a linear regression framework with standard errors
clustered at the experimental group level. Mean difference tests were conducted for all variables
displayed in the descriptive statistics (Table 3.2). We find that farmers in the afternoon sessions
are on average 4.6 years older than farmers in the evening session (p-value: 0.000).
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preferences was gathered. In case farmers did not show up for the experimental
sessions, they were replaced by another oil palm farmer in the village.10 In these
cases, the pre-experimental survey was conducted after the experiment.
Experimental sessions were carried out in the village office of the respective
village.11 Each experimental session was organized with six farmers forming one
experimental group. After arrival in the village offices, the farmers were accompa-
nied to their seats which were arranged in a circular structure to represent the plot
arrangement in the village (Figure 3.1). Afterwards, the instructor explained the
baseline scenario to the farmers. To facilitate the understanding, colored posters
were used displaying the most relevant pieces of information. An example is given
in Figure A3.1 in the Appendix. To ease payoff calculations, farmers additionally
received a sheet that showed, depending on the decision of the respective farmer
and the other five farmers in the group, all feasible payoffs and resulting donations
to the environmental NGO. Another sheet was distributed on which farmers could
keep track of their earnings in each round. To make sure that the farmers under-
stood the experiment, test questions were asked. Moreover, before the start of the
experiment, farmers played two practice rounds. Besides the instructor, two other
assistants were present who additionally helped answering farmers’ questions. At
the start of the experiment, farmers were not informed about the length of the
experiment, nor about the possibility that the explained scenario might change.
To indicate their decisions anonymously, farmers marked on a piece of paper
whether they kept the oil palm plantation established or whether they switched
to conservation. Thereafter, the assistants collected the decision sheets. Farmers
were asked to turn away from the others when making their decisions in order to
reduce the influence of other persons in the group. After each round, the instructor
announced to the group how many farmers conserved and how many of these had
bordering land. Before the start of the treatment rounds, the posters as well as the
sheets indicating the respective payoffs were updated.
During the first 15 rounds, farmers were not allowed to talk to each other. When
communication was allowed in rounds 16 to 20, farmers could discuss about the
experiment with the other farmers in the group for five minutes prior to decision
making in each round. Decisions were still kept anonymous.
After the end of the experiment, farmers were told that they should not discuss
10In total, the share of replacement farmers in our sample amounts to approx. 15%.
11In two villages, this was not feasible such that the sessions were organized in another farmer’s
house. The rooms were sufficiently large to avoid contamination of farmers’ decisions by the other
group members.
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about the experiment with other individuals in the village to avoid spill-over effects.
Spill-over effects were further minimized by implementing each treatment only once
in each village, with the exception of the two villages with 48 participating farmers
(section 3.3.3) where two treatments were repeated.
We implemented a short post-experimental survey at the end of the experiment
to gather information about the factors influencing farmers’ decisions, about farmers’
environmental perceptions and their opinion on oil palm. The two latter could
have potentially influenced their behavior in the experiment and were therefore
not included in the pre-experimental survey. Moreover, the understanding of the
experiment was assessed.
In order to determine farmers’ payoffs and the donations, we selected one
experimental round randomly. The points were converted into local currency (IDR)
by multiplying the amount of points by 1,000. On average, farmers received 86,742
IDR ($6.2), the maximum amount of money they could earn was 120,000 IDR
($8.58). This is equivalent to one to two times a worker’s daily wage. Payoffs
were distributed upon the completion of the post-experimental survey in form of a
voucher for a local shop in the village.12 The donations were transferred after the
end of the experiment to the account of the local NGO. Each village received a
certificate as payment proof that indicated the amount of donations generated in
the respective village.
3.4 Results
In this section, results of the framed field experiment will be presented. First, we
will present socioeconomic characteristics of the sample. In the next step, we will
discuss group-level results showing the effects of the interventions on environmental
effectiveness, budget efficiency as well as on other welfare measures such as farmers’
income and overall efficiency levels. Finally, we parametrically analyze treatment
effects on the individual conservation decision and its drivers.
3.4.1 Socio-economic characteristics of the sample
Descriptive statistics of the sample can be found in Table 3.2. For a more detailed
explanation of the variables, please refer to Table A3.2 in the Appendix.
12The owner of the shop was not allowed to participate in the experiment.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Age 46.07 10.83 396
Gender, 1=Female 0.05 396
Education (in years) 8.71 3.48 396
Transmigrant Farmer, 1=Yes 0.31 396
Experience as oil palm farmer (in years) 14.94 7.37 396
Javanese ethnicity, 1 = Yes 0.69 396
Melayu ethnicity, 1=Yes 0.13 396
Total value of assets (in Mio IDR) 42.13 86.29 396
Environmental extension received, 1=Yes 0.10 396
Trust [0;10] 4.06 2.31 396
Risk preferences [0;10] 5.00 2.84 396
Time preferences [0;10] 5.61 2.81 396
Biospheric values [1;6] 4.78 0.69 396
Altruistic values [1;6] 4.92 0.61 396
Egoistic values [1;6] 3.86 1.37 395
Environmental awareness [1;6] 4.10 1.50 395
Area owned (in ha) 4.03 4.17 396
Area owned under oil palm production (in ha) 3.31 2.94 396
Trees in OP, 1= Yes 0.20 396
Other crops grown besides oil palm, 1=Yes 0.29 396
Replanting, 1=Yes 0.07 396
Number of family members in the experimental group 0.49 1.17 395
Number of neighbors in the group 0.95 1.25 395
The average decision maker in the household is male, has approx. nine years
of schooling and Javanese ethnicity. Only 30% of the farmers in our sample grow
other crops besides oil palm and only 20% have trees besides oil palms growing
in their plantation - among these 60% have less than 20 trees. This indicates the
high level of landscape homogenization in our study area. To test for differences
in socioeconomic characteristics between PES designs and payment levels, we run
a total of 115 mean difference tests with group-level clustered standard errors.
Results are presented in Tables A3.3 and A3.4 in the Appendix. We can detect
eight statistically significant differences between PES designs or between payments
levels, but the absolute difference between the mean estimates is small for all
imbalanced covariates. The imbalanced covariates will be controlled for in the
following analyses.13 Since only a small share of all conducted mean difference tests
is significant and some imbalance can occur by chance (Morgan & Rubin, 2012),
we assume that our treatment randomization strategy was successful.
13None of the imbalanced covariates are statistically significant in the regression models
(section 3.4.3).
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3.4.2 Group-level results
Environmental effectiveness and its drivers
We evaluate the effect of the two PES designs and the three payment levels on
group-level environmental effects generated, reflected by the donations. This
represents our measure of environmental effectiveness. Environmental effectiveness
can be understood as the product of two distinct processes: First, participation
that measures how many farmers are willing to conserve under the respective PES-
scheme, and second, coordination which we define as the environmental benefits
generated per conserving farmer. Upon reaching the threshold for the generation of
environmental effects, the latter measures how well connected the conserved plots
are. To better understand the drivers of environmental effectiveness, we analyze
treatment effects on participation and coordination. Since our three payment levels
are by design balanced across the two PES designs in the compensation stage
(rounds 6 to 15), treatment effects of the PES designs and payment levels are
discussed separately.14
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Figure 3.3 displays the evolution of the environmental effects generated over
the course of the experiment. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show the evolution of
participation and coordination, respectively. Descriptives of the three outcome
variables at the different stages of the experiment, separated by the PES design
and the payment levels, are displayed in Table 3.3. Table A3.7 in the Appendix
14Some imbalance might occur in rounds 16-20 when communication is allowed. To test whether
any of the three payment levels is combined significantly more often with either the AT or the
AP, we run a probit estimation with group-level clustered standard errors where PES design
(1= AT, 0= AP) is regressed on assignment to the three payment levels in rounds 16-20. We do
not find evidence that any of the two PES designs is significantly confounded with any of the
three payment levels (p-values of tests for share high payment=share medium payment: 0.664,
for high=low: 0.519, for medium=low: 0.846). An overview of the distribution of payment levels
across PES designs can be found in Table A3.1 in the Appendix.
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shows the descriptives for the combined effects of the two PES designs and the
three payment levels.
To see whether the introduction of PES-schemes (compensation stage) has
significant effects on environmental effectiveness and its drivers, we use Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests for all treatments. For the two PES designs, we also use Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests to compare the compensation to the communication stage. For the
payment sizes, the sign rank test proposed by Fong, Huang, Lemos, and Mcelrath
(2018) is used. This test is recommended for comparisons of groups where one group
contains observations that cannot be matched with observations in the other group
(Guo, Gao, Niu, & Zhang, 2019).15 To test whether the effect sizes are significantly
different between different treatments, we use Mann-Whitney U tests. These
tests are performed on the change in the outcome variables between two stages
and not on the levels to account for possible existing differences at the baseline
stage. Especially farmers assigned to receive low payments tend to have higher
15This is the case when we compare the compensation to the communication stage for a certain
payment. The groups that receive the respective payment first are observed with the second
assigned payment when communication is allowed and can therefore not be matched.
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environmental outcomes in the baseline stage in comparison to farmers assigned to
high or medium payments (Table 3.3). All tests are based on the group averages
over all rounds at the respective stage, as these statistics are independent. The
significance levels are displayed in Table 3.3. For the p-values of the respective tests,
please refer to Table A3.5 in the Appendix that also provides more information on
the respective tests used.
As seen in Figures 3.3 to 3.5, participation does not follow a time trend for
the two PES designs, while coordination and the overall environmental effects
generated tend to slightly increase over time. However, this effect appears to be
very small. No common time trend can be found for the three payment levels.
This validates the use of group comparisons as the results in the compensation and
communication stages are unlikely to be driven by time effects.
Comparison between area threshold and agglomeration payment
The evolution of participation, coordination and the overall environmental effects
generated over time is very similar under the AT and the AP in the compensation
stage (rounds 6-15). The introduction of compensation payments increases the envi-
ronmental effects generated at the 1% level for both PES designs (Table 3.3). The
environmental effects increase by an average 42% for the AT and an average 31% for
the AP. This increase stems from a significant improvement in both participation,
where the average share of conserving farmers is below the ecologically relevant
threshold of 0.5 in the baseline (Figure 3.4), and in coordination. Participation
tends to be slightly larger under the AT than under the AP (Figure 3.4), while
the AP tends to perform slightly better than the AT with regard to coordination
(Figure 3.5). Both trends are supported by the average increases in the respective
outcome variables (Table 3.3). However, differences are very small between the
two designs in rounds 6 to 15. Therefore, neither the effects on participation
nor on coordination differ significantly between the PES designs leading also to
non-significant differences in environmental effects generated (Table 3.3). Thus,
while the trend is in line with our hypotheses 1 and 2, the differences are not











Table 3.3: Group-level descriptives for environmental effectiveness and its drivers
Environmental effects Participation Coordination
Baseline Compensation Communication Baseline Compensation Communication Baseline Compensation Communication
AT 135.76 193.88*** 281.76***/+++ 0.44 0.55*** 0.69***/+++ 37.26 47.21*** 63.82***/+++
(132.61) (144.57) (148.70) (0.23) (0.24) (0.32) (25.91) (24.81) (14.50)
AP 145.39 190.94*** 212.06 0.45 0.53*** 0.56 35.66 46.12*** 47.54
(149.85) (147.58) (172.04) (0.28) (0.28) (0.36) (30.29) (26.10) (28.46)
High 131.55 213.36***/mm/ll 295.20*** 0.43 0.58***/m/ll 0.73*** 33.54 50.70***/mm/ll 61.12**
(127.41) (142.66) (137.24) (0.23) (0.26) (0.27) (29.71) (26.24) (19.09)
Medium 130.27 171.59*** 230.59** 0.43 0.51*** 0.58 34.23 42.37*** 54.81***
(119.56) (151.50) (175.69) (0.22) (0.27) (0.39) (28.22) (29.04) (27.18)
Low 159.95 192.27** 219.26 0.48 0.54*** 0.58 41.61 47.66** 51.09
(117.55) (141.23) (164.34) (0.22) (0.25) (0.33) (25.79) (25.46) (23.09)
Mean values indicated, standard deviation in parentheses. Participation measures the share of conserving farmers. Coordination
measures the environmental benefits generated per conserving farmer. For paired tests, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used. For
non-paired tests, we use Mann-Whitney U tests. For partially paired tests, we use the sign rank test proposed by Fong et al. (2018).
For Mann-Whitney U tests, first differences of the outcome variables were built to control for possible differences between treatments
at the baseline stage.
Sample size is 33 for AT and AP. Sample size is 22 for each payment level in the compensation stage. For the communication stage, 20
groups receive high, 27 medium and 19 low payments.
* refers to significance levels of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. + indicates significance levels of Mann-Whitney U tests when comparing
AT and AP. h/m/l refer to significance levels of Mann-Whitney U tests when comparing different payment levels, where h, m and l
indicate significance levels in comparison to the high, medium or low payment. */+/h refer to 10%, ** /++/hh to 5% and ***/+++/hhh to
1% significance level.
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The introduction of communication after the compensation stage in combination
with the AT leads to a significant increase at the 1% level for all three outcome vari-
ables in comparison to the compensation stage without communication (Table 3.3).
In contrast, communication only marginally and insignificantly increases the value
of the three outcome variables under the AP. As a consequence, environmental
effectiveness is significantly greater under the AT than under the AP when commu-
nication is allowed (p-value of Mann-Whitney U test: 0.072). The diverging effects
are not due to slight imbalances between the PES designs and the payment levels
at the communication stage (Table A3.7 in the Appendix).16 The missing effect
of communication under the AP is surprising as other studies on threshold goods
or coordination games have highlighted its relevance (Midler et al., 2015; Tavoni,
Dannenberg, Kallis, & Löschel, 2011; Warziniack, Shogren, & Parkhurst, 2007).
Moreover, other studies have found that the effect size of communication does not
differ depending on the implied risk level for reaching the threshold required for the
public good provision (van de Kragt, Orbell, & Dawes, 1983). Since the AP and
the AT could also be interpreted as thresholds with different associated risk levels,
our findings do not support previous evidence in the literature. Possible reasons
for the diverging effects of communication between the two PES designs will be
discussed in the context of individual farmers’ conservation decisions in section 3.4.3.
Comparison between three payment levels
In the absence of communication, differences in the evolution of the three indicators
are more pronounced between the three payment levels than between the two PES
designs (Figures 3.3 to 3.5). This suggests that different payment levels have a
stronger effect on farmers’ behavior than the two PES designs when communication
is not allowed.17 All three payment sizes increase the three outcome variables linked
to environmental effectiveness at statistically significant levels in comparison to
the baseline. Thus, farmers’ decisions are likely to be also driven by non-monetary
motives as under the low payment level, costs are not fully covered. However, profit
16None of the three outcome variables are significantly increased under any of the three payment
levels when the AP is implemented.
17When depicting the evolution of the outcome variables under the six resulting PES-schemes,
i.e. the respective combination of the two PES designs and the three payment levels, higher
variations are shown for the AP. This is also supported in Tables 3.3 and A3.7 in the Appendix,
where the standard deviation is in almost all cases higher under the AP than under the AT.
However, when looking at the evolution of the combined effects, we also see high variation in the
outcome variables under the three payment sizes such that the patterns in Figures 3.3 to 3.5 are
not driven by a specific payment and PES design combination.
82
Chapter 3. PES for a biodiversity supporting landscape
motivations appear to play an important role for the land use decision because
making conservation financially more attractive than oil palm leads to significantly
higher increases in environmental outcomes than offering medium or low payments.
This supports H3.
Communication eases farmers’ coordination on the Nash equilibrium when high
payments are offered. Participation, coordination and consequently also environ-
mental effectiveness are significantly increased in comparison to the compensation
stage without communication. Communication in combination with the medium
payment also significantly increases environmental effectiveness, but this increase
appears to rather stem from an improvement in coordination than from an increase
in participation (Table 3.3). Our findings therefore support H4. While we can
still observe a positive effect of communication when low payments are offered, the
effect size is not statistically significant.18 The relevance of monetary considerations
for land use decisions is supported under communication: environmental effects
are significantly higher under high than under medium or low payments (p-values
of Mann Whitney-U test for High=Medium: 0.03, for High=Low: 0.03), while the
effects do not differ significantly between medium and low payments (p-value of
Mann Whitney-U test: 0.991).
Efficiency analysis
The original PES idea is based on market transactions between sellers and buyers of
ecosystem services. However, it can be difficult to identify the buyers of ecosystem
services in practice such that they are often represented by governments, NGOs
or other funding agencies (Wunder, 2015). These entities often have a restricted
budget and need to decide which project to spend the available funds on. Selection
criteria could be the involved budget efficiency that measures environmental effects
generated per unit of budget spent, or overall efficiency reflecting the level of
welfare generated. Moreover, a more informed policy analysis should also explore
generated income effects for the local population to assess potential development-
environment trade-offs. Therefore, we analyze the effect of the two PES designs
and the three payment levels on budget efficiency, overall efficiency and farmers’
income (Table 3.4). We also display the share of successful coordination, i.e. how
often groups coordinate on receiving compensation payments, as well as the budget
spent per capita as these, in combination with environmental effects generated,
18The insignificance of the effect is likely to be driven by the AP because under the AT, all
payment sizes significantly increase the outcome variables (Table A3.7 in the Appendix).
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drive the two efficiency measures and farmers’ income.
Budget efficiency is only calculated for rounds when PES-schemes are imple-
mented. If groups do not receive compensation payments in the respective round,
they are not considered in the calculation. To account for possible baseline dif-
ferences in environmental effectiveness (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3), which could
affect our budget efficiency estimates, the environmental effects for the two PES
designs and the three payment levels are demeaned on their respective baseline
means prior to budget efficiency calculations. Our overall efficiency measure is
based on standardized net social welfare that includes farmers’ income, i.e. the
agricultural income plus the compensation payments, plus the environmental effects
generated net of budget spending (Kuhfuss et al., 2017).19 It measures how much
of the maximum achievable welfare is reached under the respective PES-scheme
implemented.
Table 3.4 indicates that budget efficiency is significantly higher under the AP
than under the AT in the compensation stage. The higher budget efficiency of
the AP is achieved by higher average environmental benefits generated by farmers
who receive compensation payments, and by a significantly smaller average budget
spent per capita (Table 3.4).20 These findings are in line with the simulation study
by Drechsler et al. (2010) that also supports a higher budget efficiency for the
agglomeration payment in comparison to compensation mechanisms without an
explicit spatial target.21
Regarding overall efficiency, both PES designs lead to significant and similar
increases in comparison to the baseline. Both PES designs are consequently welfare
improving. The higher levels of budget efficiency generated by the AP, while having
similar overall efficiency levels than the AT, suggest that the local population bears
greater costs of the environmental improvements under the AP than under the AT
19The maximum net welfare of 720 is achieved when all farmers in the group conserve. The
minimum welfare of 500 is reached when two farmers in the group conserve. Our measure of











µi = farmer i’s income, α ∈ [30; 50; 70], Ci = 1 if LUi = C.
20The groups that receive compensation payments under the AT generate on average 272.18
units of environmental benefits over the compensation stage. In contrast, groups that receive
compensation payments under the AP generate on average 308.60 units of environmental benefits.
This is significantly higher (p-value of Mann Whitney U-test: 0.018).
21In Table 3.4, we only include rounds in which groups receive compensation payments in our
budget efficiency estimation. When we also consider cases in which no compensation payments are
made (Figure A3.2 in the Appendix), the difference between both PES designs in the compensation
stage is even more pronounced. This is because under the AP, the generation of environmental
benefits is also possible in absence of compensation payments.
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in the compensation stage. This is supported in Table 3.4. The lower income is
driven by significantly lower rates of coordination success under the AP.
When communication is introduced, the increase in overall efficiency is statisti-
cally higher under the AT than under the AP. In the communication stage, farmers
under the AT reach efficiency levels of around 80%, while under the AP efficiency
levels of around 64% are reached. From a social planner’s perspective who tries to
maximize overall welfare, the AT consequently appears to be the preferred option if
communication is allowed. Moreover, budget efficiency significantly increases under
the AT when farmers can communicate with each other because of the significant
increase in environmental effects generated (section 3.4.2). As a consequence, the
AP no longer outperforms the AT in terms of budget efficiency when communication
is allowed (p-value of Mann-Whitney U test: 0.346).
For budget and overall efficiency, conflicting patterns emerge for the three
payment levels. Offering low payments is the most budget efficient policy option
(Table 3.4).22 Only partial coverage of the costs, as done under low payments,
however leads to lower levels of farmers’ income. In contrast, the increase in overall
efficiency in comparison to the baseline is significantly greater when high instead
of medium or low payments are introduced.23 The highest overall efficiency levels
are hence reached when farmers are overcompensated for conservation. In contrast,
we do not find that the increase in overall efficiency in comparison to the baseline
differs significantly between medium and low payments.24 Consequently, similar
overall efficiency levels can be reached if low instead of medium payments are
offered, with a statistically higher budget efficiency achieved under low payments.
22Here, we only compare budget efficiency levels in the compensation stage. The results also
hold if we compare budget efficiency levels in the communication stage. P-values of Mann-Whitney
U test to compare levels in the communication stage are 0.000 for High=Medium, 0.000 for
High=Low. Under high payments, the maximum achievable environmental effects generated are
fully internalized.
23This also holds when we compare the communication stage to the baseline. P-values of
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: High=Medium: 0.027, High=Low: 0.034.












Table 3.4: Efficiency, income and cost measures
Budget efficiency Overall efficiency Coordination
success
Average farmers’ income Average p.c. intervention
costs
Comp. Comm. Baseline Comp. Comm. Comp. Comm. Comp. Comm. Comp. Comm.
AT 0.70 0.82** 0.47 0.58*** 0.79***/+++ 0.69+++ 0.82++ 96.41+++ 101.46 24.14+ 36.16++
(0.23) (0.31) (0.24) (0.27) (0.20) (6.87) (11.94) (15.26) (19.73)
AP 0.82+ 0.93 0.50 0.60*** 0.66* 0.42 0.53 90.15 96.90a 16.66 22.92
(0.24) (0.31) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28) (8.76) (13.54) (17.13) (24.06)
High 0.52 0.60*** 0.47 0.64***/m/l 0.79*** 0.6 0.81 102.16mmm/lll110.62mmm/lll 31.02mm/ll 47.37mm/lll
(0.10) (0.10) (0.28) (0.28) (0.23) (14.40) (12.36) (24.60) (23.89)
Medium 0.71hhh 0.86*** 0.46 0.54*** 0.72*** 0.52 0.64 93.07lll 98.33lll 18.56ll 27.16
(0.15) (0.13) (0.26) (0.32) (0.26) (7.24) (3.24) (17.21) (19.45)
Low 0.92hhh/mmm 1.12*** 0.53 0.59* 0.66* 0.55 0.58 84.61 85.04 11.61 14.15
(0.32) (0.29) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (5.06) (5.51) (9.36) (11.03)
Group-level mean statistics with standard deviation in parentheses displayed. Comp. refers to compensation stage (rounds 6-15), Comm. to
communication stage (rounds 16-20). Average farmers’ income is the group-level average of farmers’ income over the respective stage of the
experiment. Average per capita intervention costs reflect how much compensation payments are made to an average person in a group. Sample
size is 33 for AT and AP. For the high, medium and low payments, 22 groups are assigned to the respective payment size in the compensation
stage. For the communication stage, 20 groups receive high payments, 27 medium and 19 low payments.
a To account for slight imbalances in the distribution of payment levels over PES designs (Table A3.1) we calculate the difference in average
per capita compensation payments offered between the AT and the AP over all groups in the communication stage. The difference is added to
the income of conserving farmers who receive compensations under the AP. Without correction, averages of group-level mean farmers’ income
are, with standard deviation in parentheses, 94.98 (12.54).
Mann Whitney-U tests are used to compare the AT and the AP, or the three payment levels. Before comparing two payment levels, the groups
receiving both levels are dropped. For within test for the efficiency indicator, we use Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for paired tests. For partially
paired tests, the test proposed by Fong et al. (2018) is used. For budget efficiency, Mann-Whitney U tests are performed on levels in the
compensation, and on first differences in the communication stage. * refers to significance levels for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. + indicates
significance levels for Mann-Whitney U tests when comparing AT and AP. h/m/l refer to significance levels of Mann-Whitney U tests when
comparing different payment levels where h, m and l indicate whether the statistic is significantly different from the respective statistic for the
high, medium and low payment. */+/h refer to 10%, **/++/hh to 5% and ***/+++/hhh to 1% significance level.
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3.4.3 Individual contributions
To understand the drivers of the individual conservation decision and to derive
point estimates, we present average marginal effects (AME) of mixed effects probit
estimations in Table 3.5 for the two PES designs and in Table 3.6 for the three
payment levels. The combined effects of the PES designs and payment levels can
be found in Table A3.10 in the Appendix.
In order to account for the hierarchical structure of the error term, where errors
are possibly clustered at both the individual and the group level, individual and
group random effects (RE) are included. Because of the random assignment of
individuals to groups, and of groups to treatments, correlations between group and
individual RE as well as between unobserved factors and our treatment variables are
unlikely, supporting the use of the mixed effects model. To avoid that order effects
influence the treatment effects of the three payment levels, the order of the payments
was changed randomly (section 3.3.1). However, order effects might still bias the
results if experiencing a certain payment level first affects the conservation decision
under the second payment, and if the size or the sign of this effect differs between
payment levels (Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 2012). We test for order effects by
comparing the conservation probability of farmers who receive a respective payment
first to that of farmers who receive the respective payment second, after controlling
for a general linear time trend. None of the differences are either significant or
significantly different between the payment levels, and the effect sizes are small,
such that it is unlikely that the presented results are driven by order effects.25
Since contribution patterns may change over time due to e.g. learning effects,
we include a linear time trend in all estimations. To account for a possible dynamic
nature of the underlying decision process, we control for the lagged conservation
choice. The model specifications in columns (1) and (2) in Tables 3.5 and 3.6
assume that the initial value of the outcome variable is exogenous. In contrast,
the model specification in column (3) relaxes this assumption by conditioning the
conservation choice in each round on the initial value of the dependent variable and
25We estimate a mixed effects probit model for rounds 1-15, where the conservation choice of
farmer i in round t is regressed on dummy variables for the three payment levels in rounds 6-15
and a linear time trend. To compare whether the effect sizes differ depending on whether the
payment is received first or second, we include dummy variables that assume one if the respective
payment is received in rounds 11-15. Marginal effects of the dummy variables indicating the
difference between the respective payment level when it is received first and when it is received
second are, with p-values in parentheses, -0.017 (0.465) for the high, 0.003 (0.875) for the medium
and 0.018 (0.432) for the low payment. P-values of test High (received second) = Medium
(received second): 0.498, High = Low: 0.243, Medium = Low: 0.636.
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on the initial conservation choice of the other farmers (Akay, 2009; Rabe-Hesketh
& Skrondal, 2013; Wooldridge, 2005).
Table 3.5: Effects of two PES designs on farmers’ conservation decision
(1) (2) (3)
AT 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
AP 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
AT+com. 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
AP+com. 0.03 0.01 0.03
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Conservation (lagged) 0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Time preferences 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Egoistic values -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Biospheric values 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.022) (0.021) (0.017)
Altruistic values 0.04 0.04 0.02
(0.026) (0.025) (0.020)
Environmental awareness 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
No. of other conserving 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗
farmers (lagged) (0.004) (0.004)




No. other conserving 0.04∗∗∗
farmers, t=0 (0.011)
Round -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Other controls1 Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7486 7486 7486
AME from a mixed effects probit model with individual and group RE shown. Outcome variable
is the individual conservation decision. Standard errors displayed in parentheses. P-values for test
AT=AP: (1) 0.466, (2) 0.924, (3) 0.510; for AT+com.=AP+com.: (1) 0.000, (2) 0.000, (3) 0.000.
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1 Other controls include age, education and experience of farmer, whether a farmer is a trans-
migrant, land size owned, whether other crops are cultivated or trees growing in oil palm plots,
recent or future replanting plans, risk and time preferences, trust measures and the number of
family members and neighbors in the same experimental group.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Besides general characteristics such as age, education, farmers’ assets to proxy
income and variables reflecting the existing farm-level degree of diversification, we
include several variables capturing individual preferences. These should allow us to
gain a better understanding of the non-monetary drivers of utility, for instance,
whether altruistic or environmental motives matter for farmers’ conservation deci-
sions. Moreover, in specifications (1) and (3), we control for the lagged number of
other farmers in the group who conserve to analyze whether other farmers’ behavior
affects individual conservation decisions. In model specification (2), we replace
this variable with a dummy of whether the requirement for receiving compensation
payments under the assigned PES design was met in the previous round, to see
how past coordination success influences current conservation choices. All lagged
values capturing previous behavior and coordination in the experiment are likely to
be influenced by the implemented treatments.26 Therefore, our derived treatment
effects capture the partial effects of the treatment after controlling for their indirect
effects through the lagged conservation decision of the respective farmer and of the
other farmers, as well as through lagged group coordination success. P-values for
Wald tests of equality of coefficients are reported below Tables 3.5 and 3.6 in the
respective notes. Coefficients and full results are available in Tables A3.8 and A3.9
in the Appendix.
Effects of PES designs and payment levels on individual conservation decisions
In line with the results for environmental effectiveness (section 3.4.2), Tables 3.5
and 3.6 support significantly positive effects of the two PES designs and all three
payment levels on the individual conservation decision. While the effect sizes do
not differ significantly between the AT and the AP (Table 3.5), we find significant
differences between the three payment levels (Table 3.6). Offering high payments
can motivate a larger share of farmers to conserve than offering medium or low
payments, highlighting the relevance of monetary considerations in farmers’ conser-
26We acknowledge that the lagged number of other conserving farmers and the lagged indicator
of coordination success might not fulfill the strict exogeneity assumption required for the estimation
of consistent partial effects in nonlinear panel data models. However, the inclusion of the variables
does not affect either the point estimates or the significance levels of the other variables.
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vation choices (p-values indicated below Tables 3.5 and 3.6). This is in line with
H3. Furthermore, as already visible in Figure 3.3, in absence of communication, dif-
ferences in payment levels appear to have stronger effects on farmers’ conservation
decisions than differences in the requirements for receiving compensation.27
Table 3.6: Effects of three payment levels on farmers’ conservation decision
(1) (2) (3)
High 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Medium 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Low 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
High+com. 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Medium+com. 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Low+com. 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Conservation (lagged) 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Time preferences 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Egoistic values -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Biospheric values 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.022) (0.021) (0.017)
Altruistic values 0.04 0.04 0.02
(0.026) (0.025) (0.020)
Environmental awareness 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
No. of other conserving farmers 0.01 0.01
(lagged) (0.004) (0.004)




No. other conserving farmers, t=0 0.04∗∗∗
(0.012)
27This is also supported in Table A3.10. We do not find significant differences between the AT
and the AP in the absence of communication for any of the three payment levels, while significant
differences can be found between the payment levels.
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Round -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Other controls1 Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7486 7486 7486
AME from a mixed effects probit model with individual and group RE displayed. Outcome
variable is the individual conservation decision. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values for test
High=Medium: (1) 0.000, (2) 0.029, (3) 0.000; for High=Low: (1) 0.000, (2) 0.001, (3) 0.000;
Medium=Low: (1) 0.103, (2) 0.242, (3) 0.092; High+com.=Medium+com.: (1) 0.054, (2) 0.021,
(3) 0.060; High+com.=Low+com.: (1) 0.353, (2) 0.033, (3) 0.339; Medium+com.=Low+com.: (1)
0.352, (2) 0.999, (3) 0.391.
1 Other controls include age, education and experience of farmer, whether farmer is a transmigrant,
land size owned, whether other crops are cultivated or trees growing in oil palm plots, recent or
future replanting plans, risk preferences, trust measures and the number of family members and
neighbors in the same experimental group.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Under the AT, communication is highly effective in promoting conservation.
The approx. 12 percentage point additional effect of communication appears to be
even larger than the effect of the pure introduction of the PES design. In contrast,
under the AP the introduction of communication does not on average increase
the conservation probability in comparison to the compensation stage. Significant
increases at the 10% levels can only be observed when the AP is combined with
high payments (Table A3.10 in the Appendix).28 As a result, increases in aggregate
conservation probabilities over all payment levels are significantly larger under the
AT than under the AP, if communication is allowed (p-values below Table 3.5).
The larger effect size of the AT under communication holds for all payment levels
considered (Table A3.10 in the Appendix).
The relevance of communication for increasing conservation levels in compari-
son to the pure compensation stage is supported for all three payment levels at
statistically significant levels.29 While the increase is significantly larger under
high than under medium payments (columns (1) to (3)), the effect sizes do not
differ significantly between high and medium payments in columns (1) and (3),
and between medium and low payments in all three model specifications. If we
28The respective AME are 0.06 in all model specifications.
29The effect of communication under the different payment levels has to be interpreted as the
effect of communication dependent on prior experience in the experiment. We control for the
lagged number of other conserving farmers as well as for whether the requirements for receiving
compensation were met. Table 3.4 shows that the share of coordination failure does not differ
significantly between payment levels. While we do not claim to be fully able to control for
potential confounders based on prior experience, coordination successes are similar between the
three groups so that we believe that potential effects should only be small.
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look at the combined effect of the introduction of compensation payments and
communication in comparison to the baseline, we find that offering high payment
leads to the significantly largest increases in conservation probability (p-values of
t-tests are in columns (1) 0.000, (2) 0.000, (3) 0.000 for both High=Medium and
High=Low in Table 3.6). In contrast, the effect sizes are not significantly different
between medium and low payments (t-test, p-values in (1) 0.965, (2) 0.505, (3)
0.996 in Table 3.6). This pattern holds for both the AT and the AP (Table A3.10
in the Appendix).30 This suggests that when individuals are able to communicate
with each other, one can motivate a similar share of farmers to conserve under low
and medium payments.31 However, a certain part of the population is only willing
to conserve when extra financial incentives are offered.
Other drivers of conservation choices
The dynamic nature of the conservation decision process is supported in all three
model specifications in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Farmers who conserved in the previous
round are significantly more likely to also conserve in the current round. Besides
capturing the experience farmers had in the experiment, this might partly reflect
farmers’ general preferences towards conservation and cooperation. The latter is
supported by the very large and positive coefficient of the conservation decision
in the first round. Therefore, individuals who are unconditionally cooperative,
meaning that they are willing to contribute to the public good independent of
the action of other persons (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010), are likely to continue
conserving under all treatments. While we find a positive albeit small effect of
the lagged number of other conserving farmers in the group in Tables 3.5 and 3.6,
this effect is only significant when analyzing the treatment effects of the two PES
designs. In contrast, the number of other conserving farmers in the initial period
significantly increases the individual conservation probability for all treatments
considered. Hence, reciprocity guides individual behavior (Narloch et al., 2012).
The number of other conserving farmers could indicate a group norm in favor of
conservation. However, it appears to be of particular importance for conservation
choices whether sufficient farmers conserve for groups to receive compensation
30P-values for test of communication in comparison to the baseline are for the AT: High=Medium:
(1) 0.000, (2) 0.008, (3) 0.000 and High=Low: (1) 0.011, (2) 0.027, (3) 0.008, for the AP:
High=Medium: (1) 0.016, (2) 0.006, (3) 0.017 and High=Low: (1) 0.025, (2) 0.011, (3) 0.018 in
Table A3.10 in the Appendix.
31A similar pattern holds in the compensation stage, but the difference between medium and
low payments is marginally significantly different in columns (1) and (3).
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payments. This is indicated by a very large and significant effect of whether the
requirements for receiving compensation payments were met in the previous round
(column (2)).
Besides variables reflecting the dynamics of the experiment and cooperation
preferences, other preferences appear to have a rather small impact on the conser-
vation decision (full results available in Tables A3.8 and A3.9 in the Appendix).
Individuals who are less present biased and more aware of oil palm related en-
vironmental consequences in Jambi are significantly more likely to conserve in
the experiment. Finally, with respect to socio-economic characteristics, higher
education levels and actual diversification levels significantly and positively affect
conservation choices, at least in some of the model specifications (see full results in
Tables A3.8 and A3.9 in the Appendix).
Coordination failure and the effect of communication
One potential driver of the diverging effect of communication between the AT and
the AP could be different experiences with coordination success.32 As pointed
out in section 3.3.2, the AP is linked to a smaller probability of reaching the
requirements for receiving compensation payments and therefore involves higher
risk of coordination failure. In case farmers conserve, but the group does not
coordinate on receiving compensation payments, farmers might feel frustrated and
could reduce their beliefs on how likely it is that further conservation choices will
generate compensation payments (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010). To test whether
coordination success in the compensation stage drives the diverging effects of
communication between the two PES designs, we divide our sample into subgroups
of individuals with similar coordination experience in the compensation stage. The
first subgroup comprises individuals who never conserved in the compensation
stage. The second subgroup subsumes individuals who received compensation
payments each time they conserved in the compensation stage. Therefore, these
individuals have only experienced coordination success. The last subgroup includes
individuals who experienced coordination failure at least once in the compensation
stage, meaning that they conserved without receiving compensation payments.
Results of a linear mixed effects estimation are shown in Table 3.7.33
32By coordination success, we mean that a farmer receives compensation payments when he or
she conserves.
33Linear mixed effects model is used since estimation of a mixed effects probit model is not
feasible for the first subgroup, where the AT and the AP are perfectly collinear with the decision
to plant oil palm in the compensation stage.
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Table 3.7: Subgroup-specific effects of the two PES designs on farmers’ conservation
decision
(1) (2) (3)







AT=1 -0.00 0.10∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.030) (0.035)
AP=1 0.00 0.05 0.10∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.038) (0.030)
AT+com.=1 0.20∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.019) (0.031) (0.036)
AP+com.=1 0.04∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.018) (0.039) (0.030)
Conservation (lagged) 0.49∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.019) (0.018)
No. of other conserving -0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
farmers (lagged) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007)
Round -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.05∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.038) (0.034)
Observations 1919 2565 3040
Outcome variable is individual conservation choice. Coefficients from a linear mixed effects
model with individual and group RE displayed. Standard errors shown in parentheses. Subgroup
definition is based on conservation behavior and coordination success in the compensation stage.
P-values of t-test for AT=AP: (1) 0.712, (2) 0.211, (3) 0.213; for AT+com.=AP+com.: (1) 0.000,
(2) 0.732, (3) 0.640.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The introduction of communication significantly increases the conservation
probability of farmers who only experienced coordination success in the compensa-
tion stage, both under the AT and under the AP (column (2)). The effect size of
communication does not differ between these two groups (p-values below Table 3.7).
In contrast, under neither PES design does the introduction of communication
significantly increase the conservation probability of individuals who experienced
coordination failure in the compensation stage (column (3)). Consequently, there
is no differential effect of communication in the two PES designs for farmers who
conserved during the compensation stage. However, the shares of the respective
subgroups in the population assigned to the AT and the AP differ significantly.
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Around 48% of the farmers assigned to the AT only experience coordination success
in the compensation stage. This share is only 20% and significantly lower for the
AP (Chi2 test, p-value: 0.000).34 Therefore, while farmers who conserve in the
compensation stage and have similar experiences do not react differently to the
introduction of communication under the AT and the AP, the shares belonging to
the analyzed subgroups differ. Part of the aggregate different effect of the AT and
the AP, as shown in Table 3.5, is thus likely explained by a higher occurrence of
coordination failure under the AP in the compensation stage.
The share of farmers who never conserve during the compensation does not
differ between both PES designs (p-value of Chi2 test: 0.564) and amounts to
25% for the AT and 26% for the AP. However, as indicated in column (1), these
individuals react significantly different to the introduction of communication under
the two PES designs: While communication has a positive and significant effect
on conservation probabilities under both schemes, the increase in conservation
probabilities is significantly larger under the AT than under the AP. Reasons for
these differential effects could be e.g. different beliefs on how likely it is that the
requirements for receiving compensation payments will be met. This could be due
to different coordination success at the aggregate group level. Under the AP, 62%
of the farmers who never conserve in the compensation stage are part of a group in
which none of the farmers ever receive compensation payments in the compensation
stage. This share is only 30% for the AT.
3.5 Conclusion
Results from a framed field experiment with Indonesian oil palm farmers suggest
that PES might be a promising policy tool to motivate farmers to plant biodiversity-
friendly mixed oil palm systems that integrate trees. While the share of conserving
farmers lies below the ecologically relevant threshold of 0.5 in the baseline, the
introduction of compensation payments raises this share on average above the
relevant threshold, supporting the effectiveness of the implemented schemes. In
the absence of communication, the two conditional PES designs tested, a threshold
payment that is conditional on a minimum size of area put under conservation
(AT), and an agglomeration payment that requires farmers with bordering land to
conserve (AP), are similarly effective in increasing environmental effects and overall
3427% of the farmers assigned to the AT and 54% of those assigned to the AP experience
coordination failure in the compensation stage (Chi2 test, p-value: 0.000).
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welfare. In contrast, budget efficiency is significantly higher under the AP than
under the AT. This is partly due to a shift in the costs of conservation from the
policy maker to the local population. However, once farmers can communicate, the
AT outperforms the AP and generates significantly higher levels of environmental
effectiveness and overall welfare than the AP, while reaching similar levels of budget
efficiency. The differential effect of communication between the two PES designs is
partly driven by different coordination experiences. For farmers who previously only
experienced coordination success, communication is similarly effective in increasing
conservation probabilities under the AT and the AP. However, the higher risk
involved in the AP, where farmers with bordering land need to conserve, leads
to lower shares of farmers experiencing only coordination success under the AP
than under the AT. In contrast, communication does not raise the conservation
probabilities of farmers previously experiencing coordination failure, neither under
the AT nor under the AP. Given the higher probability of coordination success,
the AT appears to be the more promising policy tool to support the provision of
an environmental good that is both dependent on a critical size of conservation
area and its connectivity.
To generate the highest level of environmental effects and overall efficiency, addi-
tional monetary incentives should be provided under the AT because a considerable
share of the population will only switch to conservation if it is financially more
attractive than oil palm cultivation. In case this is not feasible under the existing
budget constraints of the funding agency and if the policy maker is willing to accept
lower farmers’ income, only a partial coverage of the conservation costs might be
a viable alternative instead of a full coverage. Similar increases in environmental
effects and overall welfare are reached when 60% of the costs instead of 100% are
compensated. This might be particularly relevant in the context of high-value cash
crops such as oil palm, where over- or even full compensation of foregone farmers’
income can represent a financial challenge (Muradian et al., 2013).
Our study represents one of the first experimental tests of the agglomeration
payment. Our results suggest that the stricter payment rules might lead to coordi-
nation failure, also when costs are fully covered or when conservation is financially
attractive. Therefore, further (simulation) studies analyzing the effectiveness or
efficiency of the agglomeration payment should incorporate coordination failure to
generate more robust results. Moreover, the stricter compensation rules might put
an additional monetary burden on farmers who bear greater costs for environmental
improvements under the AT than under the AP. This might bring about conflicts
96
Chapter 3. PES for a biodiversity supporting landscape
between poverty reduction goals and environmental protection, which is particularly
important for developing countries such as Indonesia.
Our results highlight the importance of communication and give insights into how
prior coordination experiences influence its effectiveness. To derive further insights
on whether communication, if introduced in the beginning, can avoid coordination
failure, a between design comparing the introduction of compensation payments
with and without communication would be needed. Moreover, implementing an
additional treatment that isolates the effect of communication could give a more
complete picture of its relevance for supporting coordination in our context. Further
research should be conducted to gain more insights into whether and when farmers
manage to coordinate under agglomeration payments. In particular, allowing for
more than one plot per farmer as well as different opportunity costs might be
important in order to enhance the comparability of the experimental results to the
scenarios considered in simulation studies, which highlight the potential advantages
of agglomeration payments (e.g. Wätzold and Drechsler 2014). Moreover, the
size of the environmental effects and its dependence on the spatial structure will
naturally affect the experimental results. In our case, the extra benefits generated
from putting bordering land under conservation are relatively small. In case the
benefits are highly dependent on the spatial structure, which e.g. is the case for
species with a low dispersal rate (Drechsler et al., 2010), the AP might increase
its performance relative to the AT since in the equilibrium higher environmental
effects will be generated under the AP than under the AT.
In comparison to other studies that experimentally analyze spatially explicit
PES designs, the external validity of our study is improved since our sample
comprises farmers and a framing around a real-world decision. Yet, further research
should complement our study to provide additional insights into the sensitivity of
the conservation behavior to different experimental parameters, such as group size,
group composition, spatial structure, and the size and structure of environmental
effects. Such evidence is urgently needed for policy makers to make informed
decisions in the face of unprecedented biodiversity loss in rapidly intensifying
agricultural landscapes.
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3.A Appendix









AT High 7 3 11 12
AT Medium 4 5 11 13
AT Low 8 6 11 8
AP High 8 6 11 8
AP Medium 3 5 11 14
AP Low 5 6 11 11
N 66
The columns listed under "2nd compensation" indicate how many of the groups that receive the
payment size indicated in the column "Compensation" first, receive high, medium or low payments,
respectively, second. To test whether the share of the respective payments differ significantly
between the PES designs, assignment to PES design (1=AT, 0 =AP) is regressed on the three
payment levels in a probit model with group-level clustered standard errors. P-values of tests
for share high payment = share medium payment: 0.664, for high = low: 0.519, for medium
= low: 0.846 when testing for independence between PES design and payment levels in the
communication stage.
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Figure A3.1: Example of poster used for explanation of experiment
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Table A3.2: Explanation of specific explanatory variables
Name Explanation
Trust Reply to the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing
with people?" on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 means fully agree.
Risk preferences Reply to the question "Are you generally a person who is fully
prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?" on a
scale from 0 to 10, where 10 means fully prepared.
Time preferences Reply to the question "Are you generally a person who is fully
prepared to give up something now in order to gain more in the
future?" on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 means fully prepared.
Total value of as-
sets
Assets considered for calculations: mobile phone, TV, motorbike, car,
truck, AC, fridge, electronic washing machine, computer. Farmers
needed to indicate how much they would receive if they sold these
items today. Sum of all assets expressed in mio. IDR.
Trees in OP Farmer has trees in his or her oil palm plantation, 1=Yes.
Transmigrant
farmer
Farmer came to Jambi within the transmigration program, 1=Yes.
Biospheric
values
Reply to the question how similar a person for whom it is very
important to conserve the environment is to the farmer. Reply on a
scale from 1 to 6, where 6 means very similar.
Egoistic values Reply to the question how similar a person for whom it is very
important to have money and possession is to the farmer. Reply on
a scale from 1 to 6, where 6 means very similar.
Altruistic values Reply to a question how similar a person for whom it is very
important to help other persons is to the farmer. Reply on a scale
from 1 to 6, where 6 means very similar.
Environmental
awareness
Assessment of the statement "If oil palm expansion continues at the
current speed, we will experience an environmental catastrophe in
Jambi. 1= don’t agree, 6= strongly agree.
Replanting Farmer is intending to replant in the next 3 years, or has replanted




Each farmer needed to indicate how many persons in the group are
family members. Ranges from 0 to 5.
Number of neigh-
bors in group
Each farmer needed to indicate how many persons in the group live




Number of other farmers in the group who conserve in a respective
round.
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Table A3.3: Mean comparison tests between PES designs
(1) (2) (3)
Area Agglomeration (1) vs. (2),
threshold payment p-value
Age 46.55 45.58 0.39
(0.69) (0.88)
Gender, 1=Female 0.06 0.05 0.83
Education (in years) 8.96 8.47 0.23
(0.33) (0.23)
Transmigrant Farmer, 1=Yes 0.34 0.28 0.38
Experience as oil palm farmer (in years) 15.86 14.02 0.06
(0.68) (0.69)
Javanese ethnicity, 1 = Yes 0.70 0.67 0.74
Melayu ethnicity, 1=Yes 0.12 0.15 0.55
Total value of assets (in Mio IDR) 43.52 40.74 0.72
(5.80) (5.05)
Environmental extension received, 1=Yes 0.09 0.11 0.55
Trust 4.18 3.93 0.30
(0.16) (0.18)
Risk preferences 5.11 4.89 0.43
(0.20) (0.20)
Time preferences 5.87 5.34 0.14
(0.27) (0.23)
Biospheric values 4.79 4.77 0.77
(0.05) (0.05)
Altruistic values 4.93 4.92 0.87
(0.05) (0.04)
Egoistic values 3.92 3.80 0.33
(0.10) (0.09)
Environmental awareness 4.10 4.10 1.00
(0.14) (0.12)
Area owned (in ha) 3.95 4.10 0.71
(0.25) (0.31)
Area owned under oil palm production 3.17 3.45 0.33
(in ha) (0.17) (0.24)
Trees in OP, 1= Yes 0.16 0.23 0.16
Other crops grown besides oil palm, 1=Yes 0.28 0.29 0.85
Replanting, 1=Yes 0.06 0.08 0.60
Number of family members in 0.57 0.40 0.49
the group (0.22) (0.08)
Number of neighbors in 0.85 1.05 0.34
the group (0.16) (0.12)
N 198 198
Standard errors clustered at group level in parentheses.
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Table A3.4: Mean comparison tests between payment levels
Name High Medium Low H vs. M H vs. L M vs. L
Age 45.28 46.18 46.74 0.17 0.05 0.38
(0.64) (0.75) (0.65)
Gender, 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.56 0.8 0.79
1=Female
Education 8.58 8.7 8.86 0.65 0.31 0.48
(in years) (0.22) (0.27) (0.26)
Transmigrant Farmer 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.65 0.48 0.79
1=Yes
Experience as oil palm farmer 14.63 15.01 15.19 0.54 0.34 0.76
(in years) (0.59) (0.59) (0.63)
Javanese ethnicity, 0.7 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.68 0.95
1 = Yes
Melayu ethnicity, 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.24 0.68 0.42
1=Yes
Total value of assets 38.24 44.45 43.72 0.19 0.26 0.87
(in Mio IDR) (4.42) (4.9) (4.7)
Environmental extension 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.11 1 0.13
received, 1=Yes
Trust 4.01 3.99 4.17 0.91 0.27 0.2
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
Risk preferences 5.02 5.04 4.94 0.94 0.6 0.56
(0.17) (0.16) (0.19)
Time preferences 5.69 5.57 5.56 0.58 0.56 0.99
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Biospheric values 4.83 4.75 4.77 0.09 0.21 0.54
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Altruistic values 4.94 4.91 4.92 0.37 0.53 0.92
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Egoistic values 3.79 3.94 3.85 0.08 0.49 0.24
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Environmental awareness 4.08 4.06 4.16 0.92 0.43 0.4
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Area owned 4.11 4.06 3.9 0.82 0.39 0.55
(in ha) (0.27) (0.25) (0.22)
Area owned under oil palm 3.36 3.38 3.18 0.89 0.36 0.31
production (n ha) (0.2) (0.2) (0.14)
Trees in OP, 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.65 0.54 0.9
1= Yes
Other crops grown besides oil 0.28 0.28 0.3 0.88 0.69 0.83
palm, 1=Yes
Replanting, 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.45 0.02 0.05
1=Yes
Number of family members in 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.94 0.95 1
the group (0.14) (0.16) (0.14)
Number of neighbors in the 0.8 0.94 1.11 0.26 0.02 0.07
group (0.09) (0.13) (0.13)
N 264 264 264
First three columns display means. Group-level clustered standard errors displayed in parentheses. P-values of
mean comparison tests displayed in columns 5 to 6. For comparison of two payment levels, farmers who will
receive both payments in the course of the experiment are discarded.
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AT 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.000
AP 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.367 0.003 0.571
AT=AP 0.484 0.004 0.411 0.005 0.647 0.008
High 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.019
Medium 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.145 0.005 0.001
Low 0.029 0.223 0.008 0.462 0.040 0.226
High=Medium 0.035 0.331 0.066 0.240 0.049 0.569
High=Low 0.021 0.472 0.029 0.254 0.016 0.899
Medium=Low 0.300 0.814 0.459 0.823 0.508 0.800
AT+High 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.040
AT+Medium 0.061 0.022 0.022 0.169 0.161 0.001
AT+Low 0.098 0.049 0.025 0.089 0.157 0.036
AP+High 0.001 0.228 0.002 0.272 0.003 0.321
AP+Medium 0.002 0.225 0.009 0.525 0.011 0.108
AP+Low 0.156 0.683 0.126 0.484 0.114 0.865
AT+High=AT+Medium 0.168 0.807 0.278 0.624 0.168 0.931
AT+High=AT+Low 0.061 0.728 0.099 0.671 0.061 0.588
AT+Medium=AT+Low 0.645 1.000 0.554 0.971 0.817 0.439
AP+High=AP+Medium 0.129 0.781 0.145 0.680 0.220 0.696
AP+High=AP+Low 0.271 0.868 0.129 0.739 0.178 0.476
AP+Medium=AP+Low 0.263 0.697 0.509 0.825 0.433 0.377
AT+High=AP+High 0.327 0.164 0.311 0.176 0.330 0.186
AT+Medium=AP+Medium 0.869 0.075 0.547 0.158 0.903 0.033
AT+Low=AP+Low 0.934 0.171 0.525 0.148 0.879 0.617
Table presents p-values for mean comparison tests. Participation measures the share of conserving
farmers. Coordination measures the average environmental effects generated per conserving
farmers. For paired tests, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used. For non-paired tests, we use
Mann-Whitney U tests. For partially paired tests, we use the sign rank test proposed by Fong et
al. (2018). The test presents a linear weighted combination of test statistics comparing paired and
independent samples, where the weights are inversely proportional to the respective variances.
Non-paired tests, e.g. AT=AP, were conducted after taking first differences of the respective
outcome variable between different stages of the experiment, i.e. between the baseline and the
compensation stage, or between the compensation and the communication stage. When comparing
the effect sizes of the three payment levels, we discard the overlap to ensure independence. For
instance, when comparing high to medium payments, the farmers who receive both high and





























Comp. Comm. Comp. Comm. Comp. Comm.
AT 0.026 0.005 0.000
AP 0.247 0.000 0.056
AT=AP 0.066 0.601 0.500 0.003 0.004 0.015 0.002 0.142 0.050 0.016
High 0.000 0.000 0.007
Medium 0.001 0.004 0.000
Low 0.010 0.091 0.098
High=Medium 0.001 0.790 0.095 0.911 0.359 0.756 0.009 0.000 0.025 0.001
High=Low 0.004 0.718 0.063 0.910 0.556 0.966 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.000
Medium=Low 0.010 1.000 0.184 0.911 0.386 0.475 0.000 0.000 0.554 0.02
Table presents p-values for mean comparison tests. For paired tests, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used. For non-paired tests, we use Mann-Whitney
U tests. For partially paired tests, we use the sign rank test proposed by Fong et al. (2018).
Non-paired tests, e.g. AT=AP, were conducted after taking first differences of the respective outcome variable between different stages of the
experiment, i.e. between the baseline and the compensation stage, or between the compensation and the communication stage. When comparing the
effect sizes of the three payment levels, we discard the overlap to ensure independence. For instance, when comparing high to medium payments, the











Table A3.7: Group-level descriptives for environmental effectiveness and its drivers (combined PES-schemes)
Environmental effects Participation Coordination
Baseline Compensation Communication Baseline Compensation Communication Baseline Compensation Communication
High 131.82 229.63***/l 316.83** 0.44 0.62***/l 0.77** 35.20 53.80***/l 66.03**
+AT (112.67) (123.78) (116.64) (0.19) (0.21) (0.24) (28.27) (23.95) (6.72)
Medium 122.18 165.63* 260.00**/+ 0.42 0.52** 0.63 34.80 40.65 66.31***/++
+AT (103.26) (133.43) (167.71) (0.18) (0.21) (0.39) (26.00) (29.10) (11.58)
Low 153.27 186.36* 264.50**/+++ 0.47 0.53** 0.67* 41.77 47.17 56.76**
+AT (101.48) (122.57) (152.50) (0.20) (0.22) (0.30) (22.56) (26.28) (22.53)
High 131.27 197.09*** 262.75 0.42 0.54*** 0.67 31.88 47.60*** 53.75
+AP (140.72) (133.54) (159.47) (0.26) (0.26) (0.31) (31.02) (28.03) (27.48)
Medium 138.27 177.54*** 203.29 0.43 0.50** 0.53 33.67 44.17** 44.19
+AP (133.50) (143.27) (179.68) (0.25) (0.28) (0.39) (30.28) (28.89) (32.62)
Low 166.64 198.18 186.36 0.50 0.55 0.52 41.44 48.15 46.97
+AP (131.43) (124.79) (166.14) (0.24) (0.23) (0.34) (28.68) (24.63) (22.66)
Mean values indicated, standard deviation in parentheses. For paired tests, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used. For non-paired tests, we use a
Mann-Whitney U test. For partially paired tests, we use the sign rank test proposed by Fong et al. (2018). For Mann-Whitney U tests, first
differences of the outcome variable were built to control for possible difference between treatments at the baseline stage.
* refers to significance levels of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. h/m/l refer to significance level of Mann-Whitney U tests when comparing the same
PES design between different payment levels where h, m and l indicate significance level in comparison to the high, medium or low payment.
*/h refer to 10%, **/hh refer to 5% and ***/hhh refer to 1% significance level.
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5 10 15 20
round 
Area threshold Agglomeration payment
The values in the graph are not demeaned. For all rounds, a base spending of 1 unit is assumed
to be able to calculate the budget efficiency also in absence of compensation payments. Groups
and rounds in which no compensation payments are made are included in the budget efficiency
calculation.
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Table A3.8: Effects of two PES designs on farmers’ conservation decision (full
tables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef. AME Coef. AME Coef. AME
AT 0.40∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.018) (0.098) (0.018) (0.093) (0.017)
AP 0.32∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.019) (0.101) (0.018) (0.097) (0.018)
AT+com. 0.61∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.019) (0.103) (0.019) (0.097) (0.018)
AP+com. 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.03
(0.100) (0.019) (0.106) (0.019) (0.100) (0.018)
Conservation 0.55∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(lagged) (0.050) (0.012) (0.052) (0.011) (0.050) (0.010)
Age -0.01 -0.00 -0.02∗ -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001)
Experience as oil 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
palm farmer (0.014) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002)
Education 0.05∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.01∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.005) (0.027) (0.005) (0.021) (0.004)
Transmigrant 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.33∗ 0.06∗
Farmer, 1=Yes (0.216) (0.042) (0.222) (0.040) (0.175) (0.032)
Area owned (in ha) -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00
(0.020) (0.004) (0.021) (0.004) (0.017) (0.003)
Other crops grown 0.49∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.22 0.04
besides oil palm,
1=Yes
(0.209) (0.040) (0.204) (0.037) (0.165) (0.030)
Trees in OP, 0.30 0.06 0.32 0.06 -0.04 -0.01
1= Yes (0.209) (0.040) (0.214) (0.039) (0.169) (0.031)
Replanting, 1=Yes 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.320) (0.062) (0.335) (0.060) (0.257) (0.047)
Risk preferences 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.030) (0.006) (0.031) (0.006) (0.025) (0.004)
Trust 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.035) (0.007) (0.037) (0.007) (0.029) (0.005)
Time preferences 0.05∗ 0.01∗ 0.05∗ 0.01∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.030) (0.006) (0.031) (0.006) (0.024) (0.004)
Egoistic values -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00
(0.058) (0.011) (0.061) (0.011) (0.047) (0.009)
Biospheric values 0.16 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.02
(0.113) (0.022) (0.119) (0.021) (0.093) (0.017)
Altruistic values 0.22 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.12 0.02
(0.135) (0.026) (0.141) (0.025) (0.110) (0.020)
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Environmental 0.21∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
awareness (0.055) (0.010) (0.057) (0.010) (0.044) (0.008)
No. of family -0.17∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.19∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.10 -0.02
members in group (0.086) (0.017) (0.079) (0.014) (0.065) (0.012)
No. of neighbors 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
in group (0.071) (0.014) (0.069) (0.013) (0.056) (0.010)
No. of other 0.05∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.01∗∗
conserving farmers
(lagged)
(0.022) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004)
Round -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
PES requirement 1.32∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
met (lagged)=1 (0.063) (0.013)
Conservation t=0 2.01∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.018)




Constant -3.75∗∗∗ -4.02∗∗∗ -3.67∗∗∗
(1.028) (1.075) (0.849)
Observations 7486 7486 7486 7486 7486 7486
Results from a mixed effects probit with individual and group RE displayed. Standard errors
shown in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) assume exogeneity of the initial land use decision.
Columns (3) and (4) condition the conservation decision in each round on the initial land use
decision and the initial land use decision of the other farmers as suggested by Wooldridge (2005)
and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013). P-values for test AT=AP: (1) 0.466, (3) 0.924, (5) 0.510;
for AT+com.=AP+com.: (1) 0.000, (3) 0.000, (5) 0.000.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A3.9: Effects of three payment levels on farmers’ conservation decision (full
tables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME
High 0.60∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.018) (0.097) (0.018) (0.093) (0.017)
Medium 0.33∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.019) (0.102) (0.019) (0.098) (0.018)
Low 0.20∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.089) (0.017) (0.093) (0.017) (0.089) (0.016)
High+com. 0.56∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.023) (0.128) (0.023) (0.120) (0.022)
Medium+com. 0.31∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.020) (0.110) (0.020) (0.105) (0.019)
Low+com. 0.43∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.023) (0.128) (0.023) (0.122) (0.022)
Conservation 0.55∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(lagged) (0.050) (0.012) (0.052) (0.011) (0.050) (0.010)
Age -0.01 -0.00 -0.01∗ -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001)
Experience as oil 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
palm farmer (0.014) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002)
Education 0.06∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.005) (0.026) (0.005) (0.021) (0.004)
Transmigrant 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.34∗ 0.06∗
Farmer, 1=Yes (0.219) (0.042) (0.222) (0.040) (0.177) (0.032)
Area owned (in ha) -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01
(0.021) (0.004) (0.021) (0.004) (0.018) (0.003)
Other crops grown, 0.50∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.23 0.04
1=Yes (0.212) (0.040) (0.204) (0.037) (0.167) (0.030)
Trees in OP, 0.31 0.06 0.33 0.06 -0.03 -0.00
1= Yes (0.212) (0.040) (0.214) (0.039) (0.171) (0.031)
Replanting, 1=Yes 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.324) (0.062) (0.334) (0.060) (0.259) (0.047)
Risk preferences 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.030) (0.006) (0.031) (0.006) (0.025) (0.005)
Trust 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.036) (0.007) (0.037) (0.007) (0.029) (0.005)
Time preferences 0.06∗ 0.01∗ 0.05∗ 0.01∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.030) (0.006) (0.031) (0.006) (0.024) (0.004)
Egoistic values -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00
(0.059) (0.011) (0.061) (0.011) (0.048) (0.009)
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Biospheric values 0.16 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.02
(0.114) (0.022) (0.119) (0.021) (0.094) (0.017)
Altruistic values 0.22 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.12 0.02
(0.136) (0.026) (0.141) (0.025) (0.111) (0.020)
Environmental 0.21∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
awareness (0.056) (0.010) (0.057) (0.010) (0.045) (0.008)
No. of family -0.17∗ -0.03∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.09 -0.02
members in group (0.088) (0.017) (0.079) (0.014) (0.066) (0.012)
No. of neighbors 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
in group (0.072) (0.014) (0.069) (0.013) (0.056) (0.010)
No. of other 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
conserving farmers
(lagged)
(0.023) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004)
PES requirement 1.29∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
met (lagged)=1 (0.063) (0.013)
Conservation t=0 2.03∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.018)




Round -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
Constant -3.81∗∗∗ -4.06∗∗∗ -3.79∗∗∗
(1.038) (1.070) (0.856)
Observations 7486 7486 7486 7486 7486 7486
Individual conservation choice is outcome variable. Coefficients and AME from a mixed effects pro-
bit model with individual and group RE shown. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) to (4)
assume exogeneity of the initial land use decision. Columns (5) and (6) condition the conservation
decision in each round on the initial land use decision and the initial land use decision of the other
farmers as suggested by Wooldridge (2005) and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013). P-values for
test High=Medium: (1) 0.000, (3) 0.029, (5) 0.000; for High=Low: (1) 0.000, (3) 0.001, (5) 0.000;
Medium=Low: (1) 0.102, (3) 0.242, (5) 0.092; High+com.=Medium+com.: (1) 0.053, (3) 0.021,
(5) 0.059; High+com.=Low+com.: (1) 0.353, (3) 0.033, (5) 0.339; Medium+com.=Low+com.: (1)
0.353, (3) 0.999, (5) 0.391.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A3.10: Effects of six PES-schemes on farmer’s conservation probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME
AT+High 0.70∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.022) (0.119) (0.021) (0.112) (0.021)
AT+Medium 0.40∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.022) (0.123) (0.022) (0.116) (0.021)
AT+Low 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.16 0.03
(0.107) (0.021) (0.112) (0.020) (0.106) (0.019)
AP+High 0.51∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.022) (0.120) (0.021) (0.115) (0.021)
AP+Medium 0.28∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.19 0.03 0.29∗∗ 0.05∗∗
(0.122) (0.023) (0.126) (0.022) (0.120) (0.022)
AP+Low 0.26∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.05∗∗
(0.116) (0.022) (0.121) (0.022) (0.115) (0.021)
AT+High+com. 0.76∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.028) (0.157) (0.028) (0.148) (0.027)
AT+Medium+com. 0.44∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.024) (0.138) (0.024) (0.127) (0.023)
AT+Low+com. 0.80∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.032) (0.179) (0.031) (0.168) (0.031)
AP+High+com. 0.31∗ 0.06∗ 0.31∗ 0.05∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.06∗
(0.166) (0.032) (0.183) (0.032) (0.165) (0.030)
AP+Medium+com. 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.14 0.02
(0.143) (0.027) (0.148) (0.026) (0.143) (0.026)
AP+Low+com. 0.15 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.15 0.03
(0.150) (0.028) (0.159) (0.028) (0.149) (0.027)
Conservation 0.54∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(lagged) (0.051) (0.012) (0.052) (0.010) (0.050) (0.010)
Age -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001)
Experience as oil 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
palm farmer (0.014) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002)
Education 0.06∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.01∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.005) (0.027) (0.005) (0.021) (0.004)
Transmigrant 0.20 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.34∗ 0.06∗
Farmer, 1=Yes (0.220) (0.042) (0.229) (0.040) (0.178) (0.032)
Area owned (in ha) -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00
(0.021) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.018) (0.003)
Other crops grown, 0.50∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.24 0.04
1=Yes (0.213) (0.040) (0.210) (0.036) (0.168) (0.030)
Trees in OP, 0.32 0.06 0.36 0.06 -0.02 -0.00
111
Chapter 3. PES for a biodiversity supporting landscape
1= Yes (0.213) (0.040) (0.220) (0.038) (0.172) (0.031)
Replanting, 1=Yes 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.01
(0.326) (0.062) (0.344) (0.060) (0.261) (0.047)
Risk preferences 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.030) (0.006) (0.032) (0.006) (0.025) (0.004)
Trust 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.036) (0.007) (0.038) (0.007) (0.029) (0.005)
Time preferences 0.06∗ 0.01∗ 0.05 0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.030) (0.006) (0.032) (0.006) (0.024) (0.004)
Egoistic values -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00
(0.059) (0.011) (0.063) (0.011) (0.048) (0.009)
Biospheric values 0.16 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.02
(0.115) (0.022) (0.122) (0.021) (0.094) (0.017)
Altruistic values 0.22 0.04 0.22 0.04 0.12 0.02
(0.137) (0.026) (0.145) (0.025) (0.112) (0.020)
Environmental 0.22∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
awareness (0.056) (0.010) (0.058) (0.010) (0.045) (0.008)
No. of family -0.17∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.19∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.10 -0.02
members in group (0.088) (0.017) (0.081) (0.014) (0.067) (0.012)
No. of neighbors 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
in group (0.072) (0.014) (0.071) (0.012) (0.057) (0.010)
No. of other 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00
conserving farmers
(lagged)
(0.023) (0.004) (0.023) (0.004)




Conservation t=0 2.05∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.018)




Round -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
Constant -3.78∗∗∗ -4.17∗∗∗ -3.75∗∗∗
(1.045) (1.104) (0.863)
Observations 7486 7486 7486 7486 7486 7486
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Coefficients and AME from mixed effects probit estimation with individual and group RE displayed.
Outcome variable is farmers’ conservation decision. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values for
test High=Medium (AT): (1) 0.003, (3) 0.497, (5) 0.003; High=Low (AT): (1) 0.000, (3) 0.001,
(5) 0.000; Medium=Low (AT): (1) 0.029, (3) 0.011, (5) 0.026; for High=Medium (AP): (1) 0.038,
(3) 0.026, (5) 0.045; High=Low (AP): (1) 0.026, (3) 0.221, (5) 0.026; Medium=Low (AP): (1)
0.888, (3) 0.316, (5) 0.848;
High+com.=Medium+com. (AT): (1) 0.070, (3) 0.055, (5) 0.091; High+com.=Low+com. (AT):
(1) 0.834, (3) 0.649, (5) 0.819; Medium+com.=Low+com. (AT): (1) 0.058, (3) 0.198, (5) 0.072;
High+com.=Medium+com. (AP): (1) 0.393, (3) 0.272, (4) 0.347; High+com.=Low+com. (AP):
(1) 0.426, (3) 0.115, (5) 0.396; Medium+com.=Low+com. (AP): (1) 0.965, (3) 0.559, (5) 0.933;
AT=AP(High): (1) 0.161, (3) 0.978, (5) 0.160; AT=AP(Medium): (1) 0.366, (3) 0.173, (5) 0.421;
AT=AP(Low): (1) 0.490, (3) 0.128, (5) 0.412; AT=AP(High+com.): (1) 0.027, (3) 0.025, (5)
0.033; AT=AP(Medium+com.): (1) 0.080, (3) 0.041, (5) 0.062; AT=AP(Low+com.): (1) 0.001,
(3) 0.001, (5) 0.001.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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The effect of soil conservation
practices on yields and soil
carbon in smallholder oil palm
plantations
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4.1 Introduction
In South-East Asia, oil palm production has been the main driver of agricultural
expansion during the last three decades (Gibbs et al., 2010). Between 1990 and
2017, the cultivated area has increased six fold (FAO, 2019). Oil palm expansion has
contributed to deforestation and has replaced more extensive agricultural land use
systems such as rubber agroforestry (Feintrenie, Schwarze, & Levang, 2010; Vijay et
al., 2016). This has raised concern about its negative environmental consequences
(Clough et al., 2016; Drescher et al., 2016; Vijay et al., 2016). In particular carbon
emissions and the potential consequences for global warming have been highlighted
(Rahman et al., 2018; van Straaten et al., 2015). Part of these emissions are due
to losses of soil organic carbon (SOC), which is the organic fraction of the carbon
stored in the soil (Guillaume et al., 2018). Among the main causes of these SOC
losses are soil erosion and little litter input in oil palm plantations in comparison
to forests (Guillaume et al., 2015).
Oil palm expansion is not only driven by industrial plantations, but also by
smallholder farmers. Around 46% of all area under oil palm in Indonesia, which is
the main palm oil producing country, is managed by smallholder farmers (Badan
Pusat Statistik, 2019). Many smallholder farmers have profited from oil palm
cultivation in terms of income and broader welfare gains (Krishna et al., 2017).
However, smallholder oil palm yields lie well below those of industrial plantations
(Euler et al., 2016; Woittiez et al., 2017) indicating the existence of yield gaps.
Closing yield gaps is important from a rural development perspective (Jelsma,
Slingerland, Giller, & Bijman, 2017). Moreover, it may also be environmentally
efficient if higher per hectare yields reduce land expansion (Kubitza, Krishna,
Urban, Alamsyah, & Qaim, 2018).
The adoption of improved management practices can potentially decrease yield
gaps. For oil palm, one of the recommended practices is mulching with empty
fruit bunches (EFB) (Comte et al., 2012; Pauli et al., 2014). EFB are the bunches
of the oil fruits which remain after the oil fruits have been stripped off during
the processing at the palm oil mills. EFB contain several nutrients and can be
used as organic fertilizer (Abu Bakar et al., 2011). While industrial plantations
in proximity to palm oil mills often apply EFB, smallholder use is much lower
(Jelsma et al., 2019). If beneficial to yields in smallholdings, wider applications
of EFB mulching could hence help to close the reported yield gaps. Moreover,
EFB mulching might also positively affect soil properties and increase SOC (Abu
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Bakar et al., 2011; Comte et al., 2013; Moradi et al., 2015; Tao et al., 2017). This
could restore part of the carbon lost during land transformation into oil palm
plantations and might also support the provision of biomass producing ecosystem
services, which are important to sustain crop growth (Lal, 2006; Minasny et al.,
2017; Petersen & Hoyle, 2016).
Our study presents evidence on the effect of EFB mulching on yields and
SOC contents in smallholder oil palm plantations in Jambi Province, in Sumatra,
Indonesia. This region represents one of the hotspots of oil palm expansion in
Indonesia and has experienced important land use changes (Drescher et al., 2016).
While several studies have reported yield and SOC increasing effects of EFB
mulching in experimental studies in industrial plantations (Abu Bakar et al., 2011;
Tao et al., 2017; Teh Boon Sung et al., 2011), we are not aware of any study
that has looked at the effect of EFB mulching in smallholder plantations. Yet,
results derived from experimental and large-scale plantations on the effects of EFB
mulching cannot simply be extrapolated to smallholder farmers because they often
face circumstances which do not match the conditions in experimental settings
(Duflo et al., 2008).
Based on yearly panel data on oil palm yields and plantation management
from 2015 until 2017, and soil samples collected in 2017, we estimate the effect
of mulching on yields and SOC. Moreover, we explore to what extent the effect
of mulching on yields operates through an improvement in SOC contents. To our
knowledge, only Tao et al. (2017) have tried to analyze the impact pathways of
EFB mulching on yields. The authors however only look at the effects of mulching
on yields, and of SOC on yields separately. Therefore, it is not possible to separate
the yield supporting effect of SOC increases from other channels.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce in more detail the
value chain linked to EFB procurement and how EFB mulching can affect yields.
Section 4.3 presents the study region, the sampling approach and the data collected.
In section 4.4, we introduce the estimation strategy. Results are presented in
section 4.5 and section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Characteristics of empty fruit bunch mulching
To avoid perishing, the fresh fruit bunches (FFB) need to be brought to the mills
within 48 hours after harvest to get processed (Gatto et al., 2015). There, they
are first sterilized to then strip off the oil containing fruits from the bunches
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(Embrandiri, Singh, Ibrahim, & Ramli, 2012). At this stage, empty fruit bunches
(EFB) are generated. In order to produce one ton of crude palm oil (CPO), around
four tons of FFB are needed if hybrid varieties are used, which are widely spread
among smallholder farmers in Indonesia (Woittiez et al., 2017). Per ton of CPO,
around one ton of EFB is produced (Comte et al., 2013). These are then sold as
organic fertilizer at the mills. As a result, access might be restricted for smallholder
farmers who often are not directly linked to the mills, but sell their FFB via
middlemen (Jelsma et al., 2019). Moreover, EFB need to be brought back to the
plantations by trucks, but the bulkiness and heavy weight complicate their transport
as well as the application in the plantations. Besides a general unawareness of
the potential positive effects of mulching material and high prices, these factors
can explain the low adoption rate of EFB mulching among smallholder farmers
(Comte et al., 2013; Jelsma et al., 2019; Rhebergen, Fairhurst, Whitbread, Giller,
& Zingore, 2018).
EFB contain nutrients such as nitrogen (N), potassium (K) and phosphor (P)
which are released in the decomposition process to the soil (Moradi et al., 2015).1
Their carbon content is estimated at 44.1% (Comte et al., 2013). Decomposition
of EFB takes between one and two years (Moradi, Teh, Goh, Husni, & Ishak,
2014). First, in particular carbon and potassium are released, while other nutrients
are released at slower rates and partly only in the second year after application
(Caliman et al., 2001; Chiew & Zaharah, 2002; Moradi et al., 2014).
Evidence from experimental studies shows that EFB application can increase
oil palm yields (Abu Bakar et al., 2011). While annual yields might not differ
significantly, Tao et al. (2017) indicate that aggregated yield increases over a 15
year time horizon amount to 2.4% to 5.9%, depending on the amount of EFB
applied.2 Other experiments report even higher yield increases of up to 19% over
two years (Chiew & Zaharah, 2002). These positive yield responses might be due
to nutrient releases as well as improvements in soil conditions such as higher SOC
contents.
Several papers report positive effects of EFB application on SOC contents, both
in the short run after just six months (Teh Boon Sung et al., 2011) and in the
1Estimates about the nutrient content of EFB are 0.65-0.94% N, 0.08-0.12% P, 1.7-3.2% K,
0.11-0.34% Ca and 0.15-0.24% Mg on a dry weight basis (Abu Bakar et al., 2011). The nutritional
content of one ton of EFB is equivalent to 6.1 kg urea, 1.7 kg TSP, 16.3 kg MOP and 3 kg kieserit
(Caliman, Martha, & Saletes, 2001).
2Yield increases are 2.4%, 5.9% and 4.8%, when 30, 60 and 90 tons EFB per hectare are
applied on a yearly basis.
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long run (Abu Bakar et al., 2011; Comte et al., 2013; Tao et al., 2017). After
six months, carbon contents increased by 0.57 percentage points for 0-15 cm and
0.19 percentage points for 15-30 cm soil depth on average (Teh Boon Sung et al.,
2011). After ten years of application and depending on the amount of EFB applied,
increases of 1 to 1.25 percentage points have been observed (Abu Bakar et al.,
2011). However, soil responses to carbon inputs likely depend on the soil type and
on the frequency of application, with more positive effects to be expected from a
continuous application (Comte et al., 2013). Increasing SOC contents could also
increase soil carbon stocks and thus improve soil carbon sequestration. Moreover,
higher SOC contents could also increase the provision of several soil ecosystem
services, which are important to sustain crop growth (Lal, 2006; Petersen & Hoyle,
2016).
SOC can affect yields by improving the soil physical properties and by sustaining
soil microbial activities and soil biodiversity (Lal, 2006, 2014; Petersen & Hoyle,
2016). Higher SOC contents improve the water holding and buffer capacity of the
soil and facilitate root growth (Lal, 2006). Furthermore, soil microbial activities
support nutrient cycling and make nutrients directly available to the plants in the
process of SOC decomposition (Petersen & Hoyle, 2016). If any of these factors limit
yields, increasing SOC potentially has a direct positive effect on yields. This could
be especially important in developing countries, where e.g. insufficient fertilization
is often a direct limiting factor.
Positive responses of oil palm yields to increases in SOC can be expected because
insufficient nutrient supply (Euler et al., 2016; Rhebergen et al., 2018), nutrient
leaching (Kurniawan et al., 2018), and water stress (Carr, 2011; Woittiez et al.,
2017) have been reported as yield limiting factors and might be positively affected
by higher SOC contents. In contrast to ample evidence about the yield supporting
effect of SOC for annual crops (Lal, 2006, 2010; Petersen & Hoyle, 2016; Wander
& Nissen, 2004), empirical evidence on the relationship between yields and SOC
for perennial crops in general,3 and more specifically for oil palm is scarce. For oil
palm, the exceptions represent Gérard et al. (2017) who find that a one percentage
point increase in SOC is associated with yearly average yield increases of 24 kg per
palm when no chemical fertilizer is applied,4 and Tao et al. (2017) who report yield
increases of 1.6 tons per hectare in response to a one percentage point increase
3The few existing studies have reported positive correlations for rubber (Samarppuli, Ekanayake,
and Samarppuli (1999) cited after Lal (2006)), coffee and forest trees (Ojienyi & Agbede, 1980).
4Normally, around 144 oil palms are planted per hectare.
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in SOC. The latter study however does not control for other confounding factors
that might be correlated with higher SOC contents such as mulching, making a
full attribution of the effects to SOC difficult.
4.3 Study region, sampling procedure and data
4.3.1 Study region
Our study takes place in Jambi Province in Sumatra, Indonesia. Oil palm cultivation
started in Jambi in the 1980s through the transmigration program that was
supported by the Indonesian government and external donors, such as the World
Bank. To spur rural development, poor farmers from the overpopulated island
of Java were relocated to less populated ones, mostly to Sumatra. The arriving
farmers were given two to three hectares of land for oil palm cultivation as well
as extension services and inputs (Gatto et al., 2015; McCarthy, 2010). Since the
introduction of oil palm in Jambi, the province has been one of the hotspots of
Indonesian oil palm expansion leading to tremendous land use changes. While
unprotected forest cover decreased by more than 75% (1990-2011), in particular
the area under oil palm production has grown fourfold between 1990 and 2016 and
surpassed rubber as the dominant land use system in 2012 (Bou Dib, Krishna, et
al., 2018). Nowadays, Jambi Province ranks seventh with regard to the area under
oil palm production among all 34 provinces in Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik,
2019).
Our study region comprises five regencies, Muaro Jambi, Batanghari, Sarolan-
gun, Tebo, and Bungo. These cover most of the lowland area in Jambi that was
strongly affected by rainforest transformation into cash crop plantations (Gatto
et al., 2015). The dominant soil type in the lowlands are Acrisols, which are char-
acterized by a low pH and low soil fertility. However, peat soils are also frequent
(Guillaume et al., 2016). Our sample represents a subsample of villages and farmers
that were part of another study in the region conducted in 2015 and 2016 and for
which we gathered additional information between May and August 2017. For the
first study, a sample of 36 villages was randomly selected from a list of all oil palm
producing villages in the region.5 From these 36 villages, we randomly selected 18
villages (Figure 4.1). In our initial sample, 12% of the farmers applied mulching on
5The precise description of the first village selection process can be found in Romero et al.
(2019).
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Figure 4.1: Location of villages with soil samples in Jambi
The lines indicate regency delimiters and the shaded area the location of Jambi city.
at least one plot. To ensure that the number of mulching adopters in the sample is
sufficiently large for identification of the treatment effects, we stratified farmers
according to whether they applied EFB on at least one plot or not in 2016. We
sampled 30 farmers who applied EFB mulching and 100 control farmers. Due to
high non-response rates in one village, a 19th village was additionally included
in the sample. Our final sample comprises 129 farmers, of which 32 applied EFB
mulching in 2016 and 97 are control farmers.
4.3.2 Plot selection and soil sampling
Per farmer, one plot was selected. In case farmers had several plots under mulching
in the case of adopters, or without mulching in the case of control farmers the
following selection procedure was applied: when several plots were located within
a 1 km radius of the house, plot selection was done randomly. Since farmers were
reluctant to guide us to plots that were further away, we otherwise selected the
closest plot.6 Soil samples to assess soil organic carbon contents were collected from
May till August 2017. On each plot, samples were taken in two locations: First,
soil sampling was done in the interrow as a common reference point. The interrow
is the row between the palms and normally kept free of frond stacks and ground
vegetation. A very limited number of farmers also mulch next to the interrow
(Table 4.2). We made sure that interrow soil samples were taken where no mulching
6We acknowledge that the non-random selection of plots that are rather close to the farmer’s
house might lead to the selection of plots with higher management intensities and might therefore
not be representative for average plots in the region.
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Figure 4.2: Soil sampling strategy
Interrow




Dark circles indicate oil palms.
material was applied. Since the effect of mulching is localized (Carron et al., 2016),
soil samples in the interrow should not be affected by nearby mulching. The
second sampling location differed by treatment. In the EFB mulching treatment,
samples were taken next to the oil palms, in the so-called weeding circle, where
farmers mulch. In the control plots, we sampled in two different locations to cover
the heterogeneity within oil palm plantations: in 50 plots, we took soil samples
between oil palms. These locations are often covered by ground vegetation. In 47
plantations, the second sampling location was located in the frond stack area. This
is where farmers put the dead or pruned frond stacks. All of the farmers in our
sample with productive plots report having frond stacks in their plantations. The
sampling scheme is depicted in Figure 4.2. We will refer to the sampling location
in the interrow as interrow sampling location, and to the second sampling location
as the management location.
Composite soil samples consisting of 25 individual subsamples were collected
in each management and interrow sampling location to cover plot variations. All
samples were collected with a soil ring from 0-5 cm soil depth, because most of the
carbon losses are located in the topsoil (Guillaume et al., 2015). The soil was air-
dried and sieved (2 mm) and all visible roots were carefully removed. All samples
were milled and weighed in tin capsules to estimate C and N content using the
Vario el cube (Elementar, Langenselbold, Germany) at the Georg-August-University
121
Chapter 4. EFB mulching to increase yields and SOC
Goettingen.
4.3.3 Socio-economic data
We visited farmers between October and November in both 2015 and 2016 and
assessed socio-economics and plot characteristics. Moreover, extensive information
on plot management and harvest quantities in the last 12 months was gathered.
Information included the amount of fertilizer and herbicide applied, harvest fre-
quency as well as other maintenance done to the oil palms. In addition, we asked
whether the farmers applied EFB mulching in the last 12 months. Between May
and August 2017, farmers were visited again to do a short follow-up survey. In this
survey, we asked information about the amount of FFB harvested and physical
inputs in the last six months. Moreover, more detailed information on mulching
was collected, including inter alia the length and the location of the application.
4.4 Conceptual model and estimation strategy
4.4.1 Reduced form estimation
To provide evidence on the effect of EFB mulching on yields in smallholder oil
palm plantations, we run a panel data oil palm production function including
information from 2015 until 2017. Yields are expressed as tons of FFB harvested.
Our mulching indicator captures whether mulching material was applied on the
plot in the current or the previous year to account for the fact that some nutrients
are still released in the second year after application (section 4.2). This might
result in a slight underestimation of our effects in the year 2015 since information
on the lagged application of EFB mulching is not available. However, over 80%
of the farmers reported in 2017 that they started mulching three or less years ago
such that only a small share of adopters might have applied mulching in 2014.
Non-adopters do not report mulching between 2014 and 2017.
One problem arising when estimating the effect of mulching on yields is the
possible endogeneity of the mulching decision. Endogeneity can stem from two
sources. First, farmers applying mulching might differ in unobservables from
non-adopters, which might simultaneously affect the mulching decision and yields.
Second, reverse causality might be present. Since FFB are harvested continuously
throughout the year, farmers might adapt their management choices in reaction to
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yields. While fixed effects (FE) estimation can help overcome endogeneity concerns
linked to unobserved heterogeneity, it is found to be inefficient in case of a limited
within-individual variation as present in the current case where only 20 observations
change the treatment (Wooldridge, 2010). Furthermore, FE estimation does not
solve potential endogeneity resulting from reverse causality. This motivates the use
of instrumental variable estimation.
A valid instrument needs to fulfill two assumptions: First, it needs to be
correlated with the endogenous variable. Second, it needs to be exogenous to the
yield equation, meaning that it is not correlated with the error term (Angrist &
Pischke, 2009). This requires that the instrument is not a relevant predictor of
yields in itself and can therefore be omitted from the yield regression, nor should it
influence yields through other channels not controlled for in the regression. We
propose the use of the number of palm oil mills found in a radius of 20 km around
the farmer’s village as instrument.7 The number of palm oil mills is calculated with
GPS data of the locations of palm oil mills in Jambi Province (World Resources
Institute et al., 2019) and of the villages. As discussed in section 4.2, farmers
obtain EFB from the palm oil mills and their decision to apply mulching is likely
determined by input availability. More mills in proximity to the village represent a
higher availability of mulching material and are therefore expected to positively
affect farmers’ mulching decision. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the number of
mills affects yields through other channels. Potential confounding effects as well
as tests to assess the predictive power of the instrument and the validity of its
omission from the yield equation will be discussed at the end of this section and in
section 4.5.2.
We run a two-stage linear random effects model. The two stages8 of the equation
can be represented as
EFBit = β10Xit + β11Zi + ε1it (4.1)
Yit = β20Xit + β21ÊFBit + ε2it (4.2)
7We have also tested the number of mills in a radius of 10 km and 30 km. However, the
radius of 20 km has a higher predictive power for the mulching decision and is thus a stronger
instrument. Likewise, using a radius of 20 km instead of 10 km or 30 km increases the variation
between villages. Five of the mills in the region are mass balanced certified with the Roundtable
on Sustainable Palm Oil. Therefore, they can still process FFB from non-certified producers,
such as the farmers in our sample, and are therefore not dropped.
8While being called two-stage regression, estimation can also occur in one step where the first
regression is plugged in the second one (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003).
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where EFBit is farmer i’s decision to mulch in period t, Xit are the control variables
treated as exogenous, Zi is the instrument, i.e. the number of palm oil mills in
a radius of 20 km. Based on the first stage estimations, predictions of mulching
applications are made. These enter the second stage regression, where tons of FFB
harvested in six months in logarithms (Yit) by farmer i in period t are regressed
on the predictions ÊFBit as well as the other exogenous covariates. ε1it and ε2it
represent the respective error terms which are assumed to be uncorrelated. To
account for the potential correlation of the error terms at the village level, and since
the initial sampling strategy is based on a two-stage process where first villages and
then farmers within villages were randomly selected, standard errors are clustered
at the village level (Abadie, Athey, Imbens, & Wooldridge, 2017).
Our control variables include measures of the three main agricultural inputs,
land, capital and labor. Land is measured as the plot size. To capture capital
input, we include spending on fertilizer and herbicide in the regression. To allow
for comparability between years, spending is inflation corrected.9 As a proxy for
labor input, we use the harvest frequency as harvesting consumes most work in
the plantation management (Euler et al., 2016).10 Moreover, a dummy for whether
a farmer has pruned the palms in the respective time period is included. We
control for the application of other manure and the presence of grazing animals
on the plot. To model potential plot-specific yield determinants, we control for
the plot age and the planting densities of the oil palms. We expect a non-linear
relationship between the plot age and yields, where yields first increase until
the oil palms have reached the full production potential and then decrease until
replanting is required after 25 to 30 years (Woittiez et al., 2017). Since other plot
characteristics initially included in the model such as the steepness, whether the
plantation borders a river as well as the squared term of the planting density were
found to be jointly insignificant,11 they were excluded from the estimation. At
the village level, we include a dummy for whether a farmer lives in a transmigrant
9We use monetary instead of physical inputs to better reflect the quality of the fertilizer
and to circumvent problems that emerge if the physical input unit is not homogeneous for all
types of input used. However, local prices are also influenced by e.g. transportation costs. Both
measures are closely linked, though (Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 0.94 for fertilizer and 0.96
for herbicide) suggesting that the effect of using either one of the two indicators should only be
small. Information on national consumer price indices with 2010 as the reference year is taken
from the World Bank.
10Some farmers also weed their plantations. This is the only frequent management activity we
do not have 2017 information on. Labor for fertilizer and herbicide application is very closely
related to input costs and thus implicitly controlled for by the spending on fertilizer and herbicide.
11P-value of F-test: 0.794.
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village that was founded under the transmigration program (section 4.3) or in a
local village. Farmers living in transmigrant villages often have better access to
inputs and information since many transmigrant farmers started growing oil palm
under contractual arrangements with companies. Moreover, the dummy captures
potential village effects that could be correlated with the village-level instrument
because transmigrant villages were often founded in proximity to palm oil mills.
We also included other potential confounders in the initial model specification
capturing the effects of potentially endogenous migration to the village, better
access to information or smaller risk of crop perishing because of easier access to
the mills. These factors were jointly insignificant and their inclusion did not affect
the results such that they have been omitted from the main model specification.12
To avoid collinearity problems, we restrict interactions between the input factors
to be zero and estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function. With the exception of
the planting density and the plantation age, all non-binary variables are expressed
in logarithms. Before log transforming, zero input costs are changed to one to
avoid dropping these observations in the estimation. The effect of these cases is
captured by a dummy variable that assumes one if either fertilizer or herbicide
is not applied (Battese, 1997).13 To allow for comparability between the three
years, input costs and harvest amount are halved for the years 2015 and 2016 to
represent six-month information (subsection 4.3.3).14 We in addition include year
fixed effects to capture potential shocks. As a robustness check, we present results
only based on the years 2015 and 2016 in Table A4.1 in the Appendix. Since in
those years more extensive data was collected, these models also control for the full
labor costs of maintaining the oil palm plantation. Finally, we cannot rule out that
other management decisions such as fertilizer application are endogeneous, too. As
a robustness check, we re-estimate the model after excluding management choices.
Results are presented in Table A4.2, columns (3) and (4), in the Appendix.
12Since migration happened also outside the transmigration program, we control for the farmer’s
individual migration decision to the village. Moreover, the distance to the next palm oil mill, the
FFB price received and whether an industrial oil palm plantation is bordering the village were
included. Results are presented in columns (1) and (2) in Table A4.2 in the Appendix. Results
are very similar to the ones presented in section 4.5.2. P-value of F-test is 0.695.
13To reduce the collinearity in the model, we do not differentiate between farmers not applying
herbicide and farmers not applying fertilizer since these dummy variables are highly correlated
with the respective input costs expressed in logarithms (rho: -0.964 for fertilizer and -0.956 for
herbicide use).
14Because of the presence of a rainy and a dry season, as well as the fact that not all inputs are
applied twice a year, we acknowledge that the data might still not be fully comparable. However,
the inclusion of time dummies should capture remaining effects.
125
Chapter 4. EFB mulching to increase yields and SOC
To control for the fact that we oversampled farmers applying mulching (sec-
tion 4.3), we additionally present results derived from pooled two-stage linear least
squares (2SLS) estimation after population weights have been applied. Following
Cameron and Miller (2015), we cluster errors at the highest and thus on the village
instead of on the individual level. The weights reflect our sampling strategy and
are based on the share of households applying EFB mulching in the full sample
in 2016. Finally, we perform restricted wild bootstrapping and present resulting
significance levels. This should address potential over-rejection of the null hypoth-
esis observed when few clusters are present (Cameron & Miller, 2015; Roodman,
Nielsen, MacKinnon, & Webb, 2019).15
4.4.2 Pathway analysis
The reduced form effect of mulching on yields, which represents the overall effect
as shown in eqn. (4.2), can operate through several pathways. Mulching induced
increases in SOC represent one such pathway. Higher SOC contents are hypothesized
to positively affect yields through e.g. an improvement in the soil water holding
capacity. We will refer to the effect of mulching on yields through an improvement
in SOC as the indirect effect (Imai, Keele, Tingley, & Yamanoto, 2011). Mulching
might also affect yields through other channels, which we do not explicitly model.
The effect of the other pathways will be referred to as the direct effect of mulching
after controlling for its effect through SOC increases. We expect a positive direct
effect because of nutrient releases, but the potential attraction of pests could also
negatively affect yields. Our hypothesized pathways are depicted in Figure 4.3.
To test our hypothesized pathways, we estimate a set of structural equations.
Estimation is based on the 2017 information collected because soil samples were
collected in 2017 only. Our structural model can be represented as follows
Yi = α0 + α1EFBi + α2SOCi + α3SOC2i + α4Z1i + u1i (4.3)
SOCi = β0 + β1EFBi + β2Z2i + u2i (4.4)
SOC2i = γ0 + γ1EFBi + γ2Z3i + u3i (4.5)
EFBi = δ0 + δ1Z4i + u4i (4.6)
15Mulching is not applied in two villages. Therefore, the number of clusters is similar to the
number of treated clusters. Having only a few clusters treated might lead to under-rejection of
the null hypothesis (MacKinnon & Webb, 2017).
126
Chapter 4. EFB mulching to increase yields and SOC





+ indicates expected positive effects.
where Yi represents six-month yields of farmer i in 2017 in logarithmized tons
of FFB, EFBi equals one if a farmer applies mulching, and SOCi is the soil
carbon content in % that also enters in squared terms in eqn. (4.3). Due to the
highly skewed distribution, the carbon contents are expressed in logarithms. The
respective vectors Z contain other exogenous variables and the respective vectors
u are the error terms.
We estimate the effects of mulching on SOC based on eqn. (4.4). We assume
that the error terms in eqn. (4.4) and eqn. (4.6) are uncorrelated. This assumption
appears realistic since it is first unlikely that farmers’ unobserved effects influence
the biophysical processes underlying the SOC-mulching relationship. Second, we
use carbon content in the interrow to control for the plot quality in the absence
of treatment. Given a localized effect of mulching (Carron et al., 2016), the SOC
contents in the interrow should not be affected by the treatment. This enables us
to control for potential unobserved plot quality differences between adopters and
non-adopters. Instrumentation strategies are thus not needed for identification of
β1 in eqn. (4.4).
In contrast, u1 might be correlated with u2, u3 and u4. Three instruments
which induce exogenous variation are therefore required for the identification of the
parameters in eqn. (4.3). As instrument for mulching, we use the number of palm oil
mills found in a radius of 20 km around the village (subsection 4.4.1). As instrument
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for the carbon content in the management location, we use the mean interrow
carbon content in the plantations of the other farmers in the village.16 Generally,
within a plantation, the carbon content in the interrow is closely correlated with
the carbon content in the management location (rho=0.98). The aggregate interrow
carbon content of the other respondents in the village should also be a close correlate
of an individual farmer’s carbon content in the management location, because soil
characteristics are correlated within a village due to e.g. similar soil types and
often a similar background in the plantation establishment.17 The interrow carbon
content of the other farmers in the village is plausibly exogenous since a direct
effect on yields of the individual farmer is unlikely and since the interrow carbon
content is unaffected by their mulching decision.
Finally, we assume a non-linear relationship between the carbon content in
a plantation and yields; very high carbon contents are associated with organic
soils and likely unfavorable to yields (Corley & Tinker, 2016). The carbon content
therefore also enters in squared terms in eqn. (4.3). The non-linear transformation of
an endogenous variable requires an own instrument (Wooldridge, 2010) (eqn. (4.5)).
We use the squared term of the interrow mean carbon content of the other farmers
in the village to predict the squared carbon content.
In absence of interaction effects between the carbon content and mulching,
identification of the respective coefficients in eqn. (4.3) is feasible with 2SLS
regression (Burgess, Daniel, Butterworth, & Thompson, 2015; Frölich & Huber,
2017).18 The direct effect of mulching on yields is represented by α1; its indirect
effect through SOC improvements by β1 ∗ α2 and γ1 ∗ α3.
16While we see that the number of individuals interviewed in a village differs, the average
number of persons interviewed in a village is not significantly different between the groups of
adopters and non-adopters. Therefore, the precision of the carbon content measures should be
similar between both.
17The variation in SOC appears to be larger across villages than within villages. We find that
the mean standard deviation within a village is smaller (4.5) than the standard deviation of the
respective village means (7.95) supporting the use of village-level soil indicators as instruments.
18We do not find significant interaction effects in the range of carbon contents considered in
this study. Coefficient (p-value) of the interaction term in an OLS estimation of yields on the
mulching indicator, SOC, their interaction and additional controls is -0.28 (0.21), if we restrict the
sample to plantations whose interrow carbon content lies in the range defined by the treatment
plantations. The insignificance of the interaction term also holds when we consider the full sample.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Descriptives and constraints to adoption
Table 4.1 displays socio-economic characteristics of the adopting and non-adopting
farmers in our sample and related plot characteristics. Adopters of mulching
are those households that apply mulching between 2015 and 2017. To compare
adopters and non-adopters, we conduct t-tests with standard errors clustered at
the village level. Harvest information, fertilizer and herbicide use show a highly
skewed distribution. Influential outliers were replaced with the 95 percentile. For
more information on outlier detection, please refer to Table A4.3 in the Appendix.
Table 4.1: Socio-econonomic and descriptive statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Control EFB (1) vs. (2)
Mean values indicated, standard
errors in parentheses, median in
italics
p-value
Household and constant plot characteristics
Years of education 7.540 8.024 0.537
(0.327) (0.627)





Age 50.414 48.143 0.360
(0.879) (2.355)
Extension received=1 0.391 0.405 0.889
Ha managed under OP production 4.054 7.292 0.186
(0.307) (2.358)
Ha managed other crops 0.985 1.018 0.952
(0.494) (0.308)
Transmigrant farmer=1 0.310 0.405 0.458
Gender, 1=female 0.000 0.048 0.143
Systematic certificate=1 0.621 0.738 0.357
Regular flooding on plot=1 0.717 0.444 0.124
Steepness of plot 2.075 2.083 0.968
(0.236) (0.182)
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River bordering=1 0.356 0.262 0.346
Plot size in ha 1.884 2.048 0.717
(0.157) (0.525)
Plot age in years 13.908 14.738 0.730
(1.301) (2.072)
Difficult road conditions=1 0.447 0.262 0.037
Carbon content interrow (%) 10.017 4.904 0.033
3.22, (3.169) 2.84, (1.413)
Carbon content management location (%) 10.503 6.042 0.055
3.98, (3.100) 4.49, (1.296)
Organic soil=1 0.172 0.048 0.039
N 87 42
Variable plot information















Other manure applied=1 0.081 0.138 0.237
N 322 65
Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Household and invariant information
displayed for farmers who ever apply EFB mulching in the years considered. Variable plot
information shows averages over all years in which mulching was applied. Cost variables are
inflation adjusted. Tons of FFB harvested and input costs were halved for 2015 and 2016 to
represent six-month information. T-tests use clustered standard errors. For a description of the
selected variables, please refer to Table A4.3 in the Appendix.
The farmers who apply EFB mulching own more assets and manage, albeit not
significantly, more hectares, suggesting that these farmers are richer. Since EFB
need to be brought from the palm oil mills to the plantations with trucks, good
road conditions facilitate mulching, as indicated by the significantly better access
to mulched in comparison to control plots. Finally, we find that mulching is not
applied on organic soils with a carbon content of 20% or more (IUSS Working Group
WRB, 2015). These carbon-rich soils likely also drive the significant difference in
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mean interrow carbon contents between adopters and non-adopters.
These descriptive statistics mirror the constraints and preconditions for EFB
adoption reported by farmers. As suitable conditions, good roads and proximity
to mills (40%) as well as plots with mineral soils and little flooding risks were
mentioned (18%).19 High costs (56%), non-availability of mulching material (40%)
as well as time constraints, lack of information and insufficient physical strength
(33%) represented perceived barriers to adoption. Only a small share of 10%
mentioned potential negative effects of mulching such as pest attraction.
Table 4.1 also shows descriptives for yields and SOC contents. We find that
per hectare yields are significantly higher on mulched in comparison to control
plots, whereas carbon content in the management location is significantly lower on
mulched plots.20 The latter might be driven by the higher prevalence of organic
soils in the control group, which is in line with the significantly higher SOC content
in the interrow sampling location of the control plots.
Putting yield and SOC contents in perspective, extrapolated yearly per hectare
yields in our sample appear to lie at the upper end of yearly per hectare yields
reported for different smallholder groups in Sumatra that range from 12.7 tons to
19.5 tons (Euler et al., 2016; Lee, Ghazoul, Obidzinski, & Koh, 2014). However,
yields are still below those of industrial plantation that can amount to 30 tons per
hectare and year (Euler et al., 2016) indicating the presence of yield gaps. If we
restrict our sample to mineral soils, the median carbon content is 2.74% in the
interrow. This is slightly higher than the reported median carbon content of 2.2%
in other smallholder plantations in Jambi Province (Guillaume et al., 2016) and
higher than mean values reported for the interrow in industrial plantations of 1.6%
(Carron et al., 2015) and 2.01% (Khasanah, van Noordwijk, Ningsih, & Rahayu,
2015).21
We find large heterogeneity with regard to the amount of EFB applied per
hectare, but the values lie in the range reported for industrial plantations of 15
to 60 tons per hectare (Table 4.2) (Tao et al., 2017). In contrast, the location
where EFB are applied differs between smallholdings and industrial plantations:
19Farmers could mention several reasons.
20We discuss in section 4.5.2 that mulching might also have a delayed effect. The comparison
of yields in Table 4.1 is based only on years when mulching is applied. This could underestimate
the differences.
21Khasanah et al. (2015) and Carron et al. (2015) apply different labels for the management
zones than used in this study. The harvest path in their studies represents the management zone
we refer to as the interrow. The age of the industrial plantations considered in these two papers
is 24 and 25 years respectively. This could partly explain why the carbon content is lower.
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Table 4.2: Descriptives of EFB mulching
Mean SD Min Max
Years of
application
3.13 2.61 0.5 15




Tons per ha 53.72 51.31 3.5 180
N 32
WC = Weeding circle, IR = next to interrow. N includes
adopters of EFB mulching selected for soil sampling.
Most industrial companies apply mulching between the palms to avoid fruit losses.
In contrast, smallholder farmers appear to mostly mulch in the weeding circle
(Table 4.2).
4.5.2 Reduced form effects of mulching on yields
Results of the reduced form effect of mulching on yields based on a random effects
instrumental variable regression are reported in Table 4.3. Six plots were not
reported in 2015 such that our panel data set is unbalanced.22 The validity of the
results presented in Table 4.3 hinges on the validity of the assumptions we impose
on the instrument. To test whether our instrument is correctly excluded from our
basic model (eqn. (4.2)), we include the number of palm oil mills in a radius of 20
km around the village in the model. The small coefficient and its insignificance
(coefficient: 0.008, p-value: 0.534) support the plausibility of the excludability
assumption.23 Besides its plausible exogeneity, instrumental variable estimation
only reduces the bias if the instrument is a good predictor for the potentially
22These farmers did not mulch between 2014 and 2017 such that the mulching indicator in
2016 is correctly specified.
23Another potential instrument is the distance to the next paved road from the plot to capture
the ease of the plot access. The distance to the next paved road is also insignificant in model
specification (1) (coefficient: 0.002, p-value: 0.838). Having two instruments allows to test for
overidentification of the instruments. Based on the Hansen J statistics, we cannot reject the
exogeneity of our instruments (p-value: 0.682). Even though the test for weak instruments
can also not be rejected, predictive power appears to be greater when one instrument is used.
Therefore, only the number of palm oil mills found in a 20 km radius is used as instrument in our
final model specification.
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endogenous variable (Olea & Pflueger, 2013). We test for weak instruments and
for whether the equations are identified with help of the test procedures developed
by Olea and Pflueger (2013) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006), which are robust
to clustered standard errors. Both tests support the strength of our instrument.24
Results of the first stage are reported in Table A4.4 in the Appendix.
Table 4.3: Instrumental variable estimation of the effect of mulching on yields
(1) (2)
Current and/or lagged mulching 0.382∗∗/b 0.325∗
(0.185) (0.175)
Implied change 44.01% 36.23%
Plot size in ha (log) 0.870∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.047)
Spending on fertilizer 0.031∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
in 1,000 IDR (log) (0.011) (0.010)
Spending on herbicide -0.004 0.017
in 1,000 IDR (log) (0.017) (0.016)
No input application=1 0.008 0.128
(0.102) (0.098)
Other manure applied=1 0.087 0.186∗∗
(0.085) (0.074)




Grazing animals=1 -0.109∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051)
Plot age 0.079∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.031)
Plot age squared -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)






Local village=1 -0.111 -0.133∗∗
24P-value for testing the hypothesis of under-identification is 0.024 in column (1). With regard
to weak instruments, we can reject the hypothesis that the bias induced is greater than 10% of
the bias resulting from OLS regression at the 5% significance level.
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Population weights No Yes
Observations 377 377
Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Outcome variable is tons of FFB harvested
in six months (log). Coefficients from a two-stage random effects estimation presented in column
(1). Results of a pooled 2SLS presented in column (2). The number of palm oil mills in a radius
of 20 km around the village is used as the instrument.
Wild bootstraps are performed on pooled 2SLS without population weights only for the treatment
indicator. 999 replications are used. P-value derived from wild bootstrapping is 0.048.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. a,b,c refer to significance levels at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level,
respectively, based on restricted clustered wild bootstraps.
Our results support a positive and very large effect of mulching on yields with
EFB mulching increasing yields by 36% (column (2)) to 44% (column (1)).25 The
significance of our estimates is supported by wild bootstraps. The direction of the
effects of the other explanatory variables on yields is in line with the literature
analyzing oil palm smallholder yields (Euler et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2014; Woittiez
et al., 2017). We find a very large land elasticity of yields; a 1% increase in plot size
increases yields by approx. 0.85%, which is very close to a one-to-one translation
of percentage land size expansion into percentage yield increases. A 1% increase
in spending on fertilizer increases yields by around 0.04%. Labor, as measured by
harvest frequency, also significantly and positively affects yields. All significant
coefficients on the logarithmized agricultural input factors are between zero and
one, implying a positive but decreasing response of the untransformed outcome
variable to increases in the input factors. Our results are robust to only using
the 2015 and 2016 data with more extensive labor information (Table A4.1 in the
Appendix) as well as to the exclusion of other potentially endogenous management
variables (Table A4.2 in the Appendix).
Our mulching indicator in Table 4.3 does not differentiate between the effects
of current and lagged mulching. Identification of the different effects of current
and lagged mulching requires two separate instruments. Given the difficulties of
finding suitable instruments with high predictive power, we look at correlations in
a random effects panel data model to get an idea of the potential difference in effect
size between current and lagged mulching. Results for the mulching indicators are
25Derivation of the percentage change is done with help of 100 ∗ (exp(β̂ − 0.5 ∗ ˆV ar(β̂))− 1)
(Kennedy, 1981).
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presented in Table 4.4, full results are available in Table A4.5 in the Appendix.
Table 4.4: Random effects panel data results of mulching on yields
(1) (2) (3)






Only lagged mulching=1 0.210∗∗
(0.090)
Only current mulching=1 0.135
(0.105)
Lagged and current mulching=1 0.339∗∗∗
(0.084)
Constant 0.341 0.452 0.449
(0.441) (0.545) (0.528)
Other controls1 Yes Yes Yes
Observations 377 257 257
Coefficients from a linear random effects model displayed. Standard errors in parentheses. Errors
are clustered at the village level. The outcome variable is tons of FFB harvested in six months
(log). Fertilizer and herbicide costs are inflation adjusted. Harvest and input information are
scaled for 2015 and 2016 to represent six-month information.
1 The same control variables as in Table 4.3 are used. Full results are available in Table A4.5 in
the Appendix.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Results from the random effects panel data model support significant correlations
between current and/or lagged mulching and yield increases, although the effect
size of approx. 23% (column (1)) is smaller than in Table 4.3. The effect of lagged
mulching appears to be slightly more important than that of current mulching
as the coefficient is highly significant and larger (column (2)).26 However, the
difference is not significant (p-value: 0.401), which provides some support for the
combined treatment variable in the instrumental variable estimation in Table 4.3.
To see whether the effect sizes differ if mulching is applied in two consecutive years,
we differentiate between farmers mulching only in the previous year, only in the
current year, and in both the current and the previous year. While both lagged and
continuous mulching in two years are significantly associated with yield increases,
26We acknowledge that in particular the effect of current mulching might suffer from potential
reverse causality problems.
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continuous mulching in two years appears to be significantly more effective than
mulching in only one year.27 Consequently, our results support a yield increasing
effect of EFB mulching. In particular the slow release of some nutrients likely
explains why part of the mulching effect only materializes in the second year after
application.
4.5.3 Pathway analysis
In order to explore whether, and if so to what extent the effect of mulching on
yields operates through an improvement in SOC, results of the structural equations
in eqn. (4.4) and eqn. (4.3) are presented in Table 4.5, columns (2) and (3). Full
model results are available in Table A4.6 in the Appendix. Since the pathway
analysis is based on cross-sectional observations from 2017, we also present reduced
form results of the effect of mulching on yields for comparison in column (1). First
stage results for the three endogenous variables in column (3) are displayed in
Table A4.7 in the Appendix. The predictive power of our instruments is sufficient
for identification of eqn. (4.3).28 For comparison, OLS results are presented in
Table A4.8 in the Appendix.





SOC (%, log) FFB
harvested in
tons (log)
Mulching=1 0.505∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗/a 0.428
(0.233) (0.056) (0.343)
Implied change 61.29% 17.88% 44.68%
Interrow SOC (%, log) 0.893∗∗∗
27P-values of t-tests for only lagged = only current mulching: 0.365, for only current = combined
mulching: 0.047, for combined = only lagged mulching: 0.018. We acknowledge that the power of
detecting statistically significant effects could differ between the groups due to a different number
of individuals belonging to the respective categories, which could explain why we do not find
significant effects for current mulching. When considering the years 2016 and 2017, 21 farmers
applied mulching only in the previous, 19 farmers only in the current and 35 farmers in both
years.
28The Sanderson Windmeijer Chi2 test for identification in case of several endogenous variables
that is robust to violations of the i.i.d. assumption (Sanderson & Windmeijer, 2016) rejects the
hypothesis of underidentification for all three endogenous variables. Respective p-values are 0.006
for mulching, 0.006 for the carbon content and 0.090 for the squared carbon content. Given the
lack of clear decision mechanisms regarding instrument strengths in case of several endogenous
variables and clustered standard errors, the existence of potential weak instrument problems
cannot fully be assessed (Sanderson & Windmeijer, 2016).
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(0.017)
SOC (%, log) 0.119
(0.560)
SOC (%, log) squared -0.035
(0.129)
Constant 0.599 0.278 0.480
(0.673) (0.247) (1.007)
Controls1 Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1282 1282 1282
Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients from a 2SLS regression shown
in columns (1) and (3). Coefficients from an OLS regression displayed in column (2). The base
category for column (2) is the carbon content in the combined control group of frond stack area
and between oil palms. Wild bootstrap p-values for mulching are in column (1): 0.109, in (2):
0.018, and in (3): 0.219, for the carbon content in column (3): 0.812 and for the squared carbon
content: 0.776.
1 The same control variables as in Table 4.3 are included in columns (1) and (3). In column (2),
we control for spending on fertilizer and herbicide, other manure application, plot age, plot age
squared, non-application of fertilizer and/or herbicide, the planting density, grazing animals, the
steepness of the plots, a bordering river, previous land use on the plot and previous fire on plot.
2 One farmer did not harvest his plot in 2017, so he was not considered in this analysis.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
a,b,c refer to significance levels at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively, based on restricted
clustered wild bootstraps. Wild bootstraps are performed for the mulching treatment and for
SOC with 999 replications.
Effect of mulching on SOC
Results of a linear regression of the carbon contents in the management location
on the mulching dummy are displayed in column (2) in Table 4.5. In the model,
we additionally include the carbon content in the interrow to control for existing
imbalances in general plantation SOC contents between adopters and non-adopters
(Table 4.1). EFB mulching significantly increases SOC contents by 18% in com-
parison to the control group, which includes samples taken in the frond stack area
and between the oil palms. The significance is supported by wild bootstraps.
Table 4.6 presents several robustness checks. In column (1), we restrict our
sample to plantations where the interrow carbon content lies in the same interval
as that of treatment plantations, which we will refer to as common support in the
following. In column (2), we further assess the influence outliers have on our results.
We use Tukey’s method (Tukey, 1977) for identification and replace outliers with
the respective upper or lower adjacent value, depending on the direction of the
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Table 4.6: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
Mulching=1 0.150∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.186∗
(0.058) (0.052) (0.100)
Implied change 15.99% 17.31% 19.84%
Interrow SOC (%,log) 0.831∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.017) (0.073)
Constant -0.070 0.027 0.521∗∗
(0.355) (0.257) (0.233)
Controls A A B
Observations 105 128 59
Coefficients from an OLS estimation displayed. Village-level clustered standard errors in paren-
theses. Dependent variable is the carbon content in the treatment location in logarithms. In
column (1), the sample is restricted to the common support of the interrow soil carbon. In column
(2), the value of outliers was replaced with the upper or lower adjacent value, respectively. Base
category for the mulching indicator in columns (1) and (2) is the carbon content in the control
group, which includes samples taken in the frond stack area and between oil palms. In column
(3), we combine our data set with another data set in smallholder plantations in the same study
region and compare carbon contents in the weeding circle with and without mulching. We only
use plantation whose interrow carbon content lies in a similar interval. Base category in column
(3) is carbon content in the weeding circle in absence of mulching.
Controls (A) include spending on fertilizer and herbicide, application of other manure, plot age,
plot age squared, non-application of fertilizer and/or herbicide, the planting density, grazing
animals, the steepness of the plots, a bordering river, previous land use on the plot and previous
fire on plot.
Controls (B) include plot age, herbicide and fertilizer input in kg and liter (log), non-application
of fertilizer and/or herbicide and previous fire on plot.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
deviation from the mean.29 One outlier is replaced for EFB mulching, and five for
the frond stack area and the sampling location between the palms, respectively.
The treatment effects and significance levels are of similar size as in Table 4.5
supporting the robustness of our results (Table 4.6, columns (1) and (2)).
Several studies have shown that spatial heterogeneity in soil characteristics,
including SOC contents, exists within oil palm plantations (Carron et al., 2015;
Guillaume et al., 2016; Khasanah et al., 2015). This is because the addition of
29Outlier identification is based on the distribution of the SOC difference between the interrow
and the respective management location. To account for the fact that carbon contents differ
between the three management locations, outliers are separately identified for the mulching, the
frond stack and the sampling location between the palms. The upper adjacent value is defined
as the value of the 75th percentile plus 3/2 of the difference between the 75th and the 25th
percentiles. The lower adjacent value is defined as the 25th percentile minus 3/2 of the difference
between the 75th and the 25th percentiles. We define outliers as the observations with SOC
differences above or below these values.
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organic material, e.g. through root material and ground vegetation, and machinery
impact differ spatially within plantations (Carron et al., 2016). Carbon contents in
the weeding circle in absence of mulching have been reported to be 0.02 percentage
points (Khasanah et al., 2015) to 0.4 percentage points (Guillaume et al., 2016)
higher than carbon contents between oil palms. In the frond stack area, both 0.09
percentage point higher (Khasanah et al., 2015) and 0.03 percentage point lower
(Carron et al., 2015) carbon contents in comparison to the weeding circle have
been reported. Our estimated mulching-induced percentage increase in carbon
contents implies a 0.72 percentage point increase if the owner of an average control
plantation in the common support area started mulching.30 Since this is larger
than potential pre-existing differences in carbon content between the weeding circle
and the other two management locations, it is unlikely that different sampling
locations drive our treatment effects. Nonetheless, we run a further robustness test
in which we control for related potential confounding effects.
To investigate whether differences in the sampling location between adopters
and non-adopters in our sample bias the results, we construct an external control
group. For this purpose, we make use of soil samples collected in the weeding circle
and the interrow in 37 smallholder plantations in our study region. These were
taken in the same soil depth (0-5 cm) and analyzed in the same laboratory as our
samples (Guillaume, 2013). The soil data set is complemented by a socio-economic
survey assessing the management practices farmers implement on their plot. None
of the farmers in the external control group apply EFB mulching such that the soil
samples can be used as counterfactual for carbon contents in the weeding circle in
absence of mulching. Moreover, if we include only plantations from the external
control group where the interrow carbon contents lie in the same interval as our
treatment plantations, plots do not differ significantly in variables possibly affecting
carbon contents, with the exception of the share of plots that were previously
affected by fire that is larger in the external control group (Table A4.9 in the
Appendix).31 This supports the validity of the external control group.
Column (3) in Table 4.6 supports a positive and significant effect of mulching
on SOC contents when our analysis is restricted to samples taken in the weeding
circle. The effect is of similar size as in the other estimations (Tables 4.5 and
4.6). EFB mulching increases SOC contents by around 20% in comparison to the
30The mean carbon content in the combined control sample in the common support area is
4.03%.
31While we are missing detailed information on plot characteristics in the external control group,
we assume that a balance on the interrow carbon content also balances other plot characteristics.
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external control group. Accordingly, adoption of EFB mulching would imply an
increase in SOC contents of 0.79 percentage points for the average farmer in the
external control group.
Overall, the derived treatment effects suggest that mulching increases SOC
contents by around 0.72 to 0.79 percentage points. This effect size lies in the range
of the effect sizes found in other studies, which range from an increase in 0.52 (Tao
et al., 2017), 0.57 (Teh Boon Sung et al., 2011) to an increase of 1.24 percentage
points (Abu Bakar et al., 2011).
Effect of carbon on yields
Column (3) in Table 4.5 reports results from a 2SLS estimation of yields on mulching
and SOC. This pathway analysis helps to explore to what extent the reduced form
effect of mulching on yields operates through an improvement in carbon contents.
Comparing columns (1) and (3) in Table 4.5 indicates that the effect size of
mulching is reduced when controlling for the carbon contents in the management
sampling locations. The reduction corresponds to a decrease in the effect size of
around 17 percentage points, but the effect size is still large, suggesting a yield
increase of around 45%. However, mulching no longer significantly affects yields.
While we are thus not able to support a significant direct effect of mulching in
the structural model, this needs to be interpreted against a rather small sample
size and a general increase in standard errors when switching from OLS to 2SLS
estimation.32 In line with our expectations, our results hint to an inverted U-shaped
relationship between SOC content and yields. Yields might thus first increase, but
at high SOC contents, which often indicate organic soils, yields decline. The effect
of SOC contents on yields is however insignificant.
Our results thus suggest that most of the effect of mulching on yields operates
through other channels but an increase in SOC contents.33 Even though the
mulching indicator is no longer statistically significant after controlling for SOC
contents, the coefficient is of comparable size. While carbon contents have been
shown to be significantly linked to yields for several annual crops, they do not
appear to be a relevant predictor of yields in our context. This suggests that none
32In the OLS estimation in Table A4.8 in the Appendix, the effect of mulching is still significant
after controlling for carbon contents.
33We acknowledge that the effect of SOC on yields might also reflect other soil characteristics
correlated with SOC contents. However, we only collected additional information on nitrogen
contents. Nitrogen and SOC are however very closely correlated (rho = 0.95) such that an
additional inclusion of nitrogen in the regression would lead to multicollinearity problems.
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of the identified mechanisms through which SOC can affect yields (section 4.2)
directly limit yields. Reasons could be inter alia that most of our plantations
have already reached a middle age such that a potential positive effect of SOC
on e.g. root development is no longer of strong relevance. Moreover, it might be
that yield responses to changes in SOC materialize with a time lag, as e.g. yield
responses to shocks (Woittiez et al., 2017), such that they are not captured in the
contemporaneous relationship between carbon contents and yields.
4.6 Conclusion
Evidence from 129 smallholder plantations in Sumatra, Indonesia, shows that
empty fruit bunch (EFB) mulching leads to higher soil carbon contents as well
as yield increases. The minimum estimated increase in carbon content is 16%,
while yields are found to increase at least by 36% on average. While the estimated
increases in SOC contents are similar to studies derived from industrial plantations,
we find larger yield increases for EFB mulching. One of the reasons could be that
smallholder plantations have greater scope for yield improvements since yield gaps
are prevalent and insufficient nutrient supply could be identified as one reason
(Euler et al., 2016). However, the carbon contents do not appear to be a significant
predictor of yields. This suggests that the positive and significant effect of mulching
on yields rather operates through other channels, e.g. direct fertilization effects or
higher soil moisture as the soil is protected from direct solar irradiation.
One limiting factor of our study is that we cannot control for other soil charac-
teristics potentially affecting yields that are correlated with SOC and could limit
crop growth. Furthermore, even though our sample size is large in comparison
to other studies looking at mulching or general soil characteristics in oil palm
plantations (e.g. Guillaume et al. 2016; Moradi et al. 2015; Tao et al. 2017) the
statistical power of our study might not be sufficient to identify significant effects
of SOC on yields, in particular in view of large heterogeneity among smallholder
farmers.
We complement knowledge on the effects of EFB mulching derived from large-
scale plantations and mostly under experimental settings with evidence from
smallholder plantations. While smallholder farmers are increasingly engaged in
oil palm production in Indonesia, their yields still lie well below yields reported
for industrial plantations (Euler et al., 2016). Our results indicate that EFB
mulching represents a management option which can help to close the reported
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yield gaps. This could hence improve the economic performance of oil palm
plantations, potentially generating positive welfare effects for smallholder farmers.
Moreover, mulching increases SOC contents. While we do not estimate carbon
stocks, it is likely that this also supports the carbon sequestration function of the
soil. Since oil palm expansion is associated with net carbon emissions (Guillaume
et al., 2018), an appropriate soil management might thus be able to improve
the carbon balance and consequently also the environmental performance of oil
palm plantations. The focus on soils for carbon sequestration as climate mitigation
strategy has also recently been highlighted by the 4 per mille Soils for Food Security
and Climate initiative that was launched at the Paris Climate Conference in 2015
(Minasny et al., 2017). However, to be of climate relevance, mulching might need
to cover larger areas of the plantations and should not be restricted to the weeding
circle, as in the case of most smallholdings considered in this analysis. Moreover, a
full assessment of the environmental performance also needs to include the emissions
generated by transporting the FFB to, and the EFB from the mills back to the
plantations, as well as the carbon released in the decomposition process.
While we can support yield enhancing effects, a more informed analysis of
potential welfare effects of mulching should focus on profits generated for smallholder
farmers. Our estimated effect size of mulching suggests yield increases of around 7
tons per hectare and year for the average non-adopter. Valued at the average price
for FFB received, this corresponds to revenues of around 9.84 million IDR. The
average amount of EFB applied in the sample as valued by the average regional
price of around 59,000 IDR per ton implies per hectare costs of mulching of around
3.18 million IDR. Even though these rough estimates neglect e.g. labor costs, the
rather huge difference between estimated revenues and costs could hint to great
income increasing potentials. However, several farmers have indicated that mulching
material is expensive. This might hold in particular for remote villages that are
further away from the mills and where transportation costs might be high. While
mulching thus represents a promising approach to close smallholder yield gaps,
poor farmers, who often additionally lack access to credit markets, are likely to be
excluded from its use. Furthermore, the amount of EFB provided from the mills
might not suffice to satisfy the demand in the region where smallholder farmers
likely compete with industrial plantations. This could thus entail distributional
conflicts between industrial plantations, rich and poor smallholder farmers.
Other mulching options could be explored in order to restore SOC and increase
yields. One possibility consists in the pruned oil palm fronds which are already
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available in the plantations. While being rich in nutrients, frond stacks’ decomposi-
tion processes are slower due to their high C/N ratio (Moradi et al., 2014). One
way to fasten the decomposition rate and increase the amount of carbon and most
nutrients released after 12 months would be by shredding or pulverizing the fronds
(Teh, 2016). This is however rarely done due to e.g. a lack of machinery (Teh, 2016).
Collective action at the village or farmers’ group level, or external provision of such
machinery at the aggregate level could potentially represent another option in order
to increase both the carbon sequestration function of the soil and yields. This could
offer opportunities for win-win situations where both income and environmental
improvements are feasible.
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4.A Appendix
Table A4.1: Effect of mulching on yields (2015-16 data)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current and/or lagged mulching=1 0.429∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗
(0.118) (0.163) (0.118) (0.155)
Plot size in ha (log) 0.732∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.091) (0.051) (0.053)
Spending on fertilizer 0.029∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
in 1,000 IDR (log) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011)
Spending on herbicide 0.023 0.034 0.026 0.033∗
in 1,000 IDR (log) (0.023) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020)
No input application=1 0.144 0.205 0.177 0.225
(0.141) (0.157) (0.136) (0.138)
Other manure applied=1 0.042 0.102 0.110 0.166∗
(0.109) (0.117) (0.089) (0.093)
Labor costs (paid) in 0.166∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
1,000 IDR (log) (0.052) (0.049)
Only family labor=1 0.988∗∗∗ 1.058∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.314)
Grazing animals=1 -0.119∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.118 -0.163∗∗
(0.070) (0.061) (0.080) (0.072)
Plot age 0.066∗∗ 0.071∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.032) (0.036) (0.028) (0.032)
Plot age squared -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Planting density 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Local village=1 -0.161∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.066) (0.071) (0.068)
Wave=16 -0.194∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051)
Labor costs (paid and valued family 0.081∗∗ 0.102∗∗
labor) in 1,000 IDR (log) (0.041) (0.046)
Constant 0.635 0.458 0.962∗∗∗ 0.671∗
(0.539) (0.542) (0.356) (0.383)
Population weights No Yes No Yes
Observations 249 249 249 249
144
Chapter 4. EFB mulching to increase yields and SOC
Coefficients from a two-stage linear random effects model displayed in columns (1) and (3), and
from a pooled 2SLS with population weights in columns (2) and (4). Village-level clustered
standard errors displayed in parentheses. The outcome variable is harvest in tons of FFB (log).
We use the number of palm oil mills found in a radius of 20 km around the village as the
instrument for the mulching decision. All price variables are inflation adjusted. Due to the high
collinearity between costs for fertilizer and herbicide application, and the respective labor costs,
the labor costs only capture spending on harvesting and maintenance (weeding and pruning) done
to the oil palms. In Indonesia, labor use is often paid as a lump sum transfer. Therefore, labor is
expressed in monetary terms. In columns (1) and (2), we only include paid labor. In columns (3)
and (4), family labor is included and valued with the mean price for labor. The restricted sample
size does not allow to derive task or regionally disaggregated labor costs. Wages do not appear to
substantially differ between tasks or regions. As with fertilizer and herbicide application, labor
inputs were analyzed for outliers (Table A4.3 for more information).
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4.2: Robustness checks for reduced form results of mulching on yields
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current and/or lagged 0.429∗∗ 0.370∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.385∗
mulching=1 (0.181) (0.210) (0.171) (0.205)
Plot size in ha (log) 0.857∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.052) (0.049) (0.047)
Spending on fertilizer 0.030∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
in 1,000 IDR (log) (0.010) (0.010)
Spending on herbicide -0.006 0.014
in 1,000 IDR (log) (0.014) (0.018)
No input application=1 -0.009 0.095
(0.084) (0.114)
Other manure applied=1 0.085 0.189∗∗
(0.077) (0.080)




Grazing animals=1 -0.103∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.096∗ -0.118∗∗
(0.053) (0.048) (0.057) (0.053)
Plot age 0.081∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.033) (0.027) (0.034)
Plot age squared -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Planting density 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Wave=16 -0.183∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.048)
Wave=17 -0.535∗∗∗ -0.471∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.166) (0.042) (0.047)
Local village=1 -0.072 -0.106 -0.130 -0.170∗∗
(0.071) (0.066) (0.080) (0.076)
Individual migration=1 0.045 0.034 0.034 0.033
(0.057) (0.058) (0.063) (0.071)
Price received for one 0.127 0.077 0.098 0.087
kg of FFB (log) (0.157) (0.194) (0.156) (0.193)
Distance to closest palm 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.006
oil mill (km) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Industrial oil palm 0.051 0.078 -0.002 0.022
plantation bordering=1 (0.103) (0.109) (0.088) (0.099)
Constant 0.214 0.174 1.175∗∗∗ 1.164∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.522) (0.314) (0.351)
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Population weights No Yes No Yes
Observations 377 377 377 377
Coefficients from a 2SLS RE effects model displayed in columns (1) and (3). Coefficients from
a pooled 2SLS model displayed in columns (2) and (4). Our instrument is the number of palm
oil mills found in a radius of 20 km around the village. Village-level clustered standard errors
in parentheses. Management decisions are excluded from columns (3) and (4) since these might
be potentially endogenous. Only fertilizer use and pruning are significantly correlated with the
number of palm oil mills found in a radius of 20 km. The respective correlation coefficients are,
with p-values in parentheses, for herbicide application -0.04 (0.943), fertilizer -0.12 (0.01), pruning
-0.12 (0.021), other manure -0.01 (0.922), and harvest frequency -0.01 (0.825).
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4.3: Explanation of selected variables
Variables Explanation
Values of assets Indicator represents the sum of the values of televisions, motorbikes, cars,
fridges, washing machines and cell-phones the farmer’s household owned
in 2016. Values were transformed into USD using the 2016 official
exchange rate from the World Bank.
Extension
received
= 1 if the farmer received extension on oil palm management or soil
conservation between 2015 and 2017.
Transmigrant
farmer
=1 if household moved to village within the transmigration program.
Regular flooding
on plot
=1 if farmer reports regular flooding on plot.
Steepness of plot Measured on a 1-6 scale where the different values indicate
0°/10°/20°/30°/45° and more than 45° slope.
Difficult road
conditions
Assistants rated access to plot as either difficult (=1) or not (=0) in
rainy season.
Organic soil = 1 if a plot has at least 20% SOC in interrow.
Fertilizer
spending
Spending on fertilizer in 1,000 IDR. Spending is inflation corrected in
each year. Information on national consumer price indices taken from the
World Bank where 2010 represents the reference year. Outlier detection
is based on the per hectare values of the strictly positive observations
and uses the box plot method developed by Tukey (1977). In case the
distribution is highly skewed though, too many variables might be
classified as outliers (Hubert & Vandervieren, 2008). Therefore, we
compare the observations classified as outliers based on Tukey’s method
to the 95 percentile of the distribution. In case Tukey’s method classifies
more observations as outliers, we winsorize the distribution at the 95
percentile. In case less observations are classified as outliers by Tukey’s
method, only these observations are replaced with the 95 percentile.
Fertilizer spending was halved for 2015 and 2016.
Herbicide
spending
Spending on herbicide in 1,000 IDR. Spending is inflation corrected in
each year. Information on national consumer price indexes taken from
the World Bank where 2010 represents the reference year. Outlier
detection was done as for fertilizer spending. Herbicide spending was
halved for 2015 and 2016.
Harvest frequency How often a farmer harvested the plot on average in six months.
Planting density Number of oil palms per hectare.
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Table A4.4: First stage results (instrument strategy)
(1)
Mulching
Plot size in ha (log) -0.064
(0.053)
Spending on fertilizer in 1,000 IDR (log) 0.019∗
(0.010)
Spending on herbicide in 1,000 IDR (log) 0.014
(0.016)
No input application=1 0.148
(0.092)




















Number of mills in a 0.086∗∗∗




Coefficients from a pooled linear model displayed. Village-level clustered standard errors in
parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4.5: Effect of mulching on yields
(1) (2) (3)
Current and/or lagged mulching=1 0.212∗∗∗
(0.056)
Spending on fertilizer in 1,000 IDR (log) 0.032∗∗∗ 0.022 0.022∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Spending on herbicide in 1,000 IDR (log) -0.003 -0.015 -0.014
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Plot age 0.070∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
Plot age squared -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No input application=1 0.021 -0.079 -0.076
(0.079) (0.099) (0.096)
Harvest frequency (log) 0.525∗∗∗ 0.419∗ 0.418∗
(0.173) (0.247) (0.237)
Planting density 0.003∗∗ 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Grazing animals=1 -0.103∗ -0.130∗∗ -0.130∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.051)
Plot size in ha (log) 0.865∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.061) (0.058)
Pruning=1 -0.020 0.048 0.049
(0.054) (0.049) (0.048)
Other manure applied=1 0.110∗ 0.090 0.091
(0.062) (0.096) (0.092)










Only lagged mulching=1 0.210∗∗
(0.090)
Only current mulching=1 0.135
(0.105)
Lagged and current mulching=1 0.339∗∗∗
(0.084)
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Constant 0.341 0.452 0.449
(0.441) (0.545) (0.528)
Observations 377 257 257
Coefficients from a linear random effects model displayed. Village-level clustered standard errors
in parentheses. The outcome variable is tons of FFB harvested in six months (log). Fertilizer
and herbicide costs are inflation adjusted. Harvest and input information are halved to represent
six-month information for 2015 and 2016.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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SOC (%, log) FFB
harvested in
tons (log)
Mulching=1 0.505∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.428
(0.233) (0.056) (0.343)
Plot size in ha (log) 0.828∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.026) (0.089)
Spending on fertilizer in 1,000 IDR (log) 0.038∗∗ 0.010 0.037∗
(0.017) (0.008) (0.020)
Spending on herbicide in 1,000 IDR (log) -0.008 -0.004 -0.004
(0.018) (0.014) (0.016)
No input application=1 -0.050 0.038 -0.037
(0.136) (0.097) (0.134)
Harvest frequency (log) 0.353 -0.075 0.374
(0.225) (0.089) (0.259)
Grazing animals=1 -0.140∗∗ 0.013 -0.148∗∗
(0.064) (0.035) (0.059)
Pruning=1 -0.040 -0.096 -0.023
(0.094) (0.061) (0.111)
Other manure applied=1 0.133 -0.019 0.130
(0.125) (0.085) (0.117)
Plot age 0.084∗∗∗ 0.005 0.082∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.008) (0.032)
Plot age squared -0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Planting density -0.001 0.002∗ -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Local village=1 0.042 0.015
(0.095) (0.136)
Interrow SOC (%, log) 0.893∗∗∗
(0.017)
SOC (%, log) 0.119
(0.560)
SOC (%, log) squared -0.035
(0.129)
Constant 0.599 0.278 0.480
(0.673) (0.247) (1.007)
Observations 128 128 128
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Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients from a 2SLS regression shown
in columns (1) and (3). Coefficients from an OLS estimation in column (2). The base category
for column (2) is the carbon content in the combined sample of the frond stack area and between
the oil palms.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4.7: First stage regression results (pathway analysis)
(1) (2) (3)
Mulching SOC (%, log) SOC (%, log)
squared
Number of oil mills in 0.053∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.046
a radius of 20km (0.016) (0.022) (0.107)
Mean interrow SOC in village, 0.125 0.863∗∗ 2.289
other farmers (log) (0.225) (0.343) (1.700)
Mean interrow SOC in village, -0.046 -0.026 0.254
other farmers (log) squared (0.053) (0.091) (0.458)
Plot size in ha (log) -0.067 0.132∗∗ 0.380∗
(0.071) (0.059) (0.225)
Spending on fertilizer 0.005 0.011 -0.012
in 1,000 IDR (log) (0.013) (0.020) (0.079)
Spending on herbicide 0.029 0.011 0.019
in 1,000 IDR (log) (0.027) (0.031) (0.133)
Plot age -0.046 -0.030 -0.047
(0.031) (0.031) (0.156)
Plot age squared 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
No input application=1 0.160 0.081 0.063
(0.167) (0.193) (0.854)
Harvest frequency (log) 0.045 0.412 1.989
(0.236) (0.285) (1.435)
Planting density 0.002 -0.001 -0.009
(0.001) (0.003) (0.012)
Grazing animals=1 0.146∗ -0.003 -0.245
(0.084) (0.127) (0.629)
Pruning=1 0.095 0.062 0.499
(0.070) (0.107) (0.426)
Other manure applied=1 0.122 -0.385∗ -1.760∗
(0.193) (0.196) (0.926)
Local village=1 -0.217∗∗∗ -0.143 -0.862
(0.081) (0.109) (0.553)
Constant -0.174 -0.523 -4.842
(0.738) (1.086) (5.424)
F-test 7.69 204.03 148.40
Observations 128 128 128
Coefficients from first stage linear OLS regressions displayed. Village-level clustered standard
errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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SOC (%, log) 0.195
(0.230)
SOC (%, log) squared -0.054
(0.047)
Plot size in ha (log) 0.815∗∗∗
(0.081)
Spending on fertilizer in 1,000 IDR (log) 0.035∗
(0.018)
Spending on herbicide in 1,000 IDR (log) -0.002
(0.020)
No input application=1 -0.027
(0.162)
Other manure applied=1 0.147
(0.100)

















Coefficients from a linear model displayed. Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4.9: Mean difference tests between EFB farmers and external control group
(1) (2) (3)
Control Mulching (1) vs. (2)
Mean values with clustered stan-
dard errors in parentheses
p-value
Plantation age (years) 13.815 16.742 0.356
(1.878) (2.523)
Fertilizer applied in kg (log) 5.319 5.621 0.581
(0.399) (0.374)
Herbicide applied in 1.655 1.417 0.508
liter (log) (0.252) (0.253)
No inputs applied=1 0.370 0.387 0.909
Plot was burned in past=1 0.333 0.161 0.067
Other manure applied=1 0.074 0.129 0.487
SOC in interrow (%, log) 0.945 0.973 0.895
(0.174) (0.120)
N 27 31
Sample restricted to plantations with a carbon content above 0.94% and below 12.12% to ensure
common support.






In the last decades, the area under oil palm production has increased markedly
in Indonesia and in other producing countries, and growth rates are predicted to
remain positive (FAO, 2019). From an ecological perspective, this expansion has
induced major negative effects and caused biodiversity loss, carbon emissions and
soil degradation. Yet, from an economic perspective, it has contributed to poverty
reduction and income growth for smallholder farmers. This contrast highlights
potential conflicts between income generation and environmental degradation
involved in oil palm expansion. The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to
the identification of suitable management practices and policies to mitigate these
trade-offs.
This thesis addresses two broad research objectives. The first is to investigate
which policies are suitable to promote the adoption of tree planting in oil palm
plantations. The second is to analyze environmental and economic outcomes
of potential policies and management practices to evaluate which approaches
could reduce environmental-economic trade-offs. These two research objectives are
explored in three essays using primary data collected in Jambi Province, in Sumatra,
Indonesia. The following conclusion first briefly summarizes the main findings.
Then, it discusses limitation as well as sustainability and policy implications.
5.1 Main findings and discussion
The first essay looks at information and free seedling delivery as potential policy
instruments to promote tree planting in oil palm plantations. Existing evidence
on whether information and free input provision can spur technology adoption is
mostly derived from technologies aiming at either income generation in the case of
the agricultural literature, or at health improvements in the general development
economics literature. We complement the literature by providing evidence on the
adoption of a technology that aims to improve local and global environmental
conditions, and to diversify income sources.
Results from a randomized controlled trial indicate that non-monetary inter-
ventions such as information provision can be effective to promote tree planting.
When only information is provided, few farmers plant, but they plant many trees
on average. Free seedling provision is important to motivate a large share of the
population to adopt tree planting. On average, these farmers only plant the number
of seedlings that were provided for free. Notwithstanding, free seedling provision
also encourages a small share of farmers to do additional planting efforts. These
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farmers plant a similar number of trees than adopters who only receive information.
Consequently, free seedling provision does not appear to crowd out own planting
efforts. However, farm-level tree survival rates are lower when trees are provided for
free. Non-correspondence between farmers’ preferences and the species distributed
could be identified as one driver of the low survival rates.
The second essay analyzes the effectiveness of different design options for
payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes to promote the adoption of mixed
oil palm-tree systems with a framed field experiment. Furthermore, it assesses the
biodiversity effects generated in the experiment. The diversity of a broad range
of species represents an environmental good whose provision is dependent on a
minimum size of conservation area at the landscape level. Increased connectivity
between the conserved areas further enhances species diversity. Evidence is missing
in the literature on which PES design options are best suited to provide such
environmental goods.
In a hypothetical scenario, two PES designs are analyzed. In the first, the
area threshold, farmers who conserve receive compensation if at least three out six
farmers in a group do so. In the second, the agglomeration payment, conserving
farmers receive compensation if at least three farmers with bordering land in the
group conserve. The PES designs are combined with three different payment levels.
The essay shows that offering farmers monetary compensation significantly
increases the probability that farmers plant mixed systems in their plantations.
Biodiversity effects are higher when farmers are overcompensated for conservation.
When farmers can communication with each other, the area threshold leads to
higher biodiversity levels than the agglomeration payment. This suggests that
setting payment rules that are hard to achieve and consequently involve the risk of
coordination failure could be detrimental for biodiversity conservation.
The third essay explores whether empty fruit bunch (EFB) mulching can
contribute to closing reported yield gaps, and to restoring soil organic carbon
(SOC) in smallholder oil palm plantations. In addition, it looks into whether the
effect of mulching on yields operates through improvements in SOC. Providing
evidence from smallholdings complements knowledge on the effect of EFB mulching
on yields and SOC that is almost entirely derived from large-scale plantations and
experimental settings.
The results demonstrate that EFB mulching increases both yields and SOC
contents. However, the effect of mulching on yields likely operates through channels
other than SOC increases. While higher SOC contents are therefore not directly
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beneficial to smallholders’ yields, the soil carbon sequestration function might
be improved. This could help to mitigate negative climate impacts of oil palm
expansion in the longer run.
Results from essays one and two suggest that policies can be effective in
promoting tree planting adoption among smallholder farmers in Indonesia. However,
only a small share of farmers plant trees when only information is provided.
Adoption rates are significantly larger under free seedling provision, which could act
as a subsidy besides relieving seed access constraints. The second essay highlights
the relevance of monetary considerations for conservation choices. Put together,
these findings suggest that free seedling provision or even monetary compensations
are needed to motivate a large share of farmers to start planting trees.
Our results further indicate that environmental improvements and income
generation can be complements. This is the case of EFB mulching, where both
increases in yields as a proxy for income, and in SOC contents can be observed.
In contrast, trade-offs might be present when tree planting is adopted, at least if
substantial parts of the oil palms are replaced with trees as in the second essay.
PES-schemes could be a way to mitigate negative income effects of farmers. If
payments under these schemes are subject to collective conservation goals at the
village or broader landscape level, care should be given to implement payment rules
that facilitate coordination. Besides generating higher biodiversity effects, such
payment rules also lead to higher farmers’ income compared to rules that require
higher coordination efforts. Consequently, they might be better suited to mitigate
environmental-economic trade-offs.
5.2 Limitations and scope for future research
The first essay provides evidence on how tree planting adoption can be promoted.
However, it is not possible to fully assess whether the trees planted actually improve
biodiversity outcomes. We were not able to collect information on environmental
outcomes on our own. Furthermore, there is a gap in the literature on ecological
outcomes of trees in oil palm plantations. Some recent studies have supported
positive effects of polycultural systems on biodiversity, but these systems include
other crops besides trees and do not relate the number of trees planted to biodiversity
outcomes (Ashraf et al., 2018; Azhar, Puan, Zakaria, Hassan, & Arif, 2014; Syafiq
et al., 2016; Yahya et al., 2017). To the best of my knowledge, there exists only
one study that explicitly links the number of trees planted in oil palm plantations
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to biodiversity outcomes (Teuscher et al., 2015). Since many farmers planted a
limited number of trees, it is questionable how large the generated biodiversity
effects are. In addition, evidence on the economic consequences of tree planting
is limited. More research regarding these issues is needed to assess the potential
environment-income trade-offs, in particular if the aim is to scale up the number of
trees planted, which likely requires to distribute a larger number of trees.
The first essay compares the effects of information and seedling delivery. Yet,
neither information nor seedling provision is a homogeneous intervention. The
information campaign had a limited scope since it consisted of the one-time screening
of a movie and the distribution of a manual. Repeated campaigns and other
channels of information provision, e.g. through demonstration plots or model
farmer approaches, represent alternative information interventions. These could
have different effects and potentially could change the conclusions on the relative
performance of information dissemination and free seedling provision.
The rationale of providing seedlings was to address market access barriers.
However, by distributing the seedlings for free, the intervention subsidized inputs.
The design does not allow to disentangle whether relieving access constraints, or
whether subsidizing inputs is the main impact channel for tree planting adoption. If
relieving access barriers is sufficient to promote tree planting adoption, the costs of
the interventions could be reduced and potentially higher levels of cost effectiveness
achieved. Further research could therefore compare interventions that provide
seedlings for free to interventions where access is provided, but farmers need to
pay for the seedlings to disentangle these two channels.
Finally, it should be noted that tree planting adoption is based on farmers’
self-reports, and tree survival was assessed one year after planting. Looking at tree
survival in a longer time horizon could generate more informed evaluations of the
two interventions. Moreover, plot visits to assess the number of trees planted could
reduce measurement errors, if e.g. farmers report having planted trees in oil palm
plantations to please the research team.
The second essay investigates with a framed field experiment whether PES
can promote tree planting. The results highlight the relevance of communication
among farmers for facilitating coordination under the area threshold. In contrast,
communication does not increase conservation probabilities under the agglomeration
payment. Communication was introduced after farmers had already experience
with the respective PES design. A clearer identification of the causal effect of
communication would require a between design. Moreover, subgroup analyses
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indicate that previous coordination success can explain part of the differential effect
of communication between the two PES designs. An assessment of farmers’ beliefs
at all stages of the experiment or the availability of transcripts of the communication
content could have improved the understanding of why the effect of communication
differs between the two PES designs.
The question of whether financial compensation is promising to promote tree
planting in oil palm plantations is answered in this thesis in a hypothetical scenario.
Providing hypothetical evidence first to assess ex ante which PES designs might
be most suited to promote tree planting is justified given the cost intensiveness of
an experimental investigation implying real compensation payments and decision
making. However, hypothetical scenarios might suffer from hypothetical biases, and
the participants in the experiment might react to the perceived expectations from
the researcher (social desirability bias). At the time of the data collection in 2018,
the European Parliament negotiated the revision of the Renewable Energy Directive,
which sets targets on the share of renewable energies in national energy mixes.
Part of the discussions evolved around whether and to what extent biofuels derived
from palm oil should be considered to meet these targets. Farmers were aware of a
general critical view of many Europeans on oil palm, and also of the ongoing debate
in the Parliament. Since the research team identified themselves, and could also be
clearly identified by physical appearance as European, farmers might have felt that
the research team expected them to behave in an environmentally friendly way.
This could have pushed them to adopt the mixed oil palm system. Potential social
desirability biases should not affect the relative performance of the two PES designs
considered, but studies involving real decision making are eventually needed to
investigate whether PES schemes in general are promising to promote tree planting.
Further research using framed field experiments could increase the external validity
of the results by using larger groups that comprise also farmers from different
villages, and neighborhood structures, in which plantations have a different number
of bordering plots. This is important since the real-world implementation of PES
schemes to promote biodiversity-friendly landscape patterns would require the
coordination of many farmers, partly living in different villages. Moreover, the
question of how PES schemes should be designed to maximize tree survival could
be addressed.
The third essay analyzes the effect of EFB mulching on yields and SOC contents.
Since EFB mulching increases SOC contents, carbon sequestration in oil palm
plantations is also likely improved. To fully analyze whether more carbon can be
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stored in the soil, estimating carbon stocks, i.e. the amount of carbon stored per
cubic meter, is important. This should be addressed by future research in order
to evaluate whether EFB mulching could improve the carbon balance of oil palm
plantations.
The analysis of whether EFB mulching increases SOC contents, and whether the
effect of EFB mulching on yields operates through improvements in SOC is based on
cross-sectional data. The availability of panel data would allow to assess temporal
dynamics as well as the potential delayed response of yields to SOC. Increasing
the sample size can improve the power of detecting statistically significant effects.
A higher sample size could also facilitate the analysis of heterogeneous treatment
effects since responses of SOC and yields to mulching are likely to be context
specific. In combination with an additional analysis of broader welfare implications
of EFB mulching, e.g. regarding its effects on profits, this could help to understand
to which farmers or plantations EFB might be most beneficial. Currently, the
uptake of EFB mulching is still very limited among smallholder farmers in Jambi
Province. Further research is thus needed to explore policy options to increase the
uptake of EFB, or of similar mulching options, if identified. Given the restricted
availability of EFB, and to increase aggregate effects, these policies should focus
on farmers for whom EFB is expected to have the highest benefits.
All three essays area based on primary data collected in Jambi Province in
Indonesia. Two particularities of Jambi Province need to be mentioned. First,
oil palm cultivation in Jambi is closely linked to the transmigration program.
Many smallholder farmers started growing oil palm under contractual arrangements
with large-scale plantations. Second, the share of smallholder farmers in Jambi
Province amounts to around 75%, while the national Indonesian average is only 46%
(Badan Pusat Statistik, 2019). The institutional background of the transmigration
program, or spill-over effects from other smallholder farmers, who e.g. are potentially
more inclined to adopt more diverse cropping systems than owners of large-scale
plantations (Azhar et al., 2011), might have affected the results in the presented
essays. It is consequently difficult to assess ex-ante whether similar results would
be derived in newly emerging oil palm cultivation areas in Indonesia, such as Papua,
or in other emerging producing regions such as South America, West Africa and
other countries in South-East Asia.
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5.3 Sustainability and policy implications
This dissertation shows that management practices and policies promoting their
uptake could potentially help to mitigate environmental-economic trade-offs involved
in oil palm expansion. In order to assess whether these practices and policies can
help increase the sustainability of oil palm cultivation, also social consequences such
as potential distributional conflicts need to be assessed. This might be particularly
important for monetary compensation schemes, such as the ones considered in the
second chapter, as well as for the promotion of best management practices that
involve high costs such as EFB mulching.
Furthermore, both explored management practices likely influence oil palm
yields, which might increase in the case of mulching, or decrease in the case of
tree planting. Changed per hectare revenues could also affect other land use
systems in the region, e.g. by land expansion and related deforestation (Kubitza,
Krishna, Urban, et al., 2018). Indirect effects on other land use systems should
be considered for a sustainability assessment. Finally, we focus on smallholder
farmers in this dissertation. Yet, around 60% of the oil palm cultivation area in
Indonesia is managed by industrial plantations. A comprehensive approach to
increase the sustainability of oil palm cultivation in Indonesia needs to integrate
the environmental, economic and social performance of these plantations.
The focus of this thesis is on the production side of the palm oil value chain. In
order to enhance the implementation, and to contribute to resulting costs of such
policies in the producing countries, the consumption side of the value chain should
be considered. One approach could be compulsory environmental standards for
palm oil. Here, the European Union plays an important role since it represents the
second biggest importing region (USDA, 2020). However, a coordinated approach
with India and China as the two other main importing countries would be needed
to streamline consumer power. Another approach could be certificates and related
voluntary standards such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil certificate. For
these certificates to be effective, monitoring needs to be ensured and certification
criteria further tightened (Carlson et al., 2018). Furthermore, the certification
process needs to be adapted to smallholders’ circumstances (Brandi, 2017). Price
premia included in certification schemes could be used to mitigate potential income
losses of farmers who manage their plantations in an environmentally friendly way.
In case further research supports the potential of PES schemes to increase the
sustainability of oil palm cultivation, it is important to consider how the resulting
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costs can be shared among countries. Cost sharing can be justified given the global
public good character of biodiversity and climate protection.
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CRC 990 Indonesia 
Follow-up Survey-2016 (shortened version) 
 
This is a research project carried out jointly by the University of Göttingen in Germany, the University of Jambi and Bogor 
Agricultural University. We wish to learn more about the environmental conditions in Jambi Province and about the decisions that 
farmers make on their farms and in their communities. The survey is conducted in 5 different Districts, and your village and 
household was selected to be part of the study. If you agree to participate in the interview, your responses will be treated 
confidentially and used strictly for research purpose. The questions covered in this questionnaire are about you, your family 
members, farming activities, physical assets and resource management. If you have any doubts about the interview, you are free to 
ask questions at any time. It is important to note that there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. It is your most honest response that 
will help us to understand your opinion. The interview will take no longer than 2 hours. Your household number will be used for 
identification in the study, and therefore your name will not be used.  
Section 2 – General land use 
 
2.1 Could you please tell me, how many hectares of land your household owns? __________________ (ha) 
 
     Please note that with “household” I mean you, but also all the other members of your family that live with you and share your 
meals regularly. Even persons that are not related to you, but that live with you and depend on you economically should be 
included here. However, relatives that have their own household should not be included here. 
 
2.2 How much of it is:  
Agricultural land (ha) Forest (ha) Sleeping/ Fallow /Waste land 
(ha) 




   
 
2.3 Which crops are you or any member of your household currently cultivating? Please include crops that you grow on your own 














plasma   
Did you sell 













Rented in (ha) 
1. Oil Palm        
2. Rubber Plantation 
(Less than 10 other trees 
per ha than rubber) 
       
3. Jungle rubber 
(More than 10 other 
trees per ha than rubber) 
       
4. Rice  
 
      
Code A: Trader=1; Company=2; Village market=3; Own shop=4; Other (specify)= 5  
 
2.4 Do you have homegarden? Yes/No 
a) If yes, what is it the size? 
2.5 Do you have oil palm in your homegarden? 
a) if yes, how many oil palms do you have? 
 
Section 3 – Oil palm cultivation 
 
Now, I would like to ask you some questions about your oil palm plots.  
Appendix A. General Appendix







Please note that with “oil palm plot” I mean a piece of land that is not spatially segmented, and where oil palms have more or less 
the same age and are managed in the same way. 
 
3.2 For the following questions, we are interested in all those oil palm plots that are managed by yourself or a member of your 
household, no matter whether the oil palms are grown on your own land or land that you rented from somebody else to grow oil 
palms.  
 
How many oil palm plots are managed by your household? 
 









3.3 Please indicate for each of these plots managed by yourself or a member of your household… 
 
 Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 
1. Size of the plot in hectares    
2. Year Planting    
3. Planting distance between oil palms in meters x meters    
4. Number of productive oil palms    






a. Do you have a certificate for the plot? (including the certificate with your 
name or with the name of the previous owner)  {Code B} (if no, go to 
question 3.4)  
   
b. Do you have this certificate with you at present, or with another 
person/ institution, e.g. a credit institution?  
(if yes, go to d)) 
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
c. If no, who is currently holding the land title/certificate? {Code C}    





a. Do you pay a rental fee for this plot? (if no, skip (b)) Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
b. If yes, amount of rent paid during the last 12 months? (‘000 Rp.)    
c. Since when do you have this agreement? (Year)    
Code A: Owned=1; Rented-in=2 
Code B: Yes, Systematic Certificate = 1; Yes, Sporadic certificate = 2; Yes, Letter from village head or Segal = 3, None=4 
Code C: Plantation company = 1; Government=2; Bank=3; Others (specify)=4 
 
 Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 
3.4 Did you acquire or managed this plot during the last 12 months? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
3.5 If no: have you cleared the whole plot and start a new plantation of oil palm during 
the last 12 months? 
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
 
If the farmer answered question 3.4 and 3.5 with “yes”, please fill questions 3.6 to 3.10. Otherwise skip to section 3.11   
 
3.6 I would now like to ask you some more detailed questions about each of these oil palm plots that you or another member of your 
household manage… 
 
To fill new plot, please refer to the plot reference specified in question 3.2a  
 
 New plot:______ New plot:_____ New plot:_____ 
1.Year of first harvest ever    
2. Number of rows    
3. Number of oil palms per rows    
4. Total number of oil palms in the plot    
3.1 How many plots do you currently own or rent to cultivate oil palm?  
 




5. How many different oil palm varieties grown in the plot?      
6. What is the name of the main variety planted in the plot? If 
the farmer does not know the name:  
Is the variety improved (1) or local (0)? 
   
a. How many of the oil palms in the plot are from variety 1?    
7. Have you ever used fire to clear this plot? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
a. If yes, when was the last time that you used fire on this 
plot (year)? 
   
8. Before these oil palms were planted, what crops or plants 
were growing on this plot? {Code A} 
   
9. Do you intercrop this plot?  Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
 If 
yes 
a. which other crop do you cultivate in this plot?    
b. how many plants have you planted in the plot?    
c. in which year did you plant them?    
Code A: oil palm = 1; plantation rubber = 2; jungle rubber = 3; other plantation = 4; annual crops (specify) = 5; grassland=6; 
forest=7; bush =8; others (specify) = 9 
 
Please help us to understand the location of your plots in the landscape: 
3.7. How far is the plot from….  
(in kilometers!) Write 0 if it is within 500 meters, or n.a. if Not available 
 New plot: __________ New plot:_________ New plot:_______ 
1. …your house?     
2. … the next paved road?    
3. … the closest market?    
5. … the closest agricultural shop?    
4. … the closest oil mill?    




New plot:______ New plot:____ 
3.8 Is there a river bordering the plot or running through the plot?  Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
If yes; a. How wide is it? meters meters Meters 
b. What is the distance between the planted oil palms and 
the river? 
meters meters Meters 
If no; a. How far is the next river or lake? meters meters Meters 
3.9 Are there swamp areas on your plot?     
3.10 a. How steep is the plot on average?  (see figure below)    
b. How is the soil texture {Code A}    
c. How is the color of the soil? 
{Code B}  
(show Card #1 to farmer) 
Rainy Season    
Dry Season    
d. How is the water penetration? {Code C}    
Code A: coarse / light (sandy)=1, medium (loam)=2; fine / heavy (clay)=3  
Code B: Blackish=1; Brownish=2; Redish=3; Yellowish =4 
Code C: Rapid=1; Moderate=2; Slow=3; waterlogged=4 
 
 




3.14 During the last 12 months, did you apply any fertilizers, soil amendments or manure on your plots? Yes/No 
If no, continue with question 3.16 If yes, fill out the following table, remember to complete first the information for Plot 1, and then continue with Plot 2.  
 
Specify: 



















Fert.1 Fert.2 Fert.3 
                  
1. Number of 
applications in the 
last 12 months: 
                  
2. Amount per 
application: 
                  
3. Unit of 
application {Code 
A} 
                  
4. Price per unit 
(‘000 Rp.): 
                  
5. Unit of 
price{Code A} 
                  
Code A: Sack=1; Kilo=2; Liter=3; Gallon =4; Other (specify)=5___________ 
 
3.15 In the past 12 months, how much did you spend on input transport for...  
 
 




















Total input transport 
(‘000 Rp) 















3.16 During the last 12 months, did you apply any herbicides or pesticides on your plots? Yes/No 




Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 
Herb. 1 Herb. 2 Herb. 3 Pesticide Herb. 1 Herb. 2 Herb. 3 Pesticide Herb. 1 Herb. 2 Herb.3 Pesticide 
            
1. Number of applications in 
the last 12 months 
            
2. Amount per application             
3. Unit of application 
{Code A} 
            
4. Price per unit (‘000 Rp.):             
5. Unit of price {Code A}             
Code A: Sack=1; Kilo=2; Liter=3; Gallon=4; Other (specify)=5 
 
 
3.17 In the past 12 months, how much did you spend on input transport for...  
 
 









Total transport Herbicide Total transport Pesticide 
Total input transport: 
 (‘000 Rp) 














3.19 During the last 12 months, did you perform (manual) weeding or leaf pruning? Yes/No 
If no, continue with question 3.20. If yes, fill out the following table, remember to complete first the information for Plot 1, and then continue with Plot 2.  
 
Plot 1  Plot 2 Plot 3 
Manual weeding 
of the soil 
Manual 
weeding of 






weeding of the 
soil 
Manual weeding 






weeding of the 
soil 
Manual weeding 






Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
1. Number of operations in the last 12 
months: 
         
2. Application paid as borongan? Yes=1; 
No=0 
         
If 
yes 
a. What was the total cost? (‘000 
Rp.) 
         
If no 
            
b. Total number of workers per 
application: 
         
c. Total number of days  per 
application: 
         
d. Total number of hours per day :          
From the total number of workers:          
e. How many of these were unpaid 
family workers? 
         
f. How many of these were casual 
workers? 
         
g. Daily wage (‘000 Rp.)          
3. Machinery cost:  
(‘000 Rp / application) 
         






3.23 During the last 12 months… 
 

















1. How often did you harvest this plot? {Code A}       
2. On average how many tn of FFB do you harvest?       
3. Application paid as borongan? Yes=1; No=0       
If yes a. What was the total cost? (‘000 Rp.)       
If no 
            
b. Total number of workers per application:       
c. Total number of days  per application:       
d. Total number of hours per day:        
From the total number of workers:       
e. How many of these were unpaid family 
workers? 
      
f. How many of these were casual workers?       
g. Daily wage (‘000 Rp.)       
4. Total cost of transportation to the mill  
(‘000 Rp.) 
      
5. Cost of transportation to the collection point.       
Code A: (Once every week=1); (Once every two weeks=2); (Once every three weeks=3); (Once every month=4); (Other (specify)) 
 
3.23 What is the average price that you obtained for the oil palm fruits in that season? (‘000 Rp/kg) 
 





Section 4: Tree planting and cutting activities 
 
4.1 During the last 12 months, have you cut any trees on your oil palm plots or elsewhere on your land? 
 
 Yes=1 /No= 0 Number cut on oil palm 
plots 
Number cut in any other 
location 
Specify:______________ 
1. Durian    
2. Petai    
3. Jengkol    
4. Meranti    
5. Sungkai    
6. Jelutung    
Other:___________    
Other:__________    
Other:__________    
 
4.2 If you cut any trees during the last 12 months, what was the main reason? 
3.20 During the past 12 months have you…    
1. …left ground vegetation grow on the plot?  Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
2. …left the palm leaves to cover all the soil on your plantation?   Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
3. …left the palm leaves as an additional row on your plantation?   Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
4. …returned the empty fruit bunches to the soil around the oil palms?   Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
5. …planted any legumes?  Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
6. …left cows graze your plot?   Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 








4.3 Did anybody ever advice you to cut trees in your oil palm plantation? Yes/No  
 
If yes:  a. please specify who: __________________ 
 



















(2) tree islands 
(clustered) 
(3) around the edge 
of the plot 




How many of 
these trees 
survived? 
1. Durian       
2. Petai       
3. Jengkol       
4. Meranti       
5. Sungkai       
6. Jelutung       
Other:_________       
Other:__________       
Other:__________       
 
 




4.6 Did anybody ever advice you to plant trees in your oil palm plantation? Yes/No  
If yes:  a. please specify who: __________________ 
 
b. What was the main reason that they gave for planting trees in your oil palm plantation? 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.7 Who in your household decides whether to cut or plant trees?: ____________________ 
 
4.8 Did you obtain any seedlings of native trees during the last 12 months? Yes/ No 
 
If yes, please fill out the following table. If no, go to question 4.12 
 Durian Petai Jengkol Meranti Sungkai Jelutung Others 
1. Where did you obtain the seedlings? {Code 
A} 
       
2. How many seedlings did you obtain?        
3. How much did you pay per seedling? 
(‘000Rp.) 
       
4. What did you do with the seedlings? {Code 
B} 
       
If = 1 a. Where did you planted?        
If = 2 b. What did you receive in return?        
If = 3 c. How much did you receive?        
Code A: Own nursery=1; extension worker = 2 government nursery=3; individual farmers’ nursery=4; local shop=5; local trader=6, 
other=7 (specify) 
Code B: Planted =1; Exchanged= 2; Sold = 3, other =4 (specify)________________________ 





4.9 If you received a free seedlings among the ones mentioned above, would you have liked to obtain other types of trees? Yes / 
No 
 
a) If yes, which other trees would you prefer? ________________________________________________________ 
 
b) Would you plant these trees in your oil palm plantation? Yes / No 
 
c) For the trees you have received for free, have you given any special maintenance?  Yes/No 
 If no, please move to question 4.12 
 














Fert.1 Fert.2 Herb.1  Herb.2 Pest.1  Pest.2 
         
1. Number of applications 
in the last 12 months  
         
2. Amount per application          
3. Unit of per application 
(Code A) 
         






4.12 Please name the three most important reasons, why you are not planting more native trees on or along your oil palm plots. 








4.14 No matter whether you have planted trees during the last 12 months or not, please indicate whether you have any native 
trees in your oil palm plantation (planted recently or a long time ago): 
 
a) Yes, there are native trees in my oil palm plantation 
b) No, there are absolutely no native trees in my oil palm plantation 
(If no, go to question 4.21)  
 
If yes, for each of your oil palm plots, please tell me how many of the different tree species there are: 
 
Name of tree species a. Number 
of trees  
b. How many trees 
are productive? 
c. Did you 
plant them? 
 








Durian       






around the trees 
Pruning the trees 
Yes/No Yes/No 
1. Number of operations in the last 12 months:   




Jengkol       
Meranti       
Sungkai       
Jelutung       
Other 1: 
_________ 
      
Other 2: 
_________ 
      
Other 3: 
_________ 
      
Other trees that cannot 
be specified 
      
 
 
Section 7 – Extension services and information  
 
Now, we are interested in learning about the different trainings or extension services you have received, as well as the sources 
from which you obtain information about oil palm management and tree planting. 
 




If yes, who provided this 
extension service? 
{Code A} 
How many times did you receive 
this service during the past 12 
months? 
1. Oil palm management Yes /No   
2. Tree planting in oil palm plantations Yes /No   
3. Planting and management of native 
fruit and timber trees 
Yes /No   
4. Water management and conservation Yes /No   
5. Soil management and conservation Yes /No   
6. Prevention of fires  Yes /No   
7. Other (specify):_______________ Yes /No   
8. Other (specify): ______________ Yes /No   
Code A: Agriculture ministry (specify) =1; Extension worker (specify) = 2 Forestry ministry (specify) =3; Company=4; 
Cooperative=5; farmers group (specify)=6; NGO (specify)  =7; Other (specify)=8 
 
7.2 Did you obtain information on oil palm management or native fruit and timber trees from any of the following sources in 
the past 12 months?  
 
 Oil palm management Tree planting 
1. Internet Yes/No Yes/No 
a. If yes, how frequently do you seek information from 
this source? {Code A}   
  
2. Other farmers in the village Yes/No Yes/No 
a. If yes, how frequently do you seek information from 
this source? {Code A}   
  
3. Other farmers outside the village Yes/No Yes/No 
a. If yes, how frequently do you seek information from 
this source? {Code A}   
b. From which village: 
  
4. Manual or booklet Yes/No Yes/No 
a. If yes, how frequently do you seek information from 
this source? {Code A}   
  
b. Who provided this manual?   




5. Movie Yes/No Yes/No 
a. If yes, how frequently do you seek information from 
this source? {Code A}   
  
b. Who show you this movie?   
Code A: Everyday=1; Once a week=2; Once every two weeks=3; Once a month=4; Other (specify)=5  
 
7.3 If the farmer has received an illustrative manual or watched the movie. Please ask the following questions: 
a). Have you followed any advice suggested in the manual or movie? Yes/No 
b). If yes, which advice did you follow? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
c) Did you discuss the contents of the manual/movie with other villagers, e.g. your neighbors or friends?  Yes/No 
d) Would you have preferred to receive this information in another way? Yes / No  
e) If yes, what way would you have found more convincing? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Section 10 - Socio-demographic characteristics 
 
10.1 In the following, I will ask you some questions about the history and characteristics of your family. 
 
1. Did your household migrate to this village?  
If no, go to question 2 
Yes /No 
If yes a. When did you migrate to this village? (Year)  
b. From where did you migrate? {Code A}  
c. Was your household part of the “transmigrasi” program? Yes /No 
2. What is the religion of your family? {Code B}  
3. and, the religion of the household head? {Code B}  
4. Total number of household members who were staying with you in the 
house during the past 12 months: 
 
Code A: Other part of Jambi = 1; Java = 2; North Sumatra = 3; South Sumatra = 4; Kalimantan = 5; Sulawesi = 6; Others 
(specify) = 7 
Code B: Islam=1, Christian=2; Hindu=3; Buddhist=4; Others (specify)=5 




10.2 For each of these________ persons, can you please give me their names (first name is sufficient). 
Enumerator: write the names into the first column; remember that the first row is for the household head.  
  





Name Relation to 










Main occupation in the 
last 12 months? 
{Code C} 
If working outside 
the village more 






have a special 
position within the 
village? 
 





1  HH head        Yes/No  
2          Yes/No  
3          Yes/No  
4          Yes/No  
5          Yes/No  
6          Yes/No  
7          Yes/No  
8          Yes/No  
9          Yes/No  
10          Yes/No  
Code A: Head=1, Spouse=2, Son/daughter=3, Sister/brother =4, grandchild=5, Father/Mother=6, Other (specify)= 7 
Code B: never attended=1; attended but not completed=2; completed SD (primary)=3; completed SMP (Middle)=4; completed SMA (High School)=5; D3 or S1 (Associates Degree or 
University level first stage)=6;  
Code C: own-agriculture=1 (specify); wage or contract labor=2 (specify); own-business activities=3 (specify); still attending school=4; household activities=5; other (specify)=6 
 




Section 11 - Assets 
 
11.1 Now I will read a list of different items to you. Please tell me, if you currently own this item and what its value is: 
 
Asset Number owned If you were to sell these items today, how much money would 
you receive? 
(‘000 Rp) 
1. Television     
2. Motorbike   
3. Car   
4. 4-wheel tractor    
5. Jeep/Truck/Angkot   
6. Fridge   
7. Air conditioner (AC)   
8. Fan   
9. Washing machine   
10. Cell-phones   
11. Computers   
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Instructions for framed field experiment  
Procedure before start of the activity  
1. Arrival: the respondents arrive at the location and show the message on their mobile phone which has 
been sent to them.  
2. The research assistants hand over the sheet of informed consent to the participants. They explain to the 
participants that this sheet contains information about their rights not to participate in the activity or to 
leave early, and the consequences these decisions will have. They explain to the participants that the 
University of Goettingen is very keen on ensuring the security of the data.  Therefore, the researcher is 
obliged by the European law to inform the participants about who they can contact in Germany in case 
they are concerned about the use of their data. They ask the participants whether they need help with 
reading the sheet of informed consent. The assistants tell the participants that they can take a seat 
somewhere in the room, raise their hands in case they need help and should come back to the assistants 
once they have read through the information sheet.    
3. The assistants ask the farmers to pick an id. They enter this id in the identification file in excel. They hand 
over the corresponding envelope for the respective id. They inform the participants that they should not 
show this id to any other person in the room in order to ensure the confidentiality of the data. They tell 
the participants that it is very important that they keep their identity number until the very end, since only 
by showing this number they will receive the compensation that they have earned. The participants should 
be informed that somebody of the research team will inform them once they can give away their ids. The 
assistants also hand over an envelope in which the prepared decision sheets of the farmers with the 
respective id are. The assistants also give a seat id to the farmer. This seat id is indicated in the 
identification file.  
4. The assistants bring the farmer to the assigned seat which is indicated in the prepared excel file.  
Begin general instructions  
Note: The sentences in italics represent instructions for the enumerators and should not be read out loud.  
Thank you very much for following our invitation and joining this workshop! We are part of the Efforts project 
which is a cooperation of the university of Goettingen, in Germany, the university of Jambi, IPB Bogor and 
Tadulako university of Palu. Our special thanks goes to the village head/PAK/Ibu X for allowing us to do the 
research in this village and helping us with the organization. This activity will take around 2-3 hours, including 
the explanations, the activity and a short survey at the end. In case you know that you will not be able to stay until 
the end of the activity please let us know now.  
All the decisions you will make in this activity will remain private. The activity consists of several rounds. In each 
round you can earn points. In the end, we will select one round randomly. The points you have earned in this round 
will then be converted in IDR by multiplying the amount of points by 1000. Hence, if you have made 100 points 
in the round, you will get 100 K IDR. This money together with the money that you have earned when completing 
our questionnaire will be given to you at the end of the activity in form of a voucher for the local shop ________. 
The reason why we use money in this activity is that it mirrors your real live where the decisions on your 
farm have monetary consequences for you. The money is not the private money of the researcher but has been 
given by the university in Goettingen, in Germany for research purposes. This means that the money is not linked 
to any political or environmental organization such that nobody is expecting you to behave in a specific way. Only 
if you behave like you would in real live, we are able to understand decision making here in Jambi.  
Before we start with explaining you in detail how the activity works, we would like to raise your attention to the 
following points:  
Some general comments:  
• Please don’t use your mobile phone throughout the workshop.  
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• The workshop in which you participate now is different from the ones your neighbors in this village have 
already participated in. Hence comments you might have heard in the last days, do not apply for your 
session.  
• All decisions you make or answers you give during the workshop will remain private, confidential and 
anonymous. Only the private activity identification numbers that you have received in an envelope in the 
beginning of the activity help us to distinguish your replies at a later moment. Please do not show your 
activity id to any other person in the room! So neither the other session members nor the research team 
are able to assign you as a person to a specific decision or earning.  
• Since all your decisions are private, don’t talk to each other once everybody is seated. Please do not 
discuss with your neighbor.  
 
• Please follow these instructions carefully. Only by following carefully you can make informed decisions 
in the activity. If you have any questions, please raise your hands. A member of the research team will 
come to you and answer your questions.  
 
• Please don’t share your personal opinion with the group when we take questions.  
 
Do you have any questions so far?  
 
Introduction to the activity 
In this activity you will be asked to make decisions on how to manage your oil palm plantation. Each person will 
have one hectare of established oil palm plantation that generates an income of 100 points per year.  
(Show photo and graph of monoculture oil palm) 
In this activity you can decide whether to maintain a pure oil palm plantation as shown in this picture, or whether 
to establish a diverse cropping system with other native trees on your plot. This would mean that you would need 
to remove around 40% of your oil palm trees which is costly and reduces your income also after accounting for 
the benefits such as fruit and timber that some of the species planted might generate. These trees can be located 
anywhere in your plantations but should be planted in a clustered way together to support their growth. They 
include mostly timber trees, such as Sungkai, but can also contain some few fruit trees such as Mangga, and 
Rambutan. However, the main purpose of the diversified plots is to increase the diversity of plants and animals 
here in Jambi. Therefore, these tree areas consist of several other tree species, and not only of one other tree or 
palm species that generate high income for you. It is important to notice that these tree areas do not contain any 
oil palms! So even if you might think of an oil palm as a tree, the word tree in this activity never refers to an oil 
palm.  
(Show photo and graph of tree areas in oil palm) 
Therefore, 
…. one hectare with pure oil palms generates an income of 100 points a year  
… one hectare with a diverse cropping system generates an income of 50 points a year.  
It is important to note that this income already includes the economic benefits of the trees. The income of the 
diverse system will therefore not exceed 50 points a year.  
In the end, we will pick one round. Each round has the same chance of being picked. You will get the returns from 
that round in form of a voucher. We will convert the points you have earned in this scenario by multiplying the 
amount by 1000. If you choose to plant a mixed system, you will get 50.000 IDR, if you choose to keep your oil 
palm plot, you will get 100.000 IDR.  
These diversified plots can increase the number of bird species in Jambi. More diversity of bird species means that 
farmers in Jambi will experience fewer problems with pests attacking their crops and that flowers of trees or 
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vegetables develop fruits. Tree areas also have positive effects on the soil, increasing water supply. We will call 
these positive effects on birds and water availability “environmental benefits”. 
In this activity, you will play several rounds. In each round you will have to decide whether you keep one hectare 
of oil palm fully established or whether you establish a diversified plot. In each round, your decision will determine 
your earnings in that specific round, as explained before.  
Throughout the whole activity, you will be assigned to a group of six people. Together you represent one village. 
Your oil palm plantations are located around the village like this. 
(Show village map with oil palm plantations located in a circle around the village) 
It is important to note that each of you has two neighbors, one on each side of your plantation. Before we start with 
the activity, you will get to know who is in your group and who are your two neighbors. Even though you know 
who is in your group and who is your neighbor, at no point in time, neither during nor after the activity, you will 
know how they decided to manage their oil palm plantation in this activity. Equally, the other group members will 
never get to know your decisions that you make during the activity. 
It is important to note, however, that these environmental benefits only occur if a certain minimum number of 
diversified plots are established in the village. Why is that so? Tree areas create a home for birds, but these animals 
need sufficient space to find food and shelter. Furthermore, environmental benefits are higher if neighboring 
farmers establish diversified plots. This is because birds can only fly a limited distance. We will now explain to 
you how your decisions in the activity affect the environmental benefits. 
Whether environmental benefits are generated depends on your decision and on the decision of the other members 
of your group. If in total at least three diversified plots are established within your group, there is enough 
conservation area to provide a home for birds, and thus environmental benefits occur. More specifically that means, 
if three or more diversified plots are established by your group, each diversified plot generates six units of 
environmental benefits. You can think of this as each diversified plot providing a home for six additional bird 
species, for example. Furthermore, if neighboring farmers establish tree areas, each neighboring farmer more 
increases environmental benefits by one additional unit. So in case two neighboring farmers engage in tree 
planting, two additional environmental benefits are generated, if three neighbors plant trees, three additional units 
of environmental benefits will be generated. To ensure that these environmental benefits produced in the activity 
actually occur here in Jambi, we will give sixty points for each diversified plot planted in your group and 10 points 
for each additional neighbor who engages in tree planting to the organization Burung Indonesia. This organization 
will invest this money in tree planting and forest protection in Harapan rainforest, Jambi Province, to provide a 
home for birds. It is important to note that these donations do not have any direct monetary effects on you but are 
meant to generate the environmental effects in Jambi your action has generated. 
Do you have any questions so far? If not we will now explain to you how to decide about the management of your 
oil palm plantation.  
How to make your decision on how to manage your oil palm plantation 
At the end of this activity you will receive a monetary earning and, in order to generate the environmental benefits 
of your decisions, donations will be made to Burung Indonesia. The size of these payments that are generated in 
this activity depend on your decision and on the decisions of your group members. In order to understand the 
possible payment sizes during the activity and to calculate your earnings later on you will receive this earning 
table (show earning table to farmers and distribute earning table to farmers). The earning table makes it easy for 
you to find out how many points you can earn in each round. It also indicates to you the possible sizes of the 
environmental benefits, and how much money is accordingly donated to Burung Indonesia in each round. In the 
first column you find the total number of diversified plots established by the other members of your group. The 
following columns of the earning table refer to your own decision and indicate whether you decided to establish 
diversified plantations or not. When you make your decision on whether to establish a diversified plantation or not 
you do not know how many plots will be established by the other members of your group since all decisions are 
made at the same time. However, by choosing the number of diversified plots you think the other members of your 
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group will plant you can know how much you would earn in that case. You can also find out about the possible 
sizes for the environmental donations generated. Therefore, you can first choose the row that corresponds to the 
number of diversified plots you think the other members of your group will plant. The following columns indicate 
whether you decide to have a pure oil palm plot or a diversified plot. Where row and column cross, you will find 
the cell that contains your earning in the respective round if you and your group members indeed plant the number 
of diversified plots as indicated in the row and the column. This is the number which is written first in the table. 
In addition, you can also see the possible sizes of the environmental donations generated if you and your group 
members indeed establish the number of diversified plots indicated in the row and the column. These are the 
numbers in brackets which are written in italics below your earning. The reason why there are several possible 
sizes of environmental donations is that the exact amount will depend on the number of neighboring farmers who 
plant trees. The higher the environmental benefits generated are, the more neighboring farmers engage in tree 
planting. We always indicate you the minimum amount of donations generated in each case and the maximum 
amount. [Assistants please follow the steps explained on the big table]. It is important to note that the donations 
correspond to the donations generated by the whole group! As with your income, the more environmental benefits 
are generated by the group, the lower will be the group income. 
Do you have any questions so far? If not, we will explain to you now how you can indicate your decision and how 
you will get to know the total number of diversified plots the group as a whole has planted.  
How to record your decisions and calculate your earnings  
At the beginning we will give you a sheet that shows pictures of the two management options that you can 
implement in your oil palm plantations. This sheet looks like this [please show the big table with the different 
management options again]. Next to the pictures, you can see numbers that indicate how we can refer to the chosen 
management option. Hence, a zero refers to a pure oil palm plantation and a one to a mixed system. At the 
beginning of each round, you will receive a decision sheet. (Show decision sheet to farmers.) Your private id 
number which we have given to you in the beginning is already written on the decision sheets which you have 
received in an envelope in the beginning of the activity. Please then have a look at the sheet which represents the 
different management options and decide about which management option you would like to implement on your 
oil palm plantation. Please circle the respective number of tree areas on your decision sheet.  
Everybody in this room will make their decision at the same time. It is important that you do not show your 
decision sheet to anybody and that you do not talk to anybody in the room – this is to ensure that your decision 
remains private. Please turn away from the others when you make your decisions. After you have marked your 
decision, please fold the decision sheet – it will then be collected by one of our assistants.  
As we play several rounds, it is important that you keep track of your decisions and the decisions of your group. 
For that purpose, we provide you with this information sheet (show information sheet to farmers). I will now 
explain to you how to fill out each cell of the information sheet.  
- Cell (1): It is very important that in each round you write down your decision on how to manage your oil 
palm plantation on your information sheet. Please enter in cell (1) whether you established a diversified 
plot or not (1=Yes). This is the same number as on your decision sheet. Please copy this number before 
you fold and submit your decision sheet. (Show correct cell to farmers.)  
- Cell (2): After collecting all the decision sheets, we will calculate the total number of diversified plots 
established by the group and inform you about this value. Please enter this value in the second cell “total 
tree areas (group)”. (Show correct cell to farmers.) 
- Cell (3): To obtain the number of diversified systems established by the other members of your group, 
which should be written in cell (3), please subtract the number of diversified systems you planted from 
the total number of tree areas established by the group, so either a zero or a 1. That means, cell (2) minus 
cell (1) gives you the value for cell (3). (Show correct cell to farmers.) 
- Cell (4): we will calculate the number of neighboring farmers in your groups and inform you about this 
value. Enter the number of neighboring farmers who established tree areas in your group in Cell (4). 
- Cell (5): To calculate your earnings you need cell (1) and cell (3) as well as the earning table. As we have 
explained to you already, the earning table makes it easy for you to find out how many points you have 
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earned in each round. In the first column you find the total number of diversified plots established by the 
other members in your group. Select the row corresponding to the value that you have entered in cell (3) 
on your information sheet! The following columns of the earning table refer to your own decision and 
indicate whether you have chosen to establish a diversified system or not. Select the column 
corresponding to the value that you have entered in cell (1) on your information sheet! Where row and 
column cross, you will find the cell that contains your earning in the respective round. Please enter the 
value which is written first in cell (5) on your information sheet. Please do not copy the values in brackets!  
(please follow the instructions on the big table) 
After filling out the information sheet, we would like to ask you to hide it again so that nobody can see what is 
written on it.  
At the end of the activity, we will randomly select one round and you will receive the monetary earning that 
corresponds to the selected round. It is important to note that we multiply the points that you have earned in the 
activity by 1,000. Thus, if your earnings are 100 points, you are paid 100,000 IDR. If your earnings are 50 points, 
you are paid 50,000 IDR, and so forth. Similarly, we will assess the units of environmental benefits generated by 
your group in the selected round and pay Burung Indonesia accordingly. That means, if 200 points of 
environmental benefit are generated, Burung Indonesia receives 200*1,000 = 200,000 IDR for tree planting in 
Jambi. 
Practice questions 
We will now get a bit familiar with the numbers and the earning table. Each of you will now receive the same 
earning table. Please take some time to familiarize yourself with the table [assistants wait until the farmers look 
up] 
We will now discuss again the most important pieces of information. Pak X [choose a person from the audience. 
Please pay attention that you not always ask the same farmers or the farmers which are sitting in front] can you 
please tell us how many points you get from keeping one hectare of oil palm plantation fully established? Pak Y 
[please choose another person from the audience] can you please tell us what is the income of a diversified plot? 
What does this mean? What would be the land use option among the two management options that generates the 
highest amount of points? [ask that to the whole audience]. As we have told you before, birds need a minimum 
amount of area under tree cover to live. Pak X, [choose another person from the audience], if the group collectively 
plants two diversified plots, is this sufficient for birds? And you Pak Y, what do you think? If the group now 
established 5 diversified plots, is that sufficient? In order to understand a bit better the concept of neighboring 
farmers, let us have again a look at the picture that represents the situation in the village. [Please show again the 
table with the location of the neighbors and take stickers which represent tree areas]. The number in the plots 
which are located around the village refer to the plantations of Pak1, Pak 2, …, Pak 6. Let us now assume that Pak 
1, Pak 3 and Pak 5 have engaged in tree planting [Please put the tree area sticker on the respective plots]. How 
many neighboring farmers are establishing a diversified plot on their plantations? [wait for reply] Now let us have 
another example. In this group, farmers 1, 2, 4 and 5 plant trees. Pak X, how many neighboring farmers establish 
a mixed cropping system? [Attention: here it is very important that this will not represent four neighboring 
farmers but 2*2 neighboring farmers]. Right, in this example only two neighboring farmers engage as the 
farmers’ plantations do not lie next to each other. In our third example, Pak 1, 2, 5 and 6 plant trees. Pak Y can 
you tell us how many neighboring farmers establish a diversified plot in this example?  
Do you have any questions so far? If not, we will now practice how to use the earning table.  
Let me give you an example. In these examples, we will know which farmers plant diversified plantations and 
which not. This is done in order to make ourselves again more familiar with the concept of neighboring farmers. 
Please remember that in reality you do not know which farmers plant trees. Pak X owns the plantation number 3. 
His two neighbors owning the plantation 1 and 2 both establish a diversified system, the other persons in the group 
plant only oil palm. Pak X decides that he would like establish a diversified plantation. In order to see how much 
Pak X earns in this round, we need to look at the earning table where we have the number of diversified plots the 
other members in the group plant and the own number of diversified plots planted. Where the column and row 
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intersect we have the cell that tells us our earning. It is the first number that indicates the earning we get. Hence, 
in our example, Pak X will earn 50 points. To see the range in which the environmental donations generated lie, 
we need to have a look at numbers in parentheses which are printed in italics below the earning. The other two 
plant one diversified plot each and together with Pak X decision three diversified plots are planted. This would 
mean that the environmental effects generated in points will be between 180 and 210. Since three neighbors 
establish diversified plantations, the precise amount of points generated for Burung Indonesia is 210.  
Now let us do another example together. In this case, the two farmers who are located to the right of Pak X owning 
the plantations 4 and 5 establish together 2 diversified systems. The other persons in the group do not plant trees. 
Pak X decides that he would like to only plant oil palm. Pak Y [please choose a person from the audience] could 
you tell us how much the farmer will earn in this scenario and where you have to look at the table? [the correct 
answer is 100 points. Please check whether the farmer gets this correct]. Now I would like to ask you what the 
range of environmental benefits and donations is which will be generated? Can you tell us in which column we 
have to look? [Please confirm that the farmer should hint to the same cell and see that no environmental benefits 
are generated]. In this case, less than three diversified systems are established such that no environmental benefits 
are generated. 
Let us now do one last example. The farmer still owns the plantation which is at the same location as plantation 3. 
You can now decide whether the farmer established a pure oil palm plot or a diversified plantation. Please select 
on your earning table the column which indicates the management option of your farmer. [please show on the big 
earning table where the respondent should mark the circle and wait until everybody is finished with this task]. Are 
you all done? The other persons in your group who establish diversified plantations are farmers 5, 6 and 1. Please 
select on the table the cell which indicates how much the farmer has earned in this round and how high 
environmental benefits will be, depending on his own plantation management choice and the choices of the other 
persons in his group. We will now go around to see whether there have been any problems with finding the correct 
case in the earning tables.  
Do you have any questions so far? If not then we will play two practice rounds. These rounds serve only for 
training purposes and won’t be considered in the final earning calculation. 
We will now distribute all the sheets you need to you. Please do not show your decision to other persons in the 
group and do not talk with each other. First, please take one of the decision sheets out of the envelope.  Now please 
write P1 in the line which indicates the round. This refers to first practice round. For the farmers who own 
Plantation Nr. 1,2, 4 and 5, you do not establish a diversified system. The farmers who own plantation 3 and 6 
decide to establish a diversified system. Please mark your decision accordingly on the decision sheet. Please copy 
the number of this management option in your information sheet in cell (1) and hide the paper afterwards again. 
You are done? Then please fold the decision sheet which we will collect now.  
Assistants please check whether the farmer has copied everything on the information sheet. 
We will now announce the group conservation effort to you. The group planted together 2 diversified crop systems 
and no neighboring farmers plant other trees than oil palm. Therefore, no donations are generated. Please copy 
these pieces of information on your information sheet in cell (2) and cell (4). Please calculate the number of 
diversified systems the other members in your group planted by subtracting cell (1) from cell (2). Write the result 
in cell (3). Now have a look at the earning table and choose the cell that tells you how many points you have earned 
in that round. Again, this is the number which you can see first. Write this amount in cell (5). [Assistant who 
explains should wait with next steps always until farmers are done. The other assistants check whether calculations 
are correct].  
Now we will play practice round 2. Please take another decision sheet out of the envelope and write in the round 
P2 which refers to the second practice round. [wait until everybody is done] This time, everybody can decide on 
his or her own whether to establish a diversified system or whether to maintain a pure oil palm plantation. Please 
now copy your management decision on the information sheet, hide it afterwards again and please look up such 
that we know that you are done. [Please wait until everybody is ready now]. Please fold the decision sheet which 
we will collect now. 
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[please collect the decision sheets. And announce group outcome] 
If everybody is done, we will accompany you now to your seat. Please do not talk to your neighbors. Please take 
the envelope with the decision sheets and that with your id with you.  
[in case the farmers are not sitting on the correct places, please bring the farmer to the assigned seat which is 
indicated by seat id and arrange the position of the seats in accordance to the predetermined group composition. 
Please make sure that he took everything with him.] 
We will now start with round one. From this round on, your decisions will have real consequences for you since 
each round can be selected to be paid for you in form of the voucher. Please now make your decisions considering 
your income and the effect your action has on the environment. We would like to ask you to face the wall when 
making your decisions. 
EXAMPLE OF TREATMENT INSTRUCTIONS  
Please interrupt the participants after five rounds.  
In the next rounds, imagine a program is introduced in Jambi that supports farmers who decide to conserve plant 
and animal diversity in their oil palm plantations. The program will make a payment to each farmer depending on 
the number of diversified plots established by the respective farmer. These payments will be made only if 
environmental benefits are generated, that means, if your group all together establishes at least three diversified 
plots. If your group establishes less than three diversified plots, no environmental benefits are generated, and 
therefore the program does not make any payments to any farmer in the group. 
If your group altogether establishes three diversified plots or more, each farmer who establish a diversified plot 
will receive a payment. The amount of the payment depends on the exact number of diversified plots established 
by the farmers: for each diversified plot established each farmer receives 50 points. These payments will then be 
added to the agricultural income. 
[Please show poster that represents Treatment 3.1.] 
For example, if five farmers in your group establish one a diversified plot, and one farmer plants only oil palm, 
your group has a total of five diversified plots. In addition, five neighboring farmers establish a diversified plot. 
That means, the threshold of three diversified plots is met, and therefore each farmer receives a payment. The 
farmers who have established one diversified plot will receive 50 points while the farmer who only plants oil palm 
does not receive any payments from the program. Hence, the total income of the farmers who have planted a 
diversified plot will be 100 points and the total income for the farmer who has planted only oil palm is 100 points. 
In another example, two farmers in the group establish a diversified plot and the other farmers keep their oil palm 
plots. Hence, in total two diversified plots are planted and a maximum amount of two neighbors establish a 
diversified plot. Therefore, the threshold of three diversified plots is not met and no payments are made. Hence, 
the total income of the farmers who have established a diversified plot is 50 points and the farmers who have 
established a pure oil palm plot is 100 points.  
Apart from this program that was newly introduced in the region, everything remains the same. You still need to 
decide whether and how many diversified plots to establish in your oil palm plantation. Depending on your 
decision, your plantation generates a certain income as explained to you before. Also, as explained before, your 
decision and the decisions of the other group members determine whether environmental benefits are generated 
and the amount of donations made to Burung Indonesia. What is new now, is that your decision and the decisions 
of the other group members also determine whether farmers in your group who plant trees receive compensation 
payments.  
Again, you can see how much you earn in each round using the earning table, which we now distribute. [Please 
distribute the earning table called Treatment 3.1 and take the old earning sheets with you]. Again, the first column 
indicates the number of diversified plots established by the other group members (cell (3) from your information 
sheet) and the following columns indicate the number of diversified plot that you chose to establish (cell (1) from 
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your information sheet). Where row and column intersect you find your earning in that round (enter this value in 
cell (5) of your information sheet). This earning already includes the payment made by the program, in case the 
total number of diversified plots established by your group is at least three. Please take some minutes to familiarize 
yourself with the tables.  
Are there any questions? If yes, please raise your hand and we will come to you. If not, then we will distribute 
again the decision sheets. As before, please do not talk to each other and also don’t show your decisions to the 
other members of your group. We will resume the activity now.  
Please interrupt the respondent after five rounds again.  
[Please show poster that represents Treatment 3.2.] 
Now a new program has been implemented in the region. Now, each farmer who established a diversified plot will 
receive 30 points if at least three diversified plots are established in the group. The change in payment is not linked 
to your behavior but purely attributable to internal budget changes of the program. We will now distribute the new 
earning tables [Please distribute the earning tables 3.2 to the farmers and take the old one with you]. The earning 
shown in the table includes already the payment made by the program, in case at least three diversified plots are 
planted in your group. Please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the new table. Everything else remains 
the same as before in the activity.  [please wait until the farmers look up again]. Any questions? If not, then we 
will resume the activity  
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